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ABSTRACT
In the history of republican China, Hu Han-min played an 
important role both in its political affairs and in its intellec­
tual life. This study concentrates on Hu’s political and social 
thought, with the emphasis on the period from 1919 to 1927.
From the time he joined Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist movement in 
1905, until his death in 1936, Hu devoted his intellectual 
energies to the study of the varieties of western socialism.
In 1919 he wrote an important series of articles for the Shanghai 
periodical Chien-she on the materialist conception of history. 
This represented one of the first comprehensive discussions of 
this aspect of Marxism to be presented in China. Hu followed 
with articles interpreting Chinese cultural and social history 
through the application of historical materialism.
During the 1920s, Hu was concerned primarily with political 
activities. This was the time of the United Front between Sun’s 
nationalist party, the Kuomintang, and the recently founded 
Chinese Communist Party. Hu initially supported this alliance 
for the Soviet support that it brought the Kuomintang. However, 
he altered this position because growing Soviet influence in 
China threatened the nationalist movement, and because the 
Chinese Communist Party threatened rural China with social 
revolution. As a result, Hu took a prominent part in bringing 
about the termination of the United Front.
H u ’s hostility to the Communist Party did not imply a simi­
lar attitude towards Marxist theory, Hu maintained an interest 
in it. His main work in the last years of his life lay in 
building Sun Yat-sen’s theories into a system which was capable 
of counteracting Marxism. The results of this venture were 
mixed, but H u ’s exposition of Sun Yat-senism reveals much about 
the strengths and weaknesses of Kuomintang doctrine.
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CHAPTER X
COMMITMENT TO THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION
The Intellectual Career of Hu Han-min:
An Introduction
The lifetime of the Chinese political activist and thinker 
Hu Han-min fell during one of the most critical periods in the 
history of China. Born in 1879 Hu came of age in the last years 
of the nineteenth century, a time when China was experiencing 
attacks on its traditional culture of an intensity and nature 
never before experienced. In those years the last illusions 
held by the imperial government that it could ignore the West 
were dispelled. Then, in 1911, came the disintegration of that 
political system. This was followed within a few years by the 
virtual fragmentation of the nation itself. At the same time 
the age-old Confucian social system which had been the underpinning 
of the imperial order finally fell victim to the repeated critical 
assaults directed at it, perishing ultimately because it was 
basically irrelevant to the modern age. The question which faced 
the men of Hu ’s generation was what should replace the former 
Confucian social and political structure. Until his death in 
1936 Hu grappled with this fundamental problem of how to construct 
a strong, unified and socially just nation.
It was evident to Hu, and to many of his contemporaries, 
that there was no way in which the old culture could be revitalized
7
8to contend with the pressures of the industrialized West. The 
quest then became one of finding the route that would guarantee 
the attainment of national ''wealth and power." Outright 
westernization presented itself as a possibility— the antithesis 
of Confucian restorationism— but it was equally untenable, and 
appealed only to a few. In fact, even this concept was a mirage, 
since the West was not a single entity, but a complex of national 
cultures, and different strains within those cultures. The 
answer, it seemed, lay in the selection of certain aspects of 
western culture, and the adaptation of these to Chinese conditions. 
But even if there were agreement on this point, the way out of 
the morass was not an easy one to find. Western ideas, regardless 
of their appropriateness, had to be translated into a political 
idiom which removed Chinese cultural resistance to them. For 
all these reasons, the formulation of a political ideology that 
would rescue the Chinese nation often proved to be a frustrating 
intellectual struggle, not only for Hu Han-min, but for all of 
his political contemporaries.
Although the men of this period offered many different 
solutions to China’s ills, all of them responded to the one 
fundamental emotional force of nationalism. In the life of Hu 
Han-min this is a constant, from his study of the anti-Manchu 
patriotic writers as a youth, to his unwavering opposition to 
Japanese aggression during his last years. Hu was certainly 
prepared to accept on his own terms much of what the western 
world had to offer China. However, the forceful imposition on 
China of any foreign political or cultural system brought at
9once to the surface Hu's uncompromising sense of nationalism.
Hu was faced with the task of finding a political ideology which 
would secure the elusive unity, and liberate the national energies 
necessary to produce a strong China. He believed he had found 
this in the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, and these he later attempted 
to develop into a more cohesive and satisfying political philo­
sophy. Sun's ideas ultimately proved inapplicable to China, it 
is true, but the reasons for their failure explain much about 
the inadequacy of social reformism in solving the problems of 
twentieth century China.
In order to make a fair assessment of the political thought 
of Hu Han-min, it is necessary to note that Hu was as important 
a figure in the political history of republican China as he was 
in its partisan ideological history. His first commitment always 
was to politics. However, the continual demands of his intense 
political life imposed certain restrictions on the organic 
development of his thought. H u ’s considerable intellectual 
activity actually was concentrated into periods of enforced 
retirement brought about by unfavourable turns in his political 
fortunes. In his life three important periods of creative 
intellectual work may be singled out, as well as a final one 
that might be seen as an epilogue to his career. From 1905 to 
1907 Hu wrote extensively for the T'ung-meng Hui publication, 
Min-pao (The People's Report), in which he attacked the Manchus 
and their defenders, and outlined and elaborated on Sun Yat-sen's 
early ideas on social reform. Over the year from mid-1919 to 
mid-1920 Hu contributed his most important and valuable work to
10
the Kuomintang journal, Chien-she (The Construction). The essays 
written at this time surveyed Marx’s theory of historical materialism, 
and attempted to utilize it in reinterpreting the Chinese past.
The third period of intense intellectual productivity was that of 
1927-1928. This followed immediately upon the breakup of the 
United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist 
Party. Hu presented a critique of the Communist Party and of 
Marxism, while trying to build a more sophisticated theoretical 
structure for Sun Yat-sen’s theories. Finally, in the years from 
1933 to 1935, when Hu was a political exile living outside China, 
he wrote at great length on current Chinese political questions. 
However, in this period, little of theoretical interest was created;
Hu confined himself to repeating and emphasizing the ideas of Sun 
Yat-sen and his own expositions of them.
The topical focus of this study of Hu Han-min is his perception 
of three related intellectual importations from the West: socialism, 
Marxism and Communism, all forms of the collectivism that Hu Han-min 
and his mentor, Sun Yat-sen, held to be fundamental to their political 
philosophy, Hu's fascination with these ideas is a motif that runs 
through his thought from 1905 until the time of his death. Since 
Hu was also a political activist, he realized that it was necessary 
to find a political mechanism if any socialist ideals were to be 
realized. It can be argued that it was the long years of political 
frustration rather than a sustained process of intellectual 
deduction that led Hu to embrace the Leninist model of party 
organization in the 1920s. This departure confronted Hu with a 
new problem. Although the alliance with the Chinese Communist
11
Party provided the Kuomintang with a highly useful political 
apparatus for stimulating mass participation in the nationalist 
revolutionary movement, it was bought at the price of Russian 
involvement in Chinese affairs. This conflicted with the one 
value that was-always decisive in H u ’s political system, his 
nationalism. As a result, he demanded the termination of the 
alliance with the Soviet Union, and the eradication of the Chinese 
Communist Party. However, the position that Hu took towards the 
Communist Party, whether in its Russian or Chinese form, did not 
carry in its wake a complete rejection of Marxism. Through all 
of his ensuing writings there is obvious a lingering intellectual 
fascination with Marx, and especially with the theory of historical 
materialism.
From this brief survey of Hu's life it is apparent that in 
making a study of the substance of H u ’s thought, and in tracing 
its evolution, it is necessary to bear in mind the record of Hu's 
political activities. In the years prior to 1919 Hu gained much 
practical experience from his work with Sun Yat-sen. In particular, 
he came to realize that the success of the revolutionary movement 
depended on an effectively organized political party. The hard 
and frustrating struggles of these years profoundly shaped the 
course of H u ’s intellectual and political life in the vital decade 
that began in 1919.
Early Years and Formative Influences
The main source of the early life of Hu Han-min is his auto­
biography, a terse account written about 1915 when he was in his
12
thirties.^ The narrative focuses primarily on the first decade
of the century, when Hu became involved in conspiratorial
activities designed to overthrow the ruling Manchu dynasty.
Very little space is devoted to recounting his early years.
When mention is made of them, it is done so in a highly impersonal
manner, illustrating well Benjamin Schwartz’ comment that "the
biographical tradition of China does not dwell on the psychological
2
subtleties of childhood,” It is possible to glean a few facts
from this period, however, and these should be put on record at
the outset, before the formative political influences on H u ’s
3
youth are described.
Hu Han-min was born near Canton on December 9, 1879. His 
given name was Yen-kuan, which he altered to Yen-hung. When he 
came of age at twenty-one, he adopted the formal name (tzu) of 
Chan-t’ang, by which he is sometimes referred to in later life. 
Han-min, the name most readily associated with him, was a pseudonym 
meaning "The Chinese People,” which he assumed in Japan in 1905. 
Sometime later Hu acquired a literary name (hao), under which he 
published several collections of poems. H u ’s pen-name, Pu-k’uei 
shih chu, was drawn from a passage in the Shih Ching (The Book 
of Odes), and translates literally as "The Master of the Studio 
of Ever-filial Piety. This name should not be interpreted as 
evidence of some latent affection on H u ’s part for the Confucian 
system of social relationships. It was simply a token of the 
dedication that he felt throughout his life to the memory of 
the parents he lost in his youth.
Although Hu Han-min was born and raised near Canton, he was
13
Cantonese only by accident of birth. On both sides of his family 
he was of Kiangsi descent. His grandfather, Hu Hsieh-san, was a 
government clerk who had moved the family home to Canton in the 
course of his work. He had married his son Wen-chao to a daughter 
of a Kiangsi family of some local prominence, and this couple 
became parents to a family of seven children, Hu Wen-chao, like 
his father, was a low-level government functionary, who served 
as a clerk in the judicial branch of the local (hsien) admini­
stration. This position on the periphery of the world of 
officialdom ensured a certain degree of security, though only a 
limited income. The large family put a strain on this, and Hu 
later recalled with evident pride how his "hard-working and frugal" 
mother coped with such a demanding life."*
If H u ’s early years were characterized by difficult economic 
circumstances, there was one advantage that his background gave 
him over the vast mass of the Chinese people. The tradition of 
literacy and government service in his family provided him with 
the home environment and the means of sustenance necessary for 
him to embark on a classical education. For a child growing up 
in the 1880s and 1890s the traditional examination system still 
offered the only guaranteed access to a respectable and perhaps 
profitable career. As a young student Hu revealed the powers of 
memory and concentration that characterized him throughout his 
life. In his autobiography he recalled that by the age of ten or 
eleven he had read the thirteen classics and could recite several 
thousand characters daily from them. He would have gone on to 
try the examinations had his father not died suddenly in the fall
14
of 1891. Hu now had to study on his own. Then in 1893, when he 
was only fourteen, his mother died. In order to support the 
younger children Hu and his older brother became tutors for the 
next few years, and H u ’s examination plans were temporarily 
postponed.^
These years in the 1890s probably were the most difficult
in Hu ’s life. The death of his parents affected him very deeply.
In his autobiography Hu expressed his profound respect for them,
and stated that his father's "probity and integrity" had made an
indelible impression on him. Hu also remarked that his father
had regarded him highly when he was a boy because of the great
7
powers of memory that he brought to his studies. One might 
speculate that Hu's lifelong studiousness and intellectual curi­
osity were an outcome of the strong bond that had been’formed 
between his father and himself. Whether or not this is true,
Hu definitely felt an obligation to realize his parents' 
expectations, and this feeling he gave public expression to in 
his choice of literary name. The loss of his parents was not all 
that Hu suffered during these years. Four of the younger members 
of the family died, leaving Hu with only his eldest brother, 
Ch'ing-jui, and youngest sister, Ning-ytian. Some thirty years 
later Hu stated that these repeated losses had left him in a severe 
state of depression. This only began to lift when he was about 
twenty-one. The principal cause of this, Hu said, was his growing 
emotional and intellectual absorption in the current political
g
problems facing China.
This turning to political interests did not mark a completely
15
unexpected development on H u ’s part, -It had been expedited by his
employment on the Canton reformist newspaper, the Ling-hai pao,
which his brother edited. H u ’s political consciousness also had
been prepared by his reading of the Ming loyalist writers Wang
Fu-chih and Ku Yen-wu. From these men Hu said he had come to
understand that ’’the subjugation of China by an alien race, the
9
Manchus, was something beyond all reason." But what drove home 
the illegitimacy of the Manchu claim to the imperial mandate was 
not so much nationalist theory but the dismally ineffective record 
of the government in preserving China against the foreign threat. 
Probably there has been no period in China’s modern history equal 
in effect to the six years from 1894 to 1900. In this brief time 
the general mood of the nation’s political "class" shifted from 
complacency to despair about the prospects of national survival. 
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 brought disgrace on the nation 
because of the derisory treatment meted out to China by a country 
long felt to be her inferior. This feeling of humiliation was 
felt especially by the young. In Hu's words, the defeat in the 
war meant that "the Ch’ing court could no longer conceal its 
rottenness and impotence . "^
As >.a consequence of the war the western powers demanded 
military bases and further commercial privileges in order to 
restore their position against that of the suddenly emergent 
Japanese. This led to the "scramble for concessions" in 1897- 
1898. In the space of a few months the imperial government 
handed away leaseholds and zones of economic penetration to 
Russia, Germany, France and Britain, For many this seemed to
16
portend the imminent partition of China, when the empire would
be "carved up like a melon." It was this sense of impending
disaster that brought about the "hundred days of reform" in the
summer of 1898. Although this episode also represented an attempt
by the young emperor to assert himself politically against the
Empress Dowager, it was motivated more by a desperate hope that
China could be modernized and strengthened overnight by the
promulgation of a host of western style reforms. Guiding the
emperor in this attempt was a small group of heterodox Confucian
scholars led by K ’ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and T ’an Ssu-t’ung.
According to H u ’s later account, he was impressed at the time by
the reform group, and welcomed their efforts to introduce change
11
into the traditional system. However, the "hundred days" soon 
ran into the vested interests of traditional officialdom, and in 
September a palace coup d'etat restored the Empress Dowager and 
the most conservative of her followers to power.
The domination of the government by the most obscurantist 
Manchu and Chinese bureaucrats led directly to the Boxer rebellion. 
In the course of this century it has become obvious that this 
was an event of overwhelming significance in the history of 
modern China, At the time it produced no less important an effect 
on those who were young and politically aware. The willingness 
of the imperial government to tolerate, and then sponsor, the 
disorganized bands of Boxer rebels in their wild attempt to drive 
out the western imperialists indicated not only the hopeless 
incompetence of the Manchus, but also the world of unreality they 
inhabited at this desperate moment in China’s history. The easy
17
suppression of the Boxers by the Japanese and the western powers,
and the imposition of a staggering indemnity on the Chinese
government seemed to threaten the imminent bankruptcy of the
nation, and its ipossible political disintegration as well. For
many of the politically articulate in China the Boxer rebellion
was a watershed in the development of their disillusionment with
12
the Manchus, and ultimately the imperial institution.
The record of the Manchu government, and Hu’s response to
it, are both easy to assess. The significance of the Boxers
themselves in the history of modern China is a more problematical
question. Hu gave it some consideration in his autobiography.
This section was written later, probably in the 1920s, and inserted
in the earlier text, an indication perhaps of a growing recognition
on his part of the importance of the Boxers. He characterized the
movement in this way:"^
The Boxer Rebellion not only had an influence on the Ch’ing 
government itself but on both China and the world at large, 
and its effect was felt even in the 1911 Revolution. The 
general motive behind it was that of driving out the 
foreigners— it was a reaction to the oppressions of the 
Great Powers— but its specific character was extremely 
complicated. It included peasants, secret society members, 
princes of the Ch’ing house and reactionary bureaucrats.
Hu then went on to describe how the missionaries and merchants
of the foreign powers had disrupted China’s traditional economy
and social patterns, especially in the north. The acquisition
of concessions and spheres of influence threatened the very
existence of the country as a political unit. These pressures
had brought about the great explosion of 1900. Hu made the
14
following judgement about the events of that year:
18
The expression of nationalist ideas among the peasantry was 
of the greatest value in the forward movement of revolutionary 
history. . . . However, the major weakness of the Boxer 
Society, and the cause thereby of its complete failure, lay 
in the leadership. The secret society chieftains were totally 
without political intelligence, and relied on the coarsest 
type of superstition as their weapons. . , , Revolutionary 
ideas are to liberate and transform; those of the Boxers lay 
in the ignorant restoration of the past. The two were . . . 
completely different. But both movements arose from the 
common ground of resistance to imperialist aggression.
(Emphasis added.)
These remarks are of more than usual interest, because of 
their similarity in tone to the evaluation of the Boxers made in 
1924 by H u ’s noted contemporary, Ch’en Tu-hsiu. Ch’en defended 
the Boxers against the charge of xenophobia, and stated that they 
were in fact representative of the great mass of the Chinese people, 
and not simply a deluded minority sect. To him the Boxer rebellion 
constituted "the great and tragic prologue” to the Chinese national 
revolution. It should be noted, though, that Ch’en’s views had 
gone through an evolution. In a 1918 article, written while he 
was still a champion of western liberalism and science, Ch’en 
disparaged the Boxers for treading "the dark path of superstition 
and theocracy.” In contrast to Ch’en, Hu seems to have grasped 
more directly the contradictory nature of the Boxer movement.
This may have been because Hu never went through a period of 
outright westernization, although it is certainly true that he 
was highly critical of traditional China. Thus, it may be argued 
that he never felt constrained to reject entirely that which at 
first glance may have seemed to be backward and irrational in 
his culture. This enabled Hu to view the Boxers as representative 
of both the shortcomings of the traditional peasant rebellion,
19
and the newly developing nationalist longings of the twentieth 
15century.
Since these comments on the Boxer rebellion were written 
some years after the event it cannot be said with any certainty 
how many of its long-range implications Hu grasped in 1900. About 
his immediate feelings towards the Manchu government there is no 
doubt. Hu singles out in his autobiography a personal incident 
from that year that was of great importance in directing him into 
the revolutionary path. This concerned a young man by the name 
of Shih Chien-ju, who met his death in an abortive attempt to 
assassinate the governor of Kwangtung. Shih was a member of the 
Hsing-chung Hui (The Revive China Society), the revolutionary 
organization that had been founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1894. Sun’s 
name had come to the attention of Hu the following year through 
western missionaries, but did not make any imprint on him at the 
time. Now, as a result of H u ’s close friendship with Shih 
Chien-ju’s brother, this revolutionary organization, and the world 
of anti-Manchu revolutionary activity, were brought home directly 
to Hu. Years later Hu paid homage to the example of revolutionary 
dedication that Shih had set for him at that time.*^
As a result of his growing political radicalism Hu decided 
that he had to go abroad to study in a freer and more vigorous 
intellectual climate. For most young Chinese this meant Japan, 
not only because that nation seemed to possess superficial 
similarities in language and culture, but more because Japan 
stood out as a model to those who sought to reform and modernize 
China. In order to undertake this programme of study Hu needed
20
money. He set about raising these funds in an imaginative if 
illegal way. He decided to hire himself out to take the exami­
nations on behalf of a wealthy patron. Since his experience as 
a journalist did not act as a suitable recommendation of his 
talents, he tried the chu-jen examination in 1900, and achieved
the degree. The next year he acted as a substitute in the lower
17
level preliminary examinations. This whole episode would have 
only anecdotal interest if it were not for the impressive level 
of achievement implied by winning the provincial degree, and at 
the early age of twenty-one as well. The traditional examination 
system made little allowance for independent thought, but it 
demanded a formidably literal knowledge of the Confucian classics. 
Because of this, Hu carried with him throughout his life a 
familiarity with the ancient culture which was denied to many of 
his later revolutionary compatriots.
With his financial problems settled, Hu set off for Japan 
in June 1902. He enrolled at the Kobun Institute in Tokyo, a 
school set up by the Japanese specifically for the growing Chinese 
student community. It offered courses in subjects such as law, 
political science and teacher training. H u ’s stay in Japan was 
short-lived, however, as he soon became involved in a dispute 
between the Chinese ambassador and Wu Chih-hui, a somewhat older 
man who had become a leading figure among the Chinese students. 
Because of his political activities, Wu had been expelled by 
Tokyo at the request of the Chinese government, Hu tried to 
convince the Kwangtung student association to mount a general 
withdrawal from school to show support for Wu. This attempt at
21
mass organization met with failure. Hu left on his own, and
18
returned to Canton.
After his return to his home city Hu served briefly as
general editor of the Ling-hai pao. This paper had moved to a
more radical position than the one it had held in 1898. Before
long Hu came under suspicion as a possible revolutionary and
was forced to leave Canton. He went to Kwangsi in early 1903,
where he taught ethics and literature at the Wuchow middle school.
According to his own description Hu also instructed the students
in "the need for a national revolution." It is not surprising,
then, that Hu’s activities brought down on his head the wrath of
the local gentry, and that he was compelled to resign. Looking
back later on his experiences at Wuchow, Hu said he felt a sense
of pride in the fact that most of the Kwangsi participants in the
191911 Revolution had been former students of his. When he 
arrived back in Canton he found a large group of students prepar­
ing to leave for’Japan to register at the Tokyo Law College. 
Hearing that the atmosphere in Tokyo had become an exciting one, 
with many radical organizations flourishing, Hu decided to join 
the group. In late 1904 Hu left on his second journey to Japan.
Dedication to the T ’ung-meng Hui
On August 20, 1905 there occurred the event which would 
provide Hu with the political mission that he had been searching 
for over the previous several years. This was the founding of 
the T ’ung-meng Hui, the "Alliance Society," which merged the 
different Chinese revolutionary groups in Tokyo into a common
22
organization under the directorship of Sun Yat-sen. Hu was absent
in Canton at the time of the inaugural meeting. Shortly after,
he returned to Tokyo where he was invited to the home of a fellow
student, Liang Chung-k’ai, in order to meet Sun. At this initial
encounter both young men were won over at once by Sun’s personal
magnetism and revolutionary optimism. Together with their wives
20they took the oath of allegiance to Sun and the T'ung-meng Hui,
Once he joined the organization, Hu rose quickly. He was
named a member of the principal committee at headquarters, and
soon after became secretary to the party. These posts brought him
into almost daily contact with Sun. Hu's specific responsibilities
concerned the organizational development of the party, and the
21propagation of Sun’s political and social ideas. With his 
classical education and journalistic background, he was particu­
larly well suited to this latter task. When the party journal,
Min-pao (The People’s Report), was founded in November 1905, Hu
22
was appointed principal editor. In this capacity, he drafted
the T ’ung-meng Hui's most famous anti-Manchu declaration, "The
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Six Great Principles of the Min-Pao." After editing the first 
five issues, Hu returned to fulltime political work in mid-1906, 
relinquishing the editorship to Chang Ping-lin. However, he 
continued to write, and in the course of the ensuing half-year he 
contributed several important articles to the journal. These 
articles were prompted by the vehement attacks being launched on 
Sun’s political and social policies in Hsin-min ts’ung-pao (The 
Renovation of the People), the newspaper of Liang Ch’i-ch'ao's 
Constitutionalist group. H u ’s discussion of Sun's programme of 
social reform will be examined in chapter II. As a result of his
23
political and journalistic activities, Hu's reputation began to 
spread. This received the most direct confirmation towards the
2 Aend of 1906 when the Manchu government put a price on his head.
The year 1906 also was the occasion of H u ’s graduation from
his two-year programme at the Tokyo Law College. This had given
him an introductory knowledge of western law and politics, and
25
more important, a thorough familiarity with Japanese. Command
of this language opened up to Hu the many western works that were
being translated into it at this time. With the completion of
his degree, and his release from editorial duties at Min-pao, Hu
was able to devote himself largely to party organization. His
new responsibilities did not last long. In March 1907, Sun Yat-
sen was expelled from Japan at the instigation of the Chinese
government, though the Japanese, hedging their bets on the
26future, sent him off with a donation to his cause. Hu followed 
his leader into a life of ceaseless conspiratorial activity, 
which sought to ignite the anti-Manchu revolution from China's 
south-east periphery.
The expulsion of Sun had a highly disruptive effect on the 
fortunes of the party. It had now lost its headquarters in 
Tokyo, with the result that the centre of gravity followed Sun's 
movements about south-east Asia. Problems of discipline and 
organization became endemic in the T'ung-meng Hui, and these 
contributed greatly to the repeated failures of its attempts to 
ignite revolutionary uprisings. Sun had no sooner left Tokyo 
in 1907 when a split appeared, initiate by Chang Ping-lin and 
some of the members left behind there. They took exception to
24
Sun’s monopolization of party funds, and less pointedly, to his
general leadership of the party. Their attacks on Sun were
brought to an end, but they left a residue of bad feeling between
27Chang and the Sun group.
Hu's movements about south-east Asia and his conspiratorial
activities form an extremely complicated chapter, one whose
detailed consideration belongs first of all to the narrative of
T 1ung-meng Hui history. The confused chronicle of his life from
1907 to 1911 may be divided into four periods of revolutionary
work, each of these centring for about one year on a city that
28happened to be the base of operations at the time. Hanoi in
1907, Singapore in 1908, Hong Kong in 1909, and Singapore again
in 1910 were the main points in his revolutionary travels during
these years. The reason for drawing attention to this four-fold
division of Hu's activities is not simply one of convenience,
though. Edward Friedman has characterized the T'ung-meng Hui as
"Blanquist" because of the obsessive conviction of its members
that the Manchus could be overthrown through conspiratorial
29putschist activities. There certainly is truth in this as a 
general chracterization of the T'ung-meng Hui strategy. However, 
in the course of Sun's "ten unsuccessful revolutionary attempts" 
there was a measure of development in his organization's approach 
to military and political strategy. In the case of Hu Han-min, 
it is apparent that the experiences of these years produced a 
growing awareness of the vital importance to the revolutionary 
cause of a highly disciplined and dedicated political party.
At the outset, the T'ung-meng Hui military strategy consisted
25
of little more than raids on random border points in Kwangtung
and Kwangsi. Between May and September 1907 three small-scale
uprisings organized from Hanoi were suppressed with relative
ease by the imperial forces. In December allies of the T ’ung-
meng Hui captured the government fort at Chen-nan-kuan, which
guarded a frontier pass on the Kwangsi border. This was located
close to the Annam-Kwangsi railway, but was otherwise far from
any place of importance. Sun and Hu made their way to the scene
of the uprising, but were forced to flee when government troops
arrived and quickly reclaimed the fort. This happened to be the
only occasion during these years in which either Sun or Hu was
involved in actual fighting. When the two men returned to Hanoi
they were expelled because of pressure exerted on the French by
Peking. Sun left in March 1908, and after some difficulties Hu
30found his way out of Singapore.
The next revolutionary venture was also staged at a small, 
isolated border town. In April 1908 an uprising was organized 
at Hokow, which was located on the frontier between Yunnan and 
Annam. One of the special characteristics of this revolt was 
the T Tung-meng Hui’s reliance on secret societies. These quickly 
proved to be the most unreliable of allies, lacking discipline 
in the face of government troops, and totally bereft of under-
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standing of the political goals of the revolutionary movement. 
Largely as a result of the Hokow revolt Hu began to experience 
serious doubts about the value of secret societies to the party’s 
cause. He told Sun that organizational work ought to be directed 
toward the official government forces. Sun rejected this advice
26
for the time, since he thought the regular troops would be too
difficult to manage. He also felt that the numerous uprisings,
failures that they might be, still constituted "the seeds of
success." He was prepared to continue to work with local secret
societies, or any group that he could rally to his banner. In
contrast to Sun's romanticism, Hu seems at this early stage to
have realized the futility of trying to adapt traditional means
32
of protest to a modern revolutionary cause.
During his time in Singapore Hu devoted his energies to a
combination of journalistic, organizational and fund-raising
activities. He became the director of the local branch of the
T'ung-meng Hui. He also worked on the party newspaper Chung-
hsing jih-pao (The China Revival Daily News). Along with Wang
Ching-wei, Hu attempted to raise the low level of political
consciousness of the overseas Chinese. According to Hu's
observation, their primitive, tribal society filled them with a
superstitious reverence for the imperial institution, and this
made them easy victims of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's reformist party. Hu
believed that the overseas Chinese needed their sense of racial
identity stimulated if they were to participate vigorously In
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the struggle against the Manchus. During his stay in Singapore 
Hu had ample opportunity for contact with his fellow countrymen, 
as he spent much of his time in Malaya and Thailand raising funds 
and spreading Sun's ideas among the Chinese communities.
At this time Hu published a major attack on the scheme 
proposed by the Manchus for the gradual introduction into China 
of constitutional government. In October 1908 his article,
27
"AlasI The Manchus’ so-called Constitutional Outline," continued 
the same basic line of argument that had been employed in Min-pao. 
Hu attacked the Manchus as racially unfit to rule China, and 
incapable of implementing any genuine reform. The constitution 
was nothing but a stratagem by which the Manchus intended to 
swindle the Chinese people, since it set out to restore to the 
central government the financial and military power that the 
Manchus had lost over the preceding half century. Hu concluded 
by stating that the Manchus had been forced to take notice of 
the western ideas gaining currency in China, Thus they utilized 
this new kind of constitutional vocabulary. However, their real 
intentions with regard to the Chinese people remained as evil 
and despotic as ever.*^
In the spring of 1909 Sun departed on a trip to Europe 
to tap potential support there. Hu went to Hong Kong, which 
became his third centre of operations during these years. Plans 
were developed that marked a notable strategic step forward from 
the simplistically conceived Hokow uprising. The units of the 
New Army stationed in Canton were to be made the object of 
T ’ung-meng Hui infiltration. Hu acted as director of the Hong 
Kong branch of the party in this operation. Preparations toward 
an uprising in February 1910 appeared to be going well. Then, 
by accident, news of the plot became known, and a hastily staged 
outbreak was put down with considerable loss of life. This 
defeat came as a great blow to Hu, not only because of the time, 
men and cost expended, but because the conspiracy had brought 
about the first penetration of government troops, the course of
28
35action favoured by Hu over the two previous years.
With this failure Hu returned to Singapore in March 1910,
and made it his base for rebuilding the depleted party treasury.
One significant gain that was made at this time, though, was
the cooperation offered by the talented revolutionary leader,
Huang Hsing. In a later assessment of the events of this period,
Hu stated that Huang’s formulation "outlined the steps and laid
36
down the strategy of the subsequent revolutionary actions."
This strategy continued the policy of infiltration of the New 
Army, but went one significant step further. The army would now 
be used as the base for seizing the city of Canton, which in turn 
would become the focal point of the rebellion. To build towards 
this, Hu set off through south-east Asia, while Sun departed 
for North America. All this activity soon made the Manchu govern­
ment aware that another revolutionary attempt was being planned 
for Kwangtung. When the revolt that later became known as the 
Huang-hua-kang Uprising broke out on April 27, 1911 the Manchus 
were prepared. The revolt was soon suppressed, and both Hu and 
Huang Hsing were fortunate to escape with their lives. The 
largest offensive mounted by the T’ung-meng Hui had failed, but 
this defeat caught the imagination of people in a way that the 
many earlier attempts had not. A few years later Hu wrote in
his autobiography the following sympathetic and just appraisal
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of this final T'ung-meng Hui uprising:
It was a moving event at the time; years have passed, and 
it is still a moving memory today. As a consequence of it 
the Manchu court was shaken, and the people acquired the 
will to brave all. It was a call to the Wuchang Uprising 
. . . .  Therefore, in the whole balance of the revolution,
29
it can be said that although the upheaval of April 27 
failed, its effect was one hundred times greater than the 
successful realization of its immediate goal would have 
been.
After the collapse of the Huang-hua-kang revolt the T ’ung- 
meng Hui membership found itself for the moment in a dispirited 
and disorganized state. Hu set off for Singapore on another 
round of preparing for the success that never seemed to come.
He was in Saigon when it finally did arrive in the form of the 
unexpected Wuchang revolt of October 10, 1911. Ironically, that 
outbreak owed virtually nothing to the efforts of the T ’ung-meng 
Hui. The momentum of the revolution passed outside the control 
of the movement that had dedicated its whole existence to the 
achievement of political power. The unheralded despatch of the 
fatal blow to the Manchus was displayed plainly by Sun Yat-sen’s 
absence in America at the time. Hu Han-min was closer to the 
scene of these great events, and in late October he left for 
Canton. For a period of a year and a half Hu was taken out of 
the peripatetic life of a revolutionary conspirator, and brought 
into the exercise of actual political power.
The Frustrations of the Republic
The first weeks of the new republic seemed to open auspi­
ciously for the leaders of the T ’ung-meng Hui. Hu Han-min’s own 
reputation as a famous revolutionary was soon attested to in his 
home province of Kwangtung. On November 9 an assembly composed 
largely of members of the Canton merchant community elected Hu 
military governor. This was immediately confirmed by the
30
Provincial Assembly, the gentry-dominated advisory body that had
been created by the Manchus. Three days later Hu reached Canton
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to take up his post. However, his tenure as governor proved 
to be very short-lived because of the demands of the national 
political scene.
On December 21 Sun Yat-sen arrived in Hong Kong on his 
return from America. Sun was determined to go on to Nanking to 
establish a provisional national government there. Hu and Liao 
Chung-k!ai disagreed with this policy, and recommended that Sun 
remain in Canton until he had consolidated his military and 
political strength. To proceed to Nanking would place Sun in a 
relatively defenceless position against both the Manchus and 
their powerful and politically ambitious general, Y\ian Shih-k’ai. 
Sun argued that an administration with at least national pre­
tensions was necessary as a bargaining lever to force Yuan to
topple the dynasty. More important, a newly constituted
republican government was necessary to ward off possible foreign
intervention as the imperial government disintegrated. Hu and 
Liao bowed to Sun?s opinion, and Hu resigned his position in
Canton to Ch’en Chiung-ming in order to accompany Sun to Nanking
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as his personal aide. They reached Shanghai on December 25, 
and four days later Sun was elected provisional president by a 
meeting of provincial representatives. On January 1, 1912 he 
took office in Nanking as the first president of the Republic 
of China, Hu became secretary-general to the president’s office, 
a post which made him chief executive-assistant in the new 
government.
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The seeming ease with which Sun was adopted president by 
one part of the nation disguised many splits forming within the 
T'ung-meng Hui. The first concerned the nature of the presi­
dential power, whether it was to be construed on the American 
model of strong executive authority or on the parliamentary one 
of authority being vested primarily in the premier and his 
cabinet. Both Sun and Hu supported a strong presidential power, 
basing their argument on China’s need for as much authority at 
the centre as possible. This was opposed by a section of the 
party based in Shanghai under the leadership of Sung Chiao-jen 
and Ch’en Ch'i-mei. These men favoured the parliamentary system, 
partly out of fear that Yilan Shih-k’ai would abuse his power 
should he succeed to the presidency. This group was able to 
prevail on Sun to change his mind, but the Provisional Parliament 
at Nanking refused to pass the necessary amendment and the provi­
sion for a strong presidency remained.^
A more important difference to appear within the T ’ung-meng 
Hui concerned the future form and role of the movement itself.
The birth of political freedom in China brought about a prolif­
eration of small parties vigorously representing every factional 
interest. The leaders of the T ’ung-meng Hui had to decide 
whether they should transform the movement into an open party 
which would join the parliamentary fray on the same terms as its 
competition, or whether they should preserve it as a closed 
revolutionary organization with a tightly controlled and highly 
select membership. At the party congress in March 1912 Hu took 
the position that the closed, exclusive party should be maintained.
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This clearly reflected H u ’s concern about the need for a tight 
organizational structure to ensure the success of the movement, 
a lesson he had learned from the problems experienced by the 
T ’ung-meng Hui in disciplining its membership in the pre­
revolutionary period.^
In opposition to the stand taken by Hu, the Shanghai wing 
of the party argued that the military phase of the revolution 
was now complete, and that the second stage, that of open poli­
tical activity, had been reached. This view was the one that 
prevailed. The T ’ung-meng Hui was changed into an open political 
party with a wide membership and ambitions for victory in the 
parliamentary arena. Within little more than a year this new 
political party, the Kuomintang, as the T ’ung-meng Hui was 
renamed in the summer of 1912, was under attack by Yuan Shih- 
k ’ai, and its national pretensions temporarily ended. What Hu 
never forgot about this whole debate on the form of the party 
was that whatever political effectiveness it might possess could 
only result from its limitation to a select and dedicated body 
of followers of Sun Yat-sen. The experience of the mistaken 
1912 reorganization confirmed what he had come to feel as a 
result of his earlier T ’ung-meng Hui activities, and it remained
with him as an example of what the revolutionary party must
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avoid if it ever was to gain success in China.
Shortly after the T ’ung-meng Hui transformed itself into 
an open, national institution Hu Han-min returned to the narrower, 
if more substantial, world of Cantonese provincial politics. In 
February Sun and Yuan came to an agreement by which the north
33
and south were to be reunited and Ytlan was to become president. 
Sun’s resignation from his office took effect at the beginning 
of May. From Nanking Sun and Hu proceeded on a heroic progress 
to Canton, which Sun had not visited since his youth. Sun then 
went to Shanghai, where he immersed himself in drawing up 
countless programmes for the development of China. Hu remained 
in Canton, where he resumed the governorship surrendered to him 
voluntarily by Ch'en Chiung-ming. At this point H u ’s autobiog­
raphy breaks off, but it is possible to reconstruct his life
/ Q
over the next few years from other sources. To some extent 
the record of these years remains fragmentary and disjointed.
This is due, however, not so much to the lack of documentation 
as it is to the haphazard life that political events in China 
forced Hu to lead.
H u ’s second term as governor of Kwangtung lasted from April 
1912 to June 1913. Conflict with Peking was endemic over the 
respective areas of national and provincial jurisdiction. Hu 
also found himself in a struggle with the gentry-dominated 
Kwangtung provisional assembly over the extent of his executive 
powers. Hu claimed that the assembly possessed only a consulta­
tion function in view of its undemocratic nature. In turn the
A Aassembly attempted to impeach Hu, This struggle, which was 
an indication of the problems faced by executive authority in 
China at that time, went unresolved during Hu’s governorship.
One interesting aspect of H u ’s tenure as governor was the 
effort made to introduce Sun’s equalization of land rights into 
the Kwangtung countryside. Perhaps inspired by a visit to Canton
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by Sun himself, the provisional assembly supported the executive
in implementing the first stage of the plan in June 1912. This
involved the determination of the current value of all land, an
assessment which was to be made by the owner. New title deeds
incorporating this value would then be issued by the province.
This stage was never completed. It took more than the six months
originally allotted to it because of the high degree of absentee
land ownership in Kwangtung. With the removal of Hu Han-min and
the Kuomintang from office in 1913 the whole scheme came to an 
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end.
In other areas the Kwangtung government was forced to take
a more conservative approach to the problems besetting it. To
bring about a recovery from a period of severe inflation at the
time of the revolution, it was necessary to impose a programme
of financial austerity. This restored the value of the province's
paper money, and regained the confidence of the merchant's
community, but at the usual price of a reduction in social 
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measures. The government also was faced with a general break­
down of law and order in some of the rural areas of the province. 
The existence there of bandit groups was compounded by the dis­
bandment of the peasant armies formed at the time of the 1911 
revolution, since the unemployed troops frequently found their 
way into banditry. Disbandment and financial retrenchment had 
begun under Gh'en Chiung-ming, and Hu continued these policies 
without hesitation. In May 1912 he gave the order for the 
destruction of these bands of liu-min. The repression was 
severe, though it was recorded that by the fall western Kwangtung
35
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had returned to calm at last.
In other less immediately contentious areas Hu’s government 
attempted to effect modernizing reforms. The legal codes were 
updated with western procedures being introduced. The govern­
ment attempted to enforce provisions against footbinding.
Buddhism and Taoism came under attack because of the superstitious 
nature of their religious belief and the social parasitism of 
their religious establishments. Government supported schools 
were prohibited from teaching the classics and venerating
Confucius. In the administration itself the use of formal titles 
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was abolished. Hu Han-min tried to confront the most intract­
able governmental problem of all, the widespread existence of 
corruption. This was more than one man ever could overcome, 
but Hu did set an example of the "new administrator" in the 
honesty of his own person. Throughout his career, whether in
public office or out of it, this aspect of Hu's political and
49moral character never was challenged.
H u ’s downfall in Kwangtung came as a result of national 
rather than local causes. In December 1912 the Kuomintang won 
almost half the seats in the nation-wide elections. Yuan Shih- 
k'ai at once set about trying to fragment this bloc through 
bribery. Finally he decided to render it leaderless by arrang­
ing the assassination of its parliamentary leader, Sung Chiao- 
jen, in March 1913, The culmination of Yttan’s betrayal of the 
constitution was his unilateral negotiation of a "reorganization 
loan" from a consortium of western nations. This he arranged 
in order to free himself completely from parliamentary control.
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Hu protested against this action, and was supported by the
Kuomintang governors of Kiangsi and Anhui. Yflan's reply to this
challenge was to remove all three from office, Hu's dismissal
coming on June 14. Hu was assigned a new position, that of
"Pacification Commissioner for Tibet," but this almost derisory
gesture by YHan was immediately rejected. The Kuomintang forces
in south China then launched an attack on Yilan that became known
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as the "second revolution." Within three weeks the military 
campaign proved to be a complete failure. The Kuomintang*s 
parliamentary representation in Peking was proscribed as well.
At the end of July Sun and Hu fled to Shanghai and from there 
to Japan. Gradually all the prominent members of the T'ung-meng 
Hui reassembled in Tokyo, there to begin work again for the 
victory they thought they had won in 1911.
In analyzing the events of the recent past Sun came to the 
conclusion that the main cause for the failure of his revolu­
tionary movement was to be found in its excessively loose 
organization. To remedy this defect he reassembled his followers 
into what was planned to be a small, closed group of committed 
revolutionaries. This new organization, formed in early 1914, 
took the name the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Chung-hua ko-ming- 
t a n g ) In order to forge a sense of cohesiveness and disci­
pline within this body, Sun demanded, almost out of desperation 
it would seem, a personal oath of allegiance from every party 
member. This practice, which was one of the more noteworthy 
characteristics of the new party, was more reminiscent of a 
traditional secret society than a m o d e m  revolutionary movement.
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In addition to this, Sun also insisted on the finger-printing
of all the membership.
Hu Han-min’s activities in the Chinese Revolutionary Party
are reminiscent of those he carried out a decade earlier in the
T ’ung-meng Hui. He acted as the general editor of the party
organ, Min-kuo tsa-chih (The Republican Journal), which seems
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to have had a short history, probably for financial reasons.
At the first general meeting of the Revolutionary Party in July 
1914 Hu was placed in charge of the political bureau, the unit 
concerned primarily with anti-Yiian propaganda and activity.
Towards the end of the year, at a conference called by Sun to 
discuss revolutionary strategy in China, Hu drafted the 
regulations on military law and local government for the 
anticipated provisional government. All of this work, though, 
would have remained no more than an exercise on paper if YUan 
Shih-k’ai had not engineered his own downfall.
In the summer of 1915 YUan set up a society charged with 
the task of considering the possible reinstitution of the 
monarchy. YUan’s intention to gain the imperial throne for 
himself was patently obvious to all. Immediately opposition 
began to form throughout the country, even among those whom 
Ytlan had counted as his supporters. The one national issue which 
the 1911 revolution definitely had settled was that the empire 
had passed forever. Although YUan finally realized this, Sun 
Yat-sen had now gained further impetus for his revolutionary 
activities. From his Tokyo base Sun planned for an insurrection 
in the Lower Yangtze Valley. To finance the recruitment of
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troops Sun sent Hu on a fund-raising expedition to the Philippines
in late 1915. By the time Hu returned to Tokyo in February 1916
the anti-YUan movement in China was rapidly gaining momentum.
Hu then went on to Shanghai, where Ch’en Ch’i-mei was in charge
of the Chinese Revolutionary Party’s plans for the uprising.
Before this could be organized Ch’en was assassinated in April
by Ytlan’s henchmen. This brought to an end Sun’s "Shanghai- 
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based strategy." However, the loss of Ch’en was fatefully
avenged by Yuan1s own sudden death on June 6. This elevated
Li Yuan-hung to the presidency, and terminated, at least
temporarily, the growing state of civil war in China. Hu recounts
that he took advantage of this unexpected respite to go to
54Hangchow and enjoy the delights of the West Lake.
During the year of Li’s presidency Hu spent much of his time 
in Peking on two missions on behalf of Sun. Hu was also respon­
sible for liaison with the members of the Kuomintang parliamentary 
delegation. This had assembled in Peking in even more disorganized 
condition than at the time of its formation in 1912. Hu and other 
Kuomintang leaders were awarded honorific military ranks by Li 
Yiian-hung for their services to the Republic. However, it was 
apparent that neither Li nor his premier, Tuan Ch’i-jui, intended 
to share their powers with an independent parliamentary body.
But once again the victories Sun never seemed able to gain himself
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were brought to him by others, Li and Tuan fell out with each 
other over the question of China’s entry into the First World 
War. Tuan pushed this measure through, Li dismissed him, and 
Tuan then rallied his considerable following of generals behind
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him. Into this chaotic picture suddenly emerged Chang Hslin, an 
older retainer of the imperial family, who came to Li’s aid at 
the price of restoring the Manchu dynasty. This was enough to 
consolidate decisive support behind Tuan, who now posed as 
guardian of the republic.
Chang Hstin’s action was also sufficient to trigger off a
separatist movement in Canton. Part of the navy mutinied and
sailed there to back up an independent government dedicated
ostensibly to the protection of the constitution. A remnant of
the Peking parliament met in Canton and on September 10, 1917
elected Sun Grand Marshal of the Military Government. Hu was
named minister of communications in the new administration.
However, despite Sun’s grandiose title real power in the province
was held firmly by a clique of generals. Of the four governments
headed by Sun in his lifetime this was probably the most futile.
A reorganization of the command which demoted Sun to the position
of one of several committeemen finally proved too much even for
his energies, and he resigned in despair in May 1918. Hu gave
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up his token position and returned with Sun to Shanghai.
The failure of the Canton government marks a convenient 
point to terminate the narrative of the first phases of H u ’s 
revolutionary career, The following two years' enforced retire­
ment that Hu spent in Shanghai allowed him an opportunity for 
new intellectual explorations, a topic to be treated in chapter 
III. Moreover, the years Hu spent working with Sun from 1905 
to 1918 form a period in which futile experimentation and 
repeated failure made Hu fully aware of the inadequacies of Sun’s
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organization. But how could the party be transformed into a 
dynamic and successful instrument? The answer certainly had not 
been found by 1919, but the quest for it dominated H u ’s political 
searchings, and made him receptive to any theory that offered an 
effective vehicle for revolutionary action. At the same time 
the revolutionary party required a social message. With respect 
to Hu, it will be recalled that much of his activity on behalf 
of Sun Yat-sen’s cause consisted of routine organizational work. 
However, Hu certainly had given consideration to the social 
content of the movement when time had permitted him, the opportu­
nity for detailed study. During the two years he spent from 
1905 to 1907 working for the party publication, Min-pao, Hu 
confronted many problems concerning general socialist theory 
and its application to China. These writings constitute the 
body of H u ’s work on theoretical matters prior to 1919. An 
examination of them reveals certain underlying assumptions with 
regard to the fundamental question of social reform. These 
assumptions became fully manifest in H u ’s political thought and 
activity in the 1920s.
CHAPTER II
THE SOCIAL REFORMISM OF THE T'UNG-MENG HUI
Introduction: Hu Han-min and Min-pao
In the two years from 1905 to 1907 Hu devoted his intellec­
tual energies to the T ’ung-meng Hui journal, Min-pao. This 
organ served as the party’s principal forum for its opposition 
to the Manchus, and its advocacy of a republican government for 
China. As well as carrying out this fundamental political 
mission, Min-pao gave public expression to the ideas which the 
leader, Sun Yat-sen, had formulated on social policy. Curiously 
enough, Sun made almost no direct contributions to his party's 
journal, but he either supervised or else gave final approval 
to articles written by others. This was the case with three of 
the major statements of T ’ung-meng Hui political and social 
policy drafted by Hu: Sun’s own introductory preface of November
1905; H u ’s famous outline of the party programme, "The Six Great 
Principles of the Min-Pao” ; and his final contribution to the 
journal, "To the Denouncers of the Min-sheng-chu-i."
As a result, there exists from this time a large body of 
material signed by Hu. However, it is difficult to trace the 
evolution of H u ’s own social thought because of his role as 
the expositor of Sun’s ideas. In evaluating this early stage 
of H u ’s intellectual career, it is not possible to penetrate
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further than his official presence, apart from one or two brief 
discussions he made on matters falling outside the confines of 
party doctrine. The consequence of this impersonality is that 
it becomes necessary to deduce H u ’s political and social thought 
from the intellectual currents present in the Min-pao group, to 
which he belonged, and secondly, to present the major statements 
of party policy which, if Hu did not create, he certainly 
endorsed. The point must be borne in mind that, regardless of 
their genesis, the ideas which Hu embraced in the Min-pao 
period remained with him throughout his life as a dedicated 
follower of Sun Yat-sen's national mission.
The Min-pao Programme:
State Socialism and Land Equalization
During the time that Hu was associated with Min-pao, first 
as general editor, and then as a major contributor, there 
appeared in the journal many translations and discussions on the 
subject of western socialism. These were written by young T ’ung- 
meng Hui members such as Liao Chung-k'ai, Feng Tzu-yu, and Hu's 
very close friend, Chu Chih-hsin. Liao, who was fluent in 
English, translated a fragment of Henry George's Progress and 
Poverty under the pseudonym "Slaughter the Rich" ( T ' u - f u ) He 
also translated a chapter from A Handbook of Socialism, by 
W.D.P. Bliss. In this brief excerpt, Bliss discussed the develop­
ment of socialism in the nineteenth century as a response to 
industrialism and the consequent impoverishment of the mass of 
the people. He also divided the history of socialism into five
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phases, the final two of which spoke of the struggle in the First
International between the socialist forces under Marx and the
anarchists under Bakunin. Bliss supported the position taken
by Marx, but in his overall approach, he emphasized the moral
2
and non-violent character of socialism.
This conception of socialism as a peaceful, constructive
philosophy received further development in the articles by
Feng Tzu-yu and Chu Chih-hsin. Both of these men were intrigued
by the experience of socialism in Germany, Feng, although
sympathetic to the German Social Democratic Party, actually was
more attracted to the state socialist measures implemented by
Bismarck. What impressed him about these programmes was the
result: the great industrial power of the German state,
combined with the improved living conditions enjoyed by its 
3
citizenry. This belief in the efficacy of state socialism was
also shared by Chu Chih-hsin, although he believed that the
full enactment of its programme would have to await the
4
eventual triumph of the social democratic movement. However, 
regardless of their differing positions on the Bismarckian brand 
of socialism, both Feng and Chu stressed the role of the state 
in strengthening and enriching the nation.
Chu Chih-hsin’s understanding of the constructive reformism 
of socialism may be seen clearly in his brief article on Marx 
which was published in Min-pao in January 1906. This 
constituted the only discussion of Marxist theory to appear in 
the journal, and it contained the first translation into Chinese 
of an excerpt from Marx: the ten demands of the Communist
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5
League set down by Marx in The Communist Manifesto. In his
article Chu portrayed Marx as a political moderate, which is
understandable in view of the association of the latter!s name
with the social democratic parties of the Second International.
This essentially peaceful interpretation of Marxism caused Chu
to minimize the possibilities of violent class struggle. Marx,
according to Chu, "possessed a strong hatred of war," and would
resort to force "only if there was no other means by which
6inequity could be removed."
When he came to translate the ten point programme from the
Manifesto, Chu emphasized the two which involved reforms of a
fiscal nature. These were the second and third listed by Marx,
respectively proposing "a heavy graduated income tax," and "the
abolition of all right of inheritance." The other eight points
7
were presented without commentary. There is one further 
interesting aspect to Chu Chih-hsin’s treatment of Marx. Martin 
Bernal has drawn attention to the manner in which Chu rendered 
the closing call to arms of the Manifesto. In the words of 
Marx, the Communists "openly declare that their ends can be 
attained only in the forcible overthrow of all existing social 
conditions," Chu transformed this into, "they proclaim openly 
their actions to remove all unjust organization within society,
g
and to rebuild it anew." Finally, in his translation of the
term "proletarian," Chu adopted from the Japanese the phrase
p ’ing-min, which literally means "the common people," and
corresponded to fu-shen, "rich gentry," the first'Japanese
9
equivalent for "bourgeois." The question of the translation
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of terminology will be discussed further in the next chapter, 
with respect to Hu Han-minTs study of historical materialism in 
1919. In the case of the first translation of Marx into Chinese 
in 1906, too much should not be read into the virtually all- 
embracing nature of the term "common people" to translate 
"proletariat." What emerges from Chu’s article is the picture 
of Marx as a practical and moderate social reformer.
The translations and articles by Liao, Feng and Chu 
contributed to the creation of the general "socialist" milieu 
in which Hu worked during the Min-pao period. Since he edited 
the first five issues, which included Chu’s article on Marx, he 
obviously shared in this knowledge, and presumably accepted the 
interpretation being given it by his close colleagues. However, 
it is necessary to maintain perspective on the T ’ung-meng Hui 
intellectual world. Marx was only one of many European socialist 
figures of note. Socialism itself was seen in terms of general 
programmes which had been applied in distant European countries. 
For the members of the T'ung-meng Hui, the policy which promised 
the social and economic redemption of China was the "equalization 
of land rights" (p’ing-chun ti-ch'iian). This plan was held by 
Sun Yat-sen to combine the most advanced western social thinking 
with the realities of the Chinese "social problem."
There is probably little doubt that, of all Sun’s ideas, 
the equalization of land rights is the most inadequately 
thought out in regard to internal consistency. The details, as 
well as the background, of this scheme have been discussed 
elsewhere with great insight and thoroughness, particularly by
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Harold Schiffrin and Martin Bernal. Here, only the general 
outline of Sun's policy will be presented. What is worth more 
attention, and what has struck all students of Sun's social 
programme, is its non-revolutionary nature. Regardless of the 
many loose ends, and the changing definitions given its termi­
nology, the land rights policy indicates certain fundamental 
assumptions about rural Chinese society, and the limits of 
T'ung-meng Hui social policy. Lest this seem of ephemeral 
importance, it should be stressed that the equalization of 
land rights remained a cornerstone of Sun’s social programme 
not only in the early revolutionary days, but throughout his 
political career. In addition, Hu Han-min, until the end of 
his life, held it to be the essential ingredient in China’s 
rural reconstruction.^
Sun apparently made his first acquaintance with the land 
rights idea in Japan around the turn of the century. This came 
about through the influence of his close Japanese friends, the 
Miyazaki brothers, who were socialist enthusiasts of Henry 
George’s principle of the single tax on increments in land 
values. At this time Sun read Progress and Poverty, and began
12
to contemplate the importance of the land question in history.
Sun probably was spurred to do this from his recent travels in 
Britain and western Europe, where he had been struck not only 
by the gap between wealth and poverty, but also by the rapid 
increase of urban property values in areas experiencing commer­
cial and industrial growth* However, Sun also looked back into 
China’s own history for examples of solutions to the land problem
47
of the distant past.
Since these measures were later cited by Hu Han-min as
evidence of a reformist tradition native to China, they are
worth a few words of description. The first "land equalization"
scheme in China's history was the well-field (ching-t'ien)
system, which supposedly had enjoyed a brief existence about the
tenth century B.C. The division of land into blocks of nine
equal units (which bore a graphic resemblance to the character
for a well) ensured the common people a basic level of subsis- 
13
tence. This was followed some centuries later by the equal- 
field (chun-t1ien) system, introduced in 9 A.D. by the usurper 
Wang Mang. In order to rescue the state from the near bank­
ruptcy endemic in the last years of the early Han, Wang Mang 
tried to break up the large estates and redistribute the land 
in order to provide the state with an adequate revenue base. 
Later dynasties attempted to revive the equal-field system, but 
in every case met with failure. As a result of his study of 
these measures, together with his reading on current ideas of 
land reform, Sun decided, probably about 1902 or 1903, to add
what he termed "the equalization of land rights" to the Hsing-
chung Hui platform. This constituted a noteworthy addition to 
the goals of the movement, since up to this time, they had been
defined in the narrow political terms of expulsion of the
14
Manchus and the establishment of a republic.
Although he now spoke of land rights as one of the objec­
tives of his party, Sun did not define what he had in mind. On 
the basis of comments made at the time by Chang Ping-lin and
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Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Bernal suggests that Sun may have been advo­
cating land nationalization, with compensation, should the need 
for expropriation arise. Speculators holding undeveloped land 
either would be heavily taxed or forced to develop their property. 
The details of this earliest phase of Sun's land programme may 
be unrecoverable, but the intention behind this system is clear.
In a letter of December 1903, Sun touched on three of the 
fundamental points in his social philosophy. First, he stated 
that in the West, concentration of land already had taken place, 
and that society there had divided into two classes of rich and 
poor. Secondly, China did not suffer from such an acute social 
problem: "The gap between rich and poor is not like that in
Europe and America." This was because the productive forces 
in China were still on the level of the individual peasant. 
Industrialization, and the attendant concentration of wealth, 
still lay in the future. The third point was to Sun the logical 
conclusion to the first two. If China implemented the proper 
preventive measures before it was too late, the social evils of 
the West could be avoided. To this end, state purchase of 
excessive land-holdings, and the prevention of land speculation 
appeared as the policies designed to place China on a path 
which would elude the polarization of society that marked the 
West
Once the T'ung-meng Hui was founded, and Min-pao established 
as the party organ, it became necessary for Sun to work out the 
details of his social policies. In doing this, his younger 
colleagues such as Chu Chih-hsin, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min
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played a part, though as mentioned earlier, the relative
participation of each is impossible to judge. Sun contributed
the preface to the first issue of Min-pao, which was published
in November 1905. In this brief statement, which he dictated to
Hu, Sun for the first time spoke of min-sheng-chu-i , the term
probably best rendered into English as "the principle of liveli- 
17
hood." Until this time, Sun had used the Japanese expression 
she-hui-chu-i to translate the word "socialism." It has been 
speculated that Sun chose this term because it matched the other 
two principles he had been discussing over the preceding year: 
min-tsu-chu-i ("the principle of nationalism"), and min-chfiian- 
chu-i ("the principle of democracy"). This seems likely in 
light of Sun's reference from this time onward to his Three 
Principles of the People, the san-min-chu-i . Apart from this 
change in terminology, which was certainly of some significance 
in determining the form in which party ideology was expressed, 
Sun’s preface to Min-pao said little of a specific nature. 
However, in it he reiterated his belief that China could avert 
the West’s social problem through the implementation of his 
programme, and actually went so far as to surmise that "our 
country's cure for the social problem could be the first to 
develop.
At the same time as he wrote the Min-pao preface, Sun 
issued the Proclamation of Military Government, also known as 
the Manifesto of the T'ung-meng Hui. In this document, Sun 
outlined his theory of the three stages of the Chinese revolu­
tion: three years of military unification; six years of
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tutelage, during which the people were to be trained in the
practice of self-government; and finally, the adoption of full
constitutional rule. Sun also attempted to spell out the
equalization of land rights policy more clearly. Since this
definition survived more or less intact, its main provisions 
19should be noted:
We should improve our social and economic organization 
and assess the value of all land in the country. The 
present value of land will still belong to the owner.
But all increases in value resulting from reform and 
social improvements shall belong to the state to be 
shared by all the people in order to create a socialist 
state (she-hui ti kuo-chia). . . .
This formulation indicated a move away from the possible
nationalization of land Sun had spoken of earlier. The focus
now was on expropriation of unearned increment, which would
finance an as yet undefined programme of social reform.
It was in order to draw together the various statements
made by Sun on the land question, as well as to express the
basic political goals of the party, that Hu wrote "The Six Great
Principles of the Min-Fao." This article, which appeared in
April 1906, constituted H u ’s first presentation of party policy.
After explaining the need for a revolutionary journal, Hu
discussed the first three of the Min-pao principles in terms of
20
their correspondence with the Three Principles of the People. 
"Overthrow the present evil government," and "Establish a 
republic," were straightforward equivalents of the principles 
of nationalism and democracy. The third Min-pao principle, 
which Hu called "Land nationalization" (t ’u-ti kuo-yu), was to 
be equated with the principle of livelihood. In regard to this
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objective, Hu referred to the varieties of socialism which
existed, and the need for China to choose the one which was
appropriate. According to Hu, socialism could be divided into
communism, state collectivism, and land nationalization. The
first of these may be ref erred, to as anarcho-communism,-, at least
21 •
such is Bernal’s surmise. By state collectivism (kuo-ch'an- 
chu-i), Hu definitely had in mind the "constitutional democra­
cies," where social policies were being enacted in the people's 
welfare. Land nationalization, Hu admitted, actually was a form 
of state collectivism, but he preferred to treat it separately,
since it was the only policy,"which could be applied to China
22
in its present stage of development."
In presenting the case for land nationalization, Hu quoted 
the basic arguments of the Henry George school on the central 
role played by land in social and economic history. Land, an 
essential element in production, was not man-made, and therefore 
should not benefit private owners. Throughout the centuries the 
value of land had increased, thus enriching the landlord without 
his having to labour. Accordingly, the landlords were able to 
absorb all "capital and wealth," while the tillers of the soil 
became steadily more impoverished. However, after he had 
produced this outline, Hu then stated that he did not have 
present-day China in mind when he referred to the evils of 
landlordism. Rather, this social problem, which other countries 
had experienced, could be averted if Sun's equalization of land 
rights was quickly put into effect. Hu pointed out that land 
values in the coastal ports currently undergoing commercial
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development might increase as much as ten times in the following
ten years if they were not checked. With the success of the
revolution, and the consequent "advance of civilization"
throughout all of China, the same process of escalating land
values would be accelerated in the interior. To prevent the
social catastrophe from occurring, Hu stated that the new
government would expropriate all land from its owners. In
return, the government would grant the right to cultivate the
land to those who were prepared to do so on their own. Therefore,
there would be no private landlordism or tenancy; the sole owner
would be the state, but cultivation would remain an individual
right. In conclusion, Hu said that the state would levy moderate
taxes on these individual "land-holdings," but only after
23
parliamentary approval had been granted.
To what extent Hu was responsible for directing Sun’s
land rights policy back towards land nationalization cannot be
ascertained. Hu makes no mention of this in his autobiography.
In fact, there was little significant difference between the
two positions, despite the seemingly more radical nature of the
Min-pao proposal. This was because Hu fully accepted Sun's
contention that Chinese society was not divided by extremes of
wealth. In the "Six Principles of the Min-Pao," Hu endorsed
24
this interpretation:
One of the truly unique characteristics of our political 
history has been the absence of a. noble class since 
the Ch’in and Han dynasties. (The Mongol and Manchu 
dynasties are not to be considered, as they maintained 
a nobility according to their own alien practices).
After the overthrow of the Manchus, there will no 
longer be any distinction between classes.
(Original emphasis)
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Class in China, then, was a political phenomenon, a point empha­
sized by Hu when he went on to say that, "while the United States 
possesses economic classes, China has none." The consequences 
for the T ’ung-meng Hui of this characterization of Chinese 
society will be discussed later. In terms of the land rights 
policy, the "classlessness" of China meant that there would be 
little opposition to this programme. The government expropria­
tion of all land would provoke little social disruption, since 
most Chinese supposedly were small individual land-holders, and 
would in effect continue to be so after the government assumed 
nominal ownership of their land.
To bring the discussion of the land rights question to a
close, there is one final statement made by Sun that should be
noted. Because of H u ’s advocacy of land nationalization, another
element had been added to the ill-defined land rights programme.
Sun attempted to make a final clarification of his policy, in so
far as it ever was possible, in a speech given in December
1906 on the occasion of the first anniversary of Min-pao. Sun
spoke of fixing land prices once the revolution had occurred,
and expropriating any later increases in land value. The
expropriation of ownership was allowed to lapse: Sun stressed
that violence and confiscation were not part of his social
programme. But the intent of this programme remained unaltered.
China would be spared "the evils of a rich minority achieving a
monopoly." Not only that, by implementing the single measure of
the land rights policy, China would become "the richest country
25
in the world," which no other nation would be able to equal.
54
With this optimistic flourish, Sun concluded his discussion of 
land rights, and, although a few further details were added in 
later years, they did not alter the basic position which Sun had 
settled on at this time.
There is one additional aspect of Sun's principle of liveli­
hood to mention, especially as Hu may have been responsible for 
its original formulation. In a lengthy counter-attack on Liang 
Ch'i-ch’ao, entitled "To the Denouncers of the Min-sheng-chu-i ,"
Hu in March 1907 introduced the "nationalization of big capital"
26
into the T'ung-meng Hui programme. This in effect meant the
expropriation of "natural monopolies" such as railways and
public utilities, a course of action which was central to the
state socialism practised in many west European countries.
Once again the question of Sun Yat-sen's responsibility in
determining policy arises. Sun approved the article and
supposedly had studied its contents. However, he made no
further mention of this proposal until 1912, when it was given
the name "regulation of capital" (chieh-chih tzu-pen) , and was
granted equal status with the equalization of land rights
27
in the principle of livelihood. Bernal believes this new
social reform was dropped temporarily from the party platform
after Hu first raised it because Sun feared it might alienate
support from the petty merchants of the overseas Chinese 
28
community. However, Hu had emphasized that the T'ung-meng Hui 
in no way intended to penalize small productive enterprises.
As with the land rights policy, the regulation of natural 
monopolies sought to prevent the development of a future social
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evil, in this case, the domination of the state and the economy 
by "big capitalism."
With respect to the point raised by Bernal, it is not at 
all implausible to suggest that Sun had the overseas Chinese 
community in mind when he abandoned the regulation of capital 
programme, since he frequently changed his position to gather 
in any potential political support. On the other hand, it may 
be argued as strongly that Sun’s tendency to experiment, at 
least momentarily, with virtually any "progressive" idea makes 
it difficult to assign such a .direct cause to any change of 
attitude on Sun’s part. Regardless of the resolution of this 
question, there is no doubt as to the general character of Sun’s 
social programme. Its message was that of a gradualist and 
reformist approach to China's social problem, which, in any 
event, was not exceedingly severte. China was poor, but China 
was not divided into entrenched economic classes of rich and 
poor. The revolutionary energies of Sun and the T'ung-meng Hui, 
therefore, could be directed at the one obviously political 
goal, the destruction of the Manchus.
Hu shared all of these positions, and he advanced them as 
strongly as possible in his discussions of party policy.
However, in comparison to Sun, Hu possessed a greater talent 
for detailed theoretical work, and' a greater interest in 
questions of a social nature. As a result, there are to be 
found in Hu's Min-pao articles comments which offer some insight 
into his political thought at this time. While these were not 
set out in a systematic manner, they are sufficient to indicate
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certain political and social attitudes which remained basic to 
Hu during the course of his life.
The Limits of Social Change
According to H u ’s later recollections of his first meeting
with Sun Yat-sen, he was very much impressed by Sun’s exposition
of the principle of nationalism, and by his insistence on China’s
need for an immediate revolution. However, Hu also admitted that
at this initial encounter he and Liao Chung-k’ai confessed to
doubts about the principle of livelihood and the equalization of
land rights. They were quickly won over by Sun’s persuasiveness,
and Hu went on to write many articles for Hin-pao in defense of
Sun’s third principle. This momentary indecisiveness Hu later
attributed to "the capitalist economic theory" and "the textbooks
which went no further than social reform" that he had been
29
exposed to at the Tokyo Law College. It is more likely,
though, that H u ’s initial reluctance about the principle of
livelihood betrayed a youthful lack of awareness of China's
social problem. If this was so, Hu was not alone, as many
students had expressed strong opposition to Sun’s social
programme at the founding meeting of the T'ung-meng Hui two
weeks earlier. What drew them to Sun Yat-sen was his mission
of political revolution; social change seemed of little relevance
30
to the one objective of driving out the Manchus. In this 
context, Sun's persistent emphasis on social reform certainly 
stands to his credit, even if he did not elucidate his ideas 
carefully. This concern about the tasks of social reform and
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economic development which would face the new post-revolutionary
China Sun was able to impart to Hu.
As noted above though, it is precisely the success enjoyed
by Sun in winning over Hu that makes the description of Hu's
thought at this time so difficult. There are two articles, and
one exposition which stand out as exceptions to this rule. The
first of the articles, "The Most Recent Political Opinions of
Mr. Yen Fu," was published in the second issue of Min-pao in
January 1906. This, incidentally, was signed "Han-min," the
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first appearance in print of Hu's famous pseudonym. The
second article actually dates from 1908, after Hu had left
Tokyo. It was a brief note contributed to the Paris anarchist
journal Hsin shih-chi (New Century), its title being "Unmarried
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Women in Kwangtung." This very interesting short statement 
on women's rights stands apart from all of Hu's other writings 
at this time, both in regard to content and degree of personal 
expression. The final article to be noted before Hu's views on 
Yen Fu are examined was an exposition entitled "Anti-foreignism 
and International Law." This lengthy work consisted of summaries 
of books and lecture notes Hu had compiled from his legal studies 
in Tokyo. According to Hu's account, his main purpose in 
writing this was to enlighten Chinese readers on the legal rights 
which China had title to against the foreign powers. Hu said 
that blind anti-foreignism was not only misguided, but in view 
of the Boxer catastrophe, highly dangerous to the national 
future. China in fact was legally empowered to take a much 
stronger stand than it did against foreign imperialism: it was
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only the incompetence and treason of the Manchus which had
33allowed China's legal rights to go unexercised. The main 
conclusion about Hu's political thought which this study indi­
cates is the deep commitment he felt to orderly, legal methods 
of solving political and social problems. This was particularly 
true of social change: to be effective and just it must never
degenerate into social disorder.
Hu's article on Yen Fu was in the first instance inspired 
by political issues, such as Yen Fu's supposed opposition to 
the anti-Manchu nationalism of the T'ung-meng Hui. However, in
the course of his discussion Hu drew on materials which afforded
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an interesting insight into his thinking. In reference to
Yen Fu's translation of Herbert Spencer's A Study of Sociology,
Hu raised the issue of the organic theory of the state. Hu
mentioned first that the development of this theory of the
virtually independent existence of the state was a reaction to
the social contract theory, which had overemphasized the range
of freedom of the individual. However, in his view, the
organic theory represented the other extreme. It gave too
much weight to society, and too little to the individual.
Furthermore, the state must be regarded as the creation of
individual men. Even though the state acquired a certain degree
35of autonomy, it was false to describe it in biological terms.
The central part of Hu's discussion consisted of a
synopsis of arguments developed to counter the organic theory
36
by a Japanese scholar, Onozuka Kiheiji. Since Hu quoted these 
points, and commented on them with obvious approval, they may
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be taken to indicate further his position on the scope for 
human activity in changing society. First of all, Onozuka drew 
attention to the expansion of the area of freedom as nations 
became more civilized, in contrast to primitive society, where 
the group was all-powerful. Hu expanded on this by mentioning 
the various levels of self-government which existed within the 
modern state. Secondly, the state was a product of both man and 
nature, but manTs responsibility for its existence was the 
greater. Living organisms were ruled by a natural life cycle, 
but this was not true in the case of the state, since its 
survival over the centuries was a result of the conscious efforts 
of men on its behalf. Hu endorsed this fully, and went on to 
state that man and nature together brought about change; neither 
could function in the absence of the other. The final point of 
interest raised by Onozuka was that the state was created by 
man for a certain end, while the living organism comes into 
existence without such a specific goal. In other words, the 
state cannot exist apart from the human will to create it, 
although that must be exercised with regard to the natural 
conditions in existence . ^
With Onozuka's arguments to support him, Hu then called on 
the Chinese people to shake off their political fatalism, and 
change the moribund form of government which was such a burden 
to them. For two thousand years there had been no progress in 
China, and in fact, under the Manchus, there was regression.
Yet, there was hope for change, Hu said, if the people would 
realize that no institutions were immutable. They were the ones
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who possessed the capacity to change the state, if only they 
would exercise their will. This did not mean that the people 
could alter the state exactly as they saw fit. However, in 
China, the balance between the individual and the state was 
weighted far too much in favour of the latter. Yet, as Onozuka 
had shown, there was no cause either to adopt a passive attitude 
towards the state, or to believe that social life was completely 
determined by nature.
Although the main points advanced in the Yen Fu article
were inspired by an outside source, the questions Hu touched on
were wider in scope and certainly of a more philosophical nature
than anything else he discussed at this time. His other articles
dealt with the more specific ramifications of Sun’s social
policies. Throughout these, however, there was present the
conviction that national greatness and social justice were in
the grasp of the Chinese people if only they would rally to the
revolutionary cause. At the same time, throughout Hu's work
there is present the other theme of moderation in the area of
social change. This second theme is the one which emerges with
great clarity in the course of his polemics with Liang Ch'i-
ch'ao, who had directed several attacks at the land equalization
programme, the most famous being his article of December 1906,
"Is a Social Revolution Really Necessary?" It was to answer
this challenge that Hu replied in March 1907 with his long
presentation of T'ung-meng Hui policy, "To the Denouncers of the 
39Min-sheng-chu-i ." These two articles are often cited as 
examples of the supposedly contrasting reformist and radical
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positions occupied respectively by the Liang and Sun groups.
However, such differences between the two were primarily of a
political nature: constitutional monarchy versus the republic.
There they were real enough. But in the area of social policy,
the differences appear to be minimal. An examination of the
main points raised by Hu in his refutation of Liang reveals the
T ’ung-meng Hui position to be a gradualist programme of reform
which most decidedly sought to avoid .any type of social disorder.
It may not be an overstatement to say that Hu ’s overriding
concern in composing his reply to Liang was precisely to refute
the claim that the principle of livelihood was aimed at causing
massive social chaos by stirring up the lower orders of society.
At the outset Hu made clear what he understood by the term
revolution, which was used so regularly by the T'ung-meng Hui.
He defined it as a form of social change which often came about
in a natural manner; therefore, it did not necessarily imply
social destruction. To illustrate this point, he cited the
changeover from human porterage to the railway as an example of
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a revolutionary development in communications. Change must 
take place, Hu stated, but it should be carried out legally, 
and should not throw society into disruption. Moreoever, the 
T ’ung-meng Hui programme envisaged no such thing as social 
levelling. Hu was most emphatic about this point. He agreed 
that the ultimate goal of the party was equality, but it was an 
equality which was "psychological" (hsin-li ti) in nature, not 
"mathematical" (shu-li ti).^
This theme of moderation in social policy stands out in
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H u ’s brief comments about Marx, and in his somewhat longer treat­
ment of foreign investment in China. Hu apparently shared, or 
had been influenced by, Chu Chih-hsin’s view that at heart Marx 
was a moderate reformer. This interpretation emerges from Hu's 
refutation of Liang Ch’i-ch'ao's charge that socialism was 
undesirable because it went to extremes:
The two men who must alarm the world today with their 
theory of capital are Marx and Engels. Yet they not 
only allow for private ownership of personal capital 
for one's own immediate use, but also for the private 
ownership of capital by peasants and handicraftsmen 
. . . .  It cannot be said that even in the case of 
the most extreme socialism that all capital will be 
nationalized.
This basically sympathetic attitude towards capital also appears 
in Hu's dismissal of Liang’s concern over foreign economic 
imperialism. Liang had argued that it was necessary to build 
up native Chinese capitalists to strengthen China's economic 
power. Hu, on the contrary, said that the T'ung-meng Hui 
welcomed investment. The foreign capitalists could pour in 
money, so that China would become "the equal of America and 
Australia." The only social problem would be be one of an excess 
of capital, and this could be managed by proper regulatory 
measures. Where Liang had gone wrong, Hu said, was in confusing 
military with economic imperialism. It was only foreign military 
imperialism which must be opposed. Economic imperialism wasm
beneficial in its effects. This concept of the dual nature of
lt l c
imperialism Harold Schiffrin has traced to a Japanese source. 
However, in view of the generally sympathetic T'ung-meng Hui 
attitude towards private capital, this theory probably did no
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more than afford academic support for Hu's economic convictions.
Hu then went on, to discuss the unique nature of Chinese
society, and the basically optimistic prospects that existed for
its regeneration. To begin with, Hu reiterated the official
party view that the social problem was becoming more acute in
both Europe and America. In the case of the latter, the
existence of plentiful land, and the absence of a monarch and a
nobility, had not prevented the development of social problems.
Trusts and monopolies dominated the economy, while high rents
and unemployment were widespread. This proved, Hu said, that
the extremes of wealth and poverty in society could not be
attributed simply to the existence of a "feudal nobility,"
although this partly accounted for the social problem facing
42
European countries. The more important cause of social misery
in Europe and America was the unrestricted play of economic
forces— the exercise of what Hu called the "theory of license."
As a consequence of this, a small minority had gained control of
43both land and capital.
Hu then turned his attention to China's social problem. It 
was more manageable than the one oppressing Europe, since China 
fortunately lacked a "noble class," but it was more difficult of 
solution than the one confronting America. However, Hu pointed 
out that China possessed one great advantage over the industrial­
ized world. In comparison to the latter, China, as Sun described
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it, "was still a youthful society." This meant that the 
prospects for China's future social and economic development 
were highly optimistic. Hu cited the opinions of "modern
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socialist scholars" to support this view: "the possibility of a 
nation practising socialism is in inverse relationship to its 
progress in civilization." The social problem in Europe and 
America, therefore, had become burdensome and deep-rooted , 
because of its age and complexity. China was not bound by such 
conditions. Hu then concluded the argument with a most curious 
illustration of this point: "New Zealand is a wild island in the 
South Sea. At any moment it may become a socialist 'utopia* 
(le-t'u) ."45
Once Hu had given expression to this early "great leap" 
theory, he then advanced the standard T'ung-meng Hui prescrip­
tion for realizing the ideal society. This meant, once again, 
the equalization of land rights, and in addition, the regulation 
of natural monopolies, the new policy which Hu had enunciated in 
this article with Sun's apparent backing. As discussed earlier, 
both programmes aimed at the prevention of future social prob­
lems, rather than at the solution of the present ones, which 
were not held to be of a critical nature. Yet it was necessary 
for Hu to stress that the T'ung-meng Hui programme not only was 
the only one suitable to China, but in fact was a unique theory 
by which the social problem could be solved. As a final note, 
it should be mentioned that this greater emphasis on Sun's 
theories was accomplished by a change in political terminology.
Up to this time, min-sheng-chu-i had appeared in the pages of 
Min-pao as a term virtually interchangeable with the conventional 
translation of socialism, she-hui-chu-i . Hu now pointed out that 
the two expressions were quite different, and that min-sheng-chu-i ,
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which Sun also referred to as "demosology," was a distinctive
46
form of socialism, and the only one applicable to China.
The debate over the nature of the T ’ung-meng Hui social
programme rested at the point reached in the polemics of early
1907. Sun was expelled from Japan in March of that year, and
Hu left with him. This brought to an end H u ’s contributions to
Min-pao. The time of his departure also coincided with the end
of the journal’s creative period in political discussion and
controversy. The changed fortunes of the T ’ung-meng Hui leaders
did not alone account for the different journalistic atmosphere
in Tokyo. Liang Ch’i-ch'ao’s paper ceased publication later that
year, largely as a result of dwindling political support for the
Constitutionalist position. The most perceptive and stimulating
critic of the T ’ung-meng Hui’s political and social policies
had now withdrawn from the scene. At the same time, there took
place among Chinese student activists in Japan a move away from
western social democratic theories, and a redirection towards
47anarchism, usually of the violent variety. For the moment, 
anarchism became the panacea for all political and social ills, 
and student attention turned away from the much more moderate, 
not to mention prosaic, philosophy of Sun Yat-sen.
Political Revolution, Social Reform
In attempting an analysis of the T'ung-meng Hui concept of 
revolution,,attention should be drawn to the great gulf that 
existed between political and social priorities in Sun’s thought. 
While it is true that Sun was moved by the social misery of
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rural China, having experienced it in his own childhood, nonethe­
less in his adult life his concern was almost completely political. 
The same generalization might be made of the T ’ung-meng Hui 
membership as a whole. It is necessary to strike a balance here. 
Sun and his followers were among the first to devote attention to 
China’s poverty, and to search for a way of ending it. Social 
questions, then, were by no means unimportant. However, they 
were definitely of secondary importance. The one consuming ambi­
tion was the attainment of political power. With the achievement 
of this, it was believed that the resolution of China’s social • 
problems would come about with relative ease.
A corollary of this view was the faith held by the Sun group 
in the efficacy of political power. In the pre-1911 period there 
existed in the T ’ung-meng Hui, perhaps understandably because of 
inexperience, a rather naive belief in the natural integrity of 
government structured on constitutional principles. After 1911 
Sun and his followers were quickly disabused of the hopes they 
had placed in a democratic republic. However, they still retained 
their faith that political solutions could be found for all social 
problems, and that no social problem could fail to be solved by 
rational, state-legislated plans. This "legislative reformism" 
not only was one of the basic characteristics of T ’ung-meng Hui 
ideology, but also of the actual practice of its successor, the 
Kuomintang, once political power was achieved.
The suitability of this measured approach to China’s social 
problems received further confirmation from the analysis Sun made 
of Chinese society. What was distinctive about China was the
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absence of serious economic divisions. Classes existed, but only 
on the political plane. The Manchus were the oppressors, the 
Chinese people the oppressed. Beyond the existence of these "two 
classes," there were no important divisions to be found. All 
Chinese suffered from poverty; the differences of degree in this 
condition were held to be of little consequence. The regeneration 
of the nation and of society as a whole, therefore, was the 
principal objective of Sun's revolution. This goal in itself 
was not an unworthy one, but it was purchased at a high cost, 
that of ignoring the sharp economic divisions which indeed 
disfigured Chinese society, especially in the increasingly 
volatile countryside.
The implications of this neglect of the social tensions 
present in Chinese society did not reveal themselves fully to 
Sun's party until much later, probably not until after the death 
of Sun himself in 1925. During the T'ung-meng Hui period the 
immediate task facing the party was the political revolution. To 
this end, Sun's followers devoted all of their energies. The 
theoretical discussions of social policy which had preoccupied 
many of them in Tokyo now must have appeared distant, and of 
little application to their current struggles. Because of his 
position at the centre of Sun's movement, Hu was absorbed 
completely in the many efforts during these years to secure, and 
to retain, political power. Not until 1919 did he have the 
opportunity to turn once again to theoretical interests of the 
kind he had begun in Min-pao.
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND ITS INTERPRETATION
The Context of the May Fourth Movement
The Revolution of 1911 brought to an end the imperial
political system which had endured for two thousand years. The
attempted restoration of the monarchy by YUan Shih-k’ai five
years later underlined the fact that it could never be called
back to life. This particular issue was settled clearly and in
surprisingly short time. However, the old Confucian culture
which had supported this political system still dominated the
intellectual world and social relationships of the Chinese
people. This was certainly true with regard to the Chinese
elite, in whom Confucianism had attained such a highly formalized
and carefully delineated status. This higher culture came under
attack by scattered individuals towards the turn of the century,
and in fact, such men as K ’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch'ao
represented what Benjamin Schwartz has called' the "breakthrough
generation" in the Chinese reevaluation of the classical 
1
tradition. However, these men remained isolated from the 
large body of the intelligentsia. It was only after 1911 that 
intellectual disaffection came to embrace much of the educated 
elite, particularly the members of the young student generation. 
These were the people who led the demonstrations against the
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Versailles Treaty on May 4, 1919, and it was this nationalist 
protest that soon came to give its name to the whole movement 
of cultural iconoclasm that had been in the making for the 
preceding several years.
In accounting for the sudden increase in the intensity of 
the attacks on the Confucian orthodoxy, one must take note of 
the Revolution of 1911, and its failure to realize any of the 
hopes that had been pinned on the destruction of the imperial 
political order. The inability of the Republic to function as 
an adequate political system, or to provide for the defense of 
China against foreign imperialism, proved that parliaments, 
constitutions and the apparatus of western liberal democracy 
could not be applied overnight to China. What that experience 
also made very clear was that the former equation of China’s 
weakness with the ruling Manchu dynasty was no longer tenable 
as an explanation of China's worsening domestic and international 
positions. Yet this belief in the treachery of the Manchus and 
the promised utopia of the Republic had been shared by most of 
the pre-1911 revolutionaries, and had been central to the political 
philosophy of the T ’ung-meng Hui. Now it became necessary to 
search within China’s own traditional way of life for the causes 
of national weakness, and in complement to this, to search the 
culture of the modern West for the reasons for its strength.
With the growing desperation of China’s situation in mind, the 
young generation was quickly drawn towards total rejection of 
that traditional culture, and, in a less clearly definable 
progression, towards the acceptance of one or several of the many
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competing philosophies that might be identified with that entity
2
known as the "West."
The May Fourth movement, in its broader cultural sense,
involved both destruction and construction. "Smash the old,
build the new!" became one of the famous slogans of the movement.
In this dual process a leading role was played by the journal
Hsin chT ing-nien (New Youth), which had been established in
Shanghai in 1915. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, a prominent member of the
intelligentsia and at the time a dedicated student and admirer
of the liberal West, was the first editor. Hsin ch ' ing-nien
brought to its x'eaders the call for national regeneration, with
youth, unspoiled and uncorrupted, leading the way. A new culture,
free from the backwardness and oppressiveness of the old
patriarchal Confucianism, had to be created. The ideals held up
to Chinese youth were those of "science and democracy." These
values of the rational and liberal western tradition would be
the route through which Ghina would realize the political victory
and the national strength which had eluded the nation in 1911.
To this end Hsin chT ing-nien launched an unceasing barrage of
attacks on all aspects of the old culture. At the same time, in
keeping with its "constructive" function, it introduced Chinese
readers by means of translations and digests to the political
3
and artistic content of that western culture.
It was through the pages of Hsin ch1ing-nien that the 
revolution in the written language was promoted during these 
years. In January 1917, Hu Shih, a young student recently 
returned from studying under John Dewey in the United States,
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published an article calling for the replacement of wen-yen, the
classical language, by one resembling more the vocabulary and
style of the spoken language. This battle was soon won. The
written medium became pai-hua, the "common language," though this
was something of a misnomer at the time, as it retained for some
years a certain stiffness as well as many literal allusions.
Nevertheless, the change in language was one that in no way can
be minimized. It was one of the easiest and most complete
victories of the May Fourth participants, perhaps indicating how
prepared the Chinese elite was for change in at least certain
cultural areas by the time it finally came. Hu Han-min was one of
those who made the adjustment immediately in his public writing
style. In a published letter of July 1919 he justified the
adoption of pai-hua in words that would have been shared by all
caught up in the new movement:^
If someone wishes to express an idea, he cannot do so 
very easily in the old language, because of the imprison­
ing effect of its many rules. This not only runs counter
to democracy (p 1ing-min-chu-i), but prevents the progress
of thought.
The classical language, with its terse, convoluted and often 
obscurantist style was not only a part of the old social order, 
but an agent of its preservation as well. The journals of the May 
Fourth period not only brought about its displacement, but in their 
constructive capacity, they led the way in shaping the new written 
language into a fluent and sophisticated means of communication 
in its own right.
During the first years of the May Fourth movement the 
challengers to the old order focused primarily on the cultural
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attack. Beginning about 1918 the emphasis began to shift towards 
contemporary political issues. This was reflected in Hsin 
chTing-nien, where articles both narrower in scope and more 
partisan in tone began to appear. The Bolshevik Revolution of 
November 1917 partly accounted for this, although the full impact 
of this great upheaval did not make itself felt in China until 
well into 1919. However, the first tremors from Petrograd and 
Moscow produced an immediate effect on one of the key figures 
of this second phase of the May Fourth period, the Peking 
University historian and political theorist, Li Ta-chao. In 
two articles published in Hsin ch1ing-nien over the latter half 
of 1918, Li welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution, and hailed it as 
a forward step in the progressive liberation of mankind. To 
China it could serve as an example of a nation being reborn and 
remade. Li’s enthusiasm was directly a result of the promise 
held out by the October Revolution. It did not represent any 
commitment to Marxism. In the words of Maurice Meisner, there 
was "nothing to suggest that he had even begun to consider 
seriously Marxist theory." But the turning had been taken, and 
the search for the theory that had made possible the Bolshevik
5
Revolution soon would be undertaken.
The major stimulus to the redirection of the May Fourth 
movement into political channels in 1918-1919 was provided not 
by the Russian revolution but by Japan and the western powers. 
Anti-Japanese activity in the form of student agitation and 
merchant boycotts had flared up in 1915 in response to the 
Twenty-one Demands pressed upon Ytian Shih-k’ai. Through these
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Japan sought to extend its sphere of influence, which had been
strengthened through the wartime occupation of Germany’s Shantung 
leasehold. At the Versailles Peace Conference the Chinese 
expected to regain at least the German concession. However, the 
Allies handed over the former German concession to Japan, in 
keeping with a secret treaty made earlier. This action produced 
in the student population a wave of monumental disillusionment 
in the western democracies. This anger was even further 
intensified when the news was made public that the Peking govern­
ment had secretly agreed to Japan’s position in Shantung several 
months previously. To the members of the May Fourth generation 
there could have been no more graphic illustration of the 
collusion between foreign imperialism and the old corrupt 
political order in China. Student demonstrations broke out in 
Peking on May 4, 1919, and very quickly spread to Shanghai and 
other cities. Hu Han-min, who was in Shanghai at the time, 
characterized the period as one of "the swelling of a great 
patriotic tide." It was, he felt, the just response of a people
humiliated by Japanese imperialism and betrayed by the indiffer-
£
ence and corruption of its own rulers.
Although cultural questions continued to interest the May 
Fourth participants, the movement now moved into a more highly 
intensive'political phase. It was this shift that contributed 
greatly to the receptiveness of many Chinese intellectuals to 
the introduction of Marxism in 1919. Hu Han-min played an 
important role in this phase of the movement.. This came about 
partly by chance, since his own political activism had been
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terminated momentarily by the failure of the Canton government 
the previous year. However, the interest Hu had shown in 
socialist theory in Min-pao more than a decade earlier makes it 
evident that a return to this type of intellectual speculation 
did not constitute an unexpected departure on his part. In the 
spring of 1919 Hu began the study of historical materialism.
This theory offered a challenge to his considerable intellectual 
powers. More important, it provided him with a new analytical 
tool for the reevaluation of the Confucian tradition that had 
brought China to the seeming nadir of its national life.
The Introduction of Marxism into China
It is not often that the introduction into a culture of an 
important intellectual current can be pinpointed to one year.
In the history of modern China this claim may be put forth with­
out too much hyperbole for 1919, when Marxism made its entry 
into the Chinese intellectual world. The suddenness of this is 
not only explained by the growing anti-imperialism of the May 
Fourth movement. The main reason for the ignorance of Marxism 
prior to this date was the dearth of Marxist materials available 
in Chinese. There existed some random references to Marx and 
his theory, it is true. However, the translations were too 
slight, and chosen too haphazardly to convey any sense of the 
scope and complexity of Marxism.
A brief examination of what was available to Chinese readers 
at the beginning of 1919 reveals the problem facing anyone wish­
ing to make a serious study of Marxism. Hu Han-min, as editor
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of Min-pao, had published Ghu Chih-hsin’s biography of Marx in
1906. This sketch had contained the ten-point proposal from The
Communist Manifesto. Two years later another Tokyo based Chinese
student journal, T !ien"i pao (Natural Justice), printed the
7
first chapter of the Manifesto. This was the first translation 
of any substantial length. However, it was buried amidst a mass 
of articles on both the peaceful and violent brands of anarchism, 
an illuminating comment on what minor figures Marx and Engels 
were at that time compared to Kropotkin and Bakunin. Later in 
1908 that same journal printed a very brief summary of the chapter 
on the family in Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State. Last of all, in 1912 a translation of 
Engels’ Socialism: Utopian and Scientific appeared in the Shangai
g
periodical Hsin shih-chieh (New World). This listing actually 
exaggerates even the minimal exposure of Marx and Engels to the 
Chinese reading public. Since these journals had virtually no 
circulation inside China these materials in effect were restrict­
ed to the overseas student and T ’ung-meng Hui groups. What can 
be surmised from the record is that those such as Li Ta-chao and 
Hu Han-min had the opportunity at the most to gain an acquaintance 
with only a few excerpts from the corpus of Marxism.
In May 1919 the years of neglect suddenly came to an end. 
There were two periodicals that led the way: Ch’en-pao fu-k’an
(The Morning Post Supplement), which was published in Peking 
under Li Ta-chao’s editorship, and Hsin ch’ing-nien. Ch’en-pao 
published a translation of Wage Labour and Capital from May 9 
to June 1, and then followed on June 2 with a translation of
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Kautsky's Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx, which appeared in
instalments until November 11. With the completion of the latter
work, the specific interest in Marxist literature on the part of
9
this newspaper came to an end.
The most important translation to appear in Ch'en-pao was 
an article by the Japanese scholar Kawakami Hajime entitled 
"MarxTs Historical Materialism." This was published between 
May 5 and May 8 , and was reprinted in the special Hsin ch'ing- 
nien issue on Marxism that was published the same month.^
Kawakami Hajime, who later became a full convert to Marxism and 
a member of the Japanese Communist Party, is a figure of impor­
tance in the transmission and interpretation of Marxism to the
11
Chinese at this time. Unfortunately, this intriguing aspect
of China's modern intellectual history has not been made the
subject of a study. However, it is clear that in the cases of
Li Ta-chao and Hu Han-min, Kawakami was influential in introducing
them to Marxism as a system. This is certainly true with respect
to the theory of historical materialism.
Kawakami Hajime probably had been the first Japanese to
acquire a degree of familiarity with the theory, and with some
of the objections that had been raised against it. This had come
about through his translating in 1905 a brief work called The
Economic Interpretation of History, This book was composed of
articles written three years earlier for the Political Science
Quarterly by an American political economist, Edwin R. A.
12
Seligman. Much more will be said about this later, since this 
work, in the form of Kawakami’s translation, had considerable
77
influence on Hu Han-min. Here it is sufficient to note that
Seligman’s interpretation, as indicated by the title, followed
the orthodox school of Marxism in so far as it assigned the
economic base almost irresistible force in bringing about
historical change, and held economic factors directly responsible
for all phenomena in the political and ideological world.
According to his later admission Kawakami found this new
theory rather puzzling at the time he was introduced to it through
Seligman's book. He had been drawn to translating the book more
for what it might tell him about economics than about history.
Furthermore, the seeming determinism and ethical relativism
troubled him. Kawakami’s biographer, Gail Bernstein, states
that neither Seligman nor historical materialism made much
13
impression on him at the time. It was not until about 1917
that Kawakami returned to Marx, and it was towards Marxian
economics that he directed his interest. This was not so much
because he was an economist by profession as it was because Marx
offered an explanation for poverty that helped answer Kawakami’s 
14
moral searchings. Historical materialism he does not seem to 
have rediscovered until 1919. During that year, and into the 
next, his journal, Researches in Social Problems, published 
articles by him explaining basic Marxist concepts. The material 
was drawn from German and English language sources, both of which
1
were beyond the reach of most Chinese and Japanese intellectuals. 
The article translated into Chinese in May 1919 was taken from 
this Japanese series. For those like Hu Han-min, who read 
Japanese fluently, the complete expositions of Kawakami Hajime
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were available. Hu did rely on some of these in his early 
writings on Marxism.
The late return of Kawakami to historical materialism is 
not without its ironies in respect to the effect it had on Li 
Ta-chao and Hu Han-min, Kawakami, who was regarded as a guide 
by these men, was himself wrestling with problems in compre­
hending Marx’s theory. Thus the "struggle" with historical 
materialism— the struggle to understand its complexities, to 
locate its balance between determinism and activism, and to 
measure its scope for ethical behaviour— was being repeated 
twice over. It should be said that Kawakami acquired an increas­
ingly sophisticated grasp of Marxism in the course of the 
16
following year. So did Li and Hu, perhaps partly because of 
their distant mentor’s own increasing erudition, but probably 
much more because of their own advancing studies. There were 
cross influences, no doubt, but it is more reasonable to see all 
three men working each in his own way towards a resolution of 
the same problems posed by historical materialism.
The momentary significance of the Kawakami article in
Ch’en-pao is revealed in two different aspects of it that turned
up in Li’s and H u ’s early interpretations of Marx. First of
all, at this stage in his studies of Marx, Kawakami still seemed
to be under Seligman’s remote influence as far as what might be
called the "basic character" of historical materialism was
concerned. Kawakami stated that, in his opinion, historical
materialism ought to be called "the economic interpretation of 
17
history." This rewording by Kawakami raises a serious problem,
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one that is more than a question of semantics. By referring to 
the theory as the "economic" interpretation the complexity of 
the interaction among the different parts of social life becomes 
blurred. This is brought out later in the article when he 
interprets the relationship between base and superstructure
18
quite one-sidedly in favour of the dominance of the former.
Thus he expressed a certain dissatisfaction with the theory:
"all of the events that take place in history cannot be explained
19
solely by regarding economics as the cause." This rigid 
formulation of the relationship between economic base and 
ideological superstructure was repeated by Li Ta-chao in his 
first discussion of Marxism, and he too shared the same dissat­
isfactions. The second point of note with regard to Kawakami*s 
interpretation is the very terse but suggestive gloss made by 
him on the term "social revolution" that Marx uses in the Preface 
to a _ Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Kawakami
explained it simply: "This means change (pien-hua) in the
20
organization of society." This remote, impersonal and morally 
neutral view of social revolution, one which was reinforced by 
his reading of the orthodox Marxist Karl Kautsky, was to be an 
important component in Hu Han-min1s conception of historical 
materialism.
Along with Ch*en-pao the other major source of materials 
on Marxism in the spring of 1919 was Hsin ch* ing-nien. In May 
its famous special issue on Marxism was published. The table 
of contents provides an illuminating glimpse into the concerns 
of these early students of Marx. There appeared two brief and
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flattering biographies of Marx, a critique of Marxian economics,
the reprint of the Kawakami article, and an essay with the
fascinating title of "Marx's Historical Materialism and the
21
Chastity Question," There were also two articles written
specifically on the theory of historical materialism. The
first, simply entitled "Marxist Theory," was written by Ku
Meng-yU; the second, by Li Ta-chao, was called "My Marxist Views,"
and represented Li's first venture into Marxist theory. Each
of these articles is of interest in tracing the problems faced
by Chinese thinkers in coming to an understanding of Marx.
Ku Meng-yii, author of the first of these, was one of Li
Ta-chao's colleagues at Peking University. Later he became a
member of the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory, which
was a spiritual predecessor of the Chinese Communist Party.
However, rather than giving his political allegiance to it, Ku
22
went on to become a prominent member of the Kuomintang. In
his Hsin ch'ing-nien article Ku provided a short sketch of the
theory of historical materialism, with some emphasis on Marx's
23
indebtedness to Hegel and Feuerbach. However, Ku showed 
little awareness of Marx's conception of the relationship 
between base and superstructure, and as a result believed that 
Marx had placed too much emphasis on economic forces. Ku 
accepted one of the revisionist critiques of Marxism, that law 
acted as one of the fundamental determinants of social life 
and thus of the mode of production. He also believed in the 
eventual victory of socialism through evolutionary means. Class 
struggle did not necessarily carry violent overtones; labour
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unions and the type of political power made possible by the
concentration of workers in factory organization both made
socialism a certainty. It is also of interest that Ku Meng-yii
stated that for him historical materialism was a "method of
24
historical investigation." Its main value, then, was as a
tool of historical analysis. This assessment of the function 
of the theory was shared by Hu Han-min, and it divided both of 
these men from Li Ta-chao.
The second of these two articles, Li Ta-chao’s "My Marxist 
Views," offers a striking example of the difficulties faced by 
a Chinese intellectual at that time in coming to .an understand­
ing of Marx through the medium of haphazard translations and
2
commentaries available either in Japanese or in his own language.
As mentioned earlier, Li had been influenced by Kawakami Hajime,
and to Kawakami Li also owed his introduction to some of the
basic source materials: excerpts from The Communist Manifesto,
The Poverty of Philosophy, and the Preface to _a Critique of
26
Political Economy. However, in its main line of interpretation,
his essay, whether Li realized it or not, actually represented 
the "Marxist views" of an Italian scientist, Eugenio Rignano, 
who had written a chapter on historical materialism in a
27
collection of his work called Essays in Scientific Synthesis.
Approximately one-third of Li’s article was taken directly from
Rignano; as a result, it is a curious amalgam of the views of
two different authors, both labouring under similar misappre- 
28
hensions.
Rignano certainly possessed a simplistic understanding of
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Marx. His chief error, which he passed on to Li, lay in seeing 
the theory as one of unmitigated economic determinism. Thus 
there was no room for free human activity, and so, to Rignano 
(and Li), Marx’s concept of class struggle seemed completely at 
odds with the assumption that the mode of production carried 
history inexorably in its wake. In taking this approach Rignano 
appeared to be wholly unaware of the comments made by Marx and 
Engels on the degree of mutual influence that occurred between 
the economic base and the more "activist" superstructure. In 
fact, Rignano thought that he had advanced a trenchant criticism 
of Marx by drawing attention to the retarding effect of legal 
systems on economic development, and Li in turn repeated this 
point in his essay. Neither seemed aware that Engels had
discussed this in the letters he wrote late in life on historical
. , . 29materialism.
As a result of Rignano’s incomplete and highly mechanistic
interpretation of Marxism, Li made a somewhat unenthusiastic
conversion to the theory. The vision of man changing his own
destiny had attracted Li to the Bolshevik Revolution, and thence
to the Marxist theory that lay behind that event. However, he
could not embrace that theory fully until he had stripped it of
30the excessive determinism that Rignano had conveyed to him.
Only when he received the message of Leninism did Li find that 
he could reconcile his own emotional commitment to political 
activism with the demands of Marxist theory.
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The Founding of Chien-she
It was not. long after the May Fourth incident that Sun
Yat-sen and his group in Shanghai entered the ideological fray.
In the heated intellectual atmosphere of the time it was clearly
necessary for Sun to have a forum for his views, one that could
compete with the many publications already in circulation among
the intelligentsia and the youth of China. Under the auspices
of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, which later that year was
renamed the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang), two
journals were founded. These were Hsing-ch'i p Ting-lun (The
Weekly Critic), and Chien-she, which carried the English
subtitle, The Construction. The first named of these appeared
on June 8 , 1919 and ran through fifty-three issues until June 
31
6, 1920. Chien-she, which carried lengthier articles, 
commenced publication on August 1, 1919. Its final issue was
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that of September 1, 1920. In all, it published twelve numbers.
As might be expected, the contributors to the two journals 
to a large extent overlapped. The members of the Chien-she 
Society were Tai Chi-t’ao, Chu Chih-hsin, Liao Chung-k'ai, Wang 
Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. All but Tai had been with Sun since 
the Min-pao days. Some division was made in editorial 
responsibilities for the two journals; for example, Tai took 
charge of Hsijig-chlji p * ing-lun and used it as the main platform 
for his own work, contributing at least an article a week. Hu 
and Chu Chih-hsin, along with Tai, were joint editors of Chien- 
she. As a further illustration of the closeness of the 
intellectual world in China at this time, Li Ta-chao acted as
84
the Peking representative for Chien-she, and he also made a few
33brief contributions to both publications.
It was in Chien-she that Hu published all his articles in
the 1919-1920 period. In the course of that year he displayed
a growing sophistication in his handling of the concept of
historical materialism. This gives reason to suppose that Hu
was only really coming to grips with Marxism in the spring and
summer of 1919, despite his previous exposure to more general
socialist thought. In the opening issue of Chien-she there
appeared H u Ts first writings of the May Fourth period: one article
was a synopsis and critique of the theories on mass psychology
of the French social scientist, Gustave Le Bon; the other was a
3 Ashort speculative essay called "Mencius and Socialism." In the
first article, Hu was concerned to show that Le Bon’s rather
contemptuous attitude towards mass behaviour, as expressed for
example in mass political movements, was completely mistaken.
Here it was that Hu declared how much genuine motivation, self-
discipline and restraint, and true patriotism characterized the
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current May Fourth movement in China. The first reference made 
to Marx in these articles appeared in "Mencius and Socialism."
In this article, Hu exaggerated somewhat the socialistic 
propensities of Mencius in order to find a socialist presursor 
in the Chinese tradition. This momentary awkwardness disappeared 
by the time of H u ’s fall articles. In October he published 
the first half of his "Materialistic Investigation of the 
History of Chinese Philosophy," which surveyed the history of 
ancient China and the whole Chinese philosophical heritage
85
36
in impressive style. His second major study to utilize the
methodology of historical materialism was his "Enquiry from an
Economic Standpoint into the Family System," which was published 
37
in May 1920. This traced the development of the traditional
patriarchal system, that central part of the old order which
was under sustained attack during the May Fourth years.
In the December 1919 issue of Chien-she, after finishing
his survey of the Chinese philosophical tradition, Hu presented
a long discussion of the theory of historical materialism
itself. This bore the title, not quite so cumbers.ome in
Chinese, of "A Criticism of Criticisms of Historical Material- 
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ism." It was Hu Han-min1 s major treatment of Marxist theo­
retical concepts in their own right. Here Hu laid out the 
principal texts of Marx and Engels, and attempted to refute or 
moderate the criticisms expressed by several western theoreti­
cians. This exercise proved to be much more than a comparison 
of texts. In the article were revealed, as had been the case 
with Li Ta-chao, the readjustments of Marxist vocabulary and 
Marxist concepts that Hu either consciously or unwittingly made 
in order to render the theory suitable to his own personal 
outlook, or, more significantly, applicable to China. One 
particular concern of H u ’s was the relationship between economic
forces and ethical norms. This was given amplification in his
39January 1920 article, "Class and Theories of Morality." His
last contribution to Chien-she in August of that year was on
the same topic, being a synopsis and comparison of the ethical
40
views of Karl Kautsky and Achille Loria. These three works
86
focused more than the others on the specific content of historical 
materialism. However, all of Hu Han-minfs articles at this time 
were infused with the "spirit" of the theory; thus his under­
standing of Marxism must be sought in the totality of his work.
The Background to H u ’s Marxism
Before examining Hu Ts articles on historical materialism it 
is necessary to identify the strain of Marxism which Hu encoun­
tered in his researches. It has been mentioned that Kawakami 
Hajime, Li Ta-chao and a few other writers had been the first to 
make Marxist ideas of any sophistication known in China, either 
in the form of translation or discussion of them. However, their 
conception of Marxism, and Hu’s as well, all had a similar back­
ground— the world of central European Marxism, specifically that
of the German social democratic movement of the turn of the 
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century. In the case of Hu Han-min this is extraordinarily 
apparent, perhaps because the critiques of Marxism that he had 
studied indirectly reinforced the view that the Marxism of that 
time was indeed the true faith. The "delayed reaction" to 
social democratic Marxism may have been due to the culture lag 
or simply the translation lag between western Europe and China; 
whatever the reason might be, the reader is left with the uncanny 
feeling of having been transported back two decades into the world 
of the central European socialist movement, a time of massive 
optimism about the socialist future. Paradoxically, both this 
political movement and the future it had envisioned lay shattered 
at the time that Hu first encountered Marxism in 1919.
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What were the main components of the Marxism dominant at 
the turn of the century? The arbitrary selection of these, and 
the necessary simplification involved, will carry obvious risks. 
However, there are several characteristics that can be isolated, 
and whether or not these tell the whole story about European 
Marxism they can be justified because they clearly influenced 
H u Ts understanding of it.
To begin with, Marxism in the 1890s was a theory that had
undergone considerable elaboration by Engels, who had created,
or certainly developed, the idea of scientific socialism.
Engels had given particular stress to Darwin's theory of
evolution, and thus had joined Darwin with Marx. Biological
and historical evolution became one; the history 'of nature and
the history of man were united. Now, regardless of whether
this represented a perversion of Marx’s conception of man's
history being separate from nature, and regardless of whether
dialectical materialism was a legitimate form of reasoning,
there was one incontestable historical result of Engels' work.
This was the belief that the coming of socialism was a matter
42
that had been scientifically proved. Marx's conclusions 
about the "laws" of history and economics were seen as 
scientific, and this science said that socialism, at least in 
western and central Europe, was bound to be realized. Thus 
there reappeared in Marxism, many years after the apocalyptic 
certainty of The Communist Manifesto, a deterministic element, 
one that was to cause the orthodox Marxists increasing trouble, 
especially in the years after Engels' death in 1895.
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However, this problem created by Engels, or at least this
problematic side of Marx that Engels had brought into the open
again, was only a part of the dilemma facing German socialism
at this time. In addition to this, there was the question 
*
raised by the development of a strong social democratic political 
movement. At first glance, the combination of economic deter­
minism supposedly proven by science and the voluntarism implied 
in a mass political movement seems contradictory, not to mention 
the juxtaposition of the Marxist goal of social revolution with 
the actions of a democratic political party. This did not prove 
to be the case, although the tensions created by these conflict­
ing demands were severe, and did contribute eventually to the 
breaking off from the movement of the Russian Bolshevik faction. 
Around the year 1900, which is the key point in time for an 
understanding of Hu Han-min*s Marxism, there seemed to be no 
contradiction between the class struggle necessary for the 
triumph of socialism, and the mass democratic political movement, 
since the latter was simply the means by which the former was 
to be realized.
In this regard, it is important to observe that Engels, in 
his introduction to Marx*s Class Struggles in France, written 
only a few months before his death in 1895, spoke with great
enthusiasm of the rapid increase in votes for the German Social 
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Democratic Party. The future seemed assured, since the 
workers were using the ballot to conquer political power.
There was included in this important last work of Engels the 
caveat that violence would have to be used if the bourgeois
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state tried to deprive the workers of their just electoral
gains. However, there is no doubt that Engels, at least in so
far as democratic Europe was concerned, wrote off the barricades
of 1848 and the Paris Commune as being futile sacrifices of the
working class, and instead saw the peaceful democratic process
to be the key to victory. In doing this, it should be noted,
Engels was building on some earlier utterances of Marx. In 1872
Marx had stated in Amsterdam that the United States, Britain and
Holland might find a peaceful route to socialism. Eight years
later, in. the introduction he wrote to the French Socialist Party
constitution, Marx noted optimistically that the workers were
45
turning bourgeois democracy to their own use.
At first sight, these new directions indicated by Marx
and Engels late in their lives seemed to be of limited value
because of their restriction to bourgeois constituencies. This
may well be true, but for the purpose of understanding the
transmission of this form of Marxism to China, and particularly
to an individual such as Hu Han-min, the caveats expressed by
Marx and Engels in their original texts were not conveyed. But
what was conveyed was a sense of ideological flexibility depend-
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ing on the particular nation or society involved. This is 
certainly very true in Hu's case; in his encounter with Marxism 
in 1919 there is no evidence ever displayed that Hu saw one 
form of Marxist political action to be the only one possible, 
nor for that matter did he seem to see that there was any one 
form specifically and immediately applicable to China. Rather, 
historical materialism appealed to him because of the insights
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it provided into the historical process, and the outline it 
offered of the workings of history on the grand scale.
As a consequence, then, of the late writings and actions 
of the founders of the faith, Marxism had developed about the 
turn of the century the somewhat awkwardly reconciled character­
istics of philosophical determinism and mass political action. 
The attempt to synthesize these fell to Karl Kautsky, a close 
friend and disciple of Engels, and the leading theoretical
spokesman for the German social democratic movement at this 
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time. Kautsky's explanation of the concept of class struggle 
is most relevant to the later comprehension of the term by 
Kawakami Hajime, Li Ta-chao and Hu Han-min. Kautsky, in keeping 
with the "scientific" and deterministic strand then current in 
Marxism, emphasized that the revolutionary changes in society 
were a result of great changes that were working themselves out 
slowly amongst the forces of production. Here he was going 
back to the words of the Preface to the Critique of Political 
Economy: "the period of social revolution," when "with the
change in the economic foundation the entire immense super­
structure is more or less rapidly transformed." Class struggle 
was tied to these great underlying economic changes. Because 
of this, there was no reason to engage in class struggle of an 
excessive or violent nature if the conditions were not ripe. 
Scientific socialism was to sharpen men's insights and prevent 
such adventurism.^
All the same, in this revision of Marxism the rhetoric of 
class struggle had to be maintained, as the concept was for
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Marx a fundamental part of his investigation. In reality, the
terms "class struggle" and "social revolution" for Kautsky became
transmuted into essentially democratic and non-violent concepts,
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at least in the short run. Social revolution, then, had
become divided into two parts: one consisting of change taking
place within the economic base, over which men had no direct
control; and the other consisting of political action through
which the workers were to gain control of the state— in Germany,
for instance, when they wrested power from the bourgeoisie and
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their allies through the ballot box. Thus the concept of
revolution not only had lost its apocalyptic tones of 1848, but
it had veered close to signalling simply the accession to power
of a new group of power-holders. That is, it had lost something
of its earlier sense of massive social change accompanying
convulsive political upheavals. In China, Li Ta-chao was
searching for the more volatile brand of Marxism; Hu Han-min,
on the other hand, accepted the Kautskyite interpretation without
any intellectual reluctance.
The second aspect of the German social democratic movement
that found its way into Hu Han-min’s Marxism is one which is
more immediately discernible than the previous one. Because of the
much accentuated emphasis on the "scientific" nature of Marxism
there was launched, also about the turn of the century, an assault
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on the theory by the German and Austrian neo-Kantian school.
Simply put, the main contention of this group was that Marxism 
did not explain why socialism ought to come about, or why anyone 
ought to strive for its attainment. The neo-Kantians also were
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responding to a worrisome feeling, one shared by many sympathizers
with Marxism, that the theory was entirely devoid of moral and
ethical principles, all ideas being nothing but the product of
different economic configurations. It was in reply to this
challenge that Kautsky entered the lists in 1906 with his Ethics
52
and the Materialist Conception of History. Hu Han-min displayed 
a very close familiarity with this work in his May Fourth writings, 
and to a very large extent he relied on it as a guide to under­
standing the relationship between economic forces, social class 
and the world of ethical thought.
Kautsky based his interpretation on the supposed affinity
that existed between Marxism and Darwinism; and in fact it was
53for this assumption that Hu held Kautsky in such high regard.
The first premise in Kautsky's argument was the existence of the
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'social instinct,” which had evolved in man from primeval times.
On to this Kautsky grafted historical materialism. This enabled 
him to formulate a morality for the oppressed, or as he termed 
them, the "uprising classes." The morality that had been 
developed by the ruling class was self-justificatory, and the 
ruling class naturally attempted to delude the oppressed classes 
with this "morality." However, in a formulation that seemed to 
stray dangerously close to an idealist position, Kautsky stated 
that the oppressed classes, in particular the proletariat, were 
proof against this, and instead created their own morality on 
the basis of their own class interest and the experience of 
their own class s t r u g g l e . T h u s ,  beginning with the concept 
of the basic social instinct which he took from Darwinism,
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Kautsky argued that historical materialism not only allowed for
moral principles, but made for an even higher morality on the
part of the oppressed. Although this case for the superior
morality of the proletariat did not convince Hu, the general
method of argument employed by Kautsky was highly influential
56on his own consideration of ethical systems. The importance
of Kautsky’s approach lay in his deduction of ethical values
from a combination of evolutionary factors as revealed by Darwin,
and economic factors as revealed by Marx through historical
materialism. This identification of Marx with Darwin, whose
reputation was then at its apogee in the science-filled atmosphere
of the May Fourth years, could not but strengthen the "truth" of
57the materialist conception of history.
Apart from Kautsky there was one other significant inter­
preter of Marx for Hu Han-min. This was Edwin Seligman, the 
American economist, whose book, The Economic Interpretation of 
History, had been translated into Japanese by Kawakami Hajime 
in 1905. Seligman, a scholar of considerable repute, said that 
he had composed this brief work to explain the premises of
historical materialism to those unable to read the original
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German language texts. Seligman was familiar with all the 
works of Marx and Engels that had been published by 1901, the 
time of the publication of the articles later reprinted in his 
book. He was also well abreast of developments in the German 
social democratic movement, such as the growing controversy 
between Kautsky and the revisionists over the accuracy of Marx’s 
analysis of the health of west European capitalism.
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There is no doubt that Seligman's volume played a very
important role in the formation of Hu's conception of historical
materialism. As well as providing a general sketch of Marx's
life and of the Marxist movement, Seligman offered for the first
time to Hu the basic texts regarding the theory. The imposing
collection of source materials laid out by Hu in the introduction
to his December 1919 article was drawn largely from Seligman's 
59
book. The texts from The Holy family, the first and third
volumes of Capital, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,
Wage Labour and Capital, and most important of all, Engels'
letters of September 1890 to Joseph Bloch and January 1894 to
Heinz Starkenburg on the problem of economic determinism and
historical materialism, were all made available by Seligman.
All of these texts emphasized the complexity and subtlety of
the economic process acting on the life of man. They drew
attention to the degree to which man himself could make his own
history, though in Marx's famous words, "not as he pleased."
These were invaluable supplements to the relevant sections of
The Communist Manifesto and the Preface to A Critique of
Political Economy that Kawakami Hajime had made available in
his Ch'en-pao article, and they allowed for a much more refined
grasp of historical materialism than, say, had been possible for
Li Ta-chao. Furthermore, the presentation of these texts in
his December essay was not only of importance to the development
of Hu's own argument; just as valuable as this, he had made
available to Chinese readers for the first time the essential
60
materials of the Marxist conception of history.
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Seligman’s interpretation of historical materialism exercised 
a strong effect on Hu, though it is certainly true that H u ’s own 
intellectual bent took him in the same direction. Basically, 
the analysis made by Seligman separated the "scientific socialism" 
of Marx from his "economic interpretation" of history. As 
Seligman expressed it: "Socialism is a theory of what ought to
be; historical materialism is a theory of what has been." They 
were "at bottom entirely independent conceptions."^'*' The first 
point that Seligman made in his critique of socialism was that 
Marx had been badly mistaken in his assessment of the state of 
western capitalism; not only had capitalism survived but it had 
prospered in the late nineteenth century. Secondly, regardless 
of the merits that the Marxian analysis of capitalism might 
possess, it was not possible to deduce the existence of class 
struggle from any such economic postulates. The presence of 
class struggle in a society had no necessary association with 
the economic factors located by Marx. The last argument that 
Seligman advanced was that if socialism should succeed capitalism, 
which he doubted, the time required for this transition would be 
of such a length that the question of socialism was of no 
immediate relevance. Since Marx himself had shown how slow the 
change from feudal to capitalist society had been, Seligman 
said that it would only be logical to expect the development of 
the socialist economic base to be equally drawn out. In his 
view, the Marxian analysis of capitalism either was in error, 
or else was of no practical concern.
On the more positive side, Seligman accepted what he called
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"the economic interpretation of history," that part of Marxism
that provided a means of analysis of past and present events,
and in this respect he cited examples of non-socialist scholars
who also were applying the theory in their research. Seligman’s
own application of the theory was somewhat erratic, though.
Despite frequent references to Engels’ letters on the subject,
and despite his repeated cautionary words about "economics only
being the final cause in the midst of a host of factors,"
Seligman adopted a rather mechanistic view of historical causa- 
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tion. The American Civil War he described as being "at the 
bottom a struggle between two economic principles," and the 
Spanish-American War he explained as being "the outcome of the 
sugar situation" that had caused the Cuban insurrection. Although 
he took a more subtle approach to the rise of nineteenth 
century democracy, which he attributed to the Industrial Revolu­
tion, Seligman tended to see economic causes determining poli­
tical events in a direct way.
Hu toyed briefly with this monocausal approach when he
stated that the First World War had resulted from "the struggle
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for markets and colonies." On the whole, Hu did not interpret 
historical causation in such direct economic terms. His 
explanation of the war may have been a reaction to the continual 
political and economic depredations of the imperialist powers 
in China. In his general application of historical materialism,
Hu emphasized that economic factors worked in a subtle and often 
indirect manner. In taking this approach, Hu.was more consistent 
than Seligman had been. What is.particularly striking,
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though, is the degree to which Hu shared, or else adopted, SeligmanTs 
basic response to historical materialism. Seligman opposed 
"scientific socialism;1* Hu, if he did not oppose it, certainly 
ignored it. Most worthy of note, both shared the belief that the 
genius of Marx’s theory lay in its being a new historical method­
ology. The prophetic and emotional side of historical materialism 
possessed no appeal to Seligman or to Hu Han-min; for them the 
attraction of the theory was completely an intellectual one.
Economic Determinism and Human Will
Hu wrote his principal essay on historical materialism to
disprove the objections raised by several critics to the supposed
economic determinism that the theory contained. None of these
critics denied the importance of economic forces in history, but
all reacted in one way or another to what they saw as the blind
6 4
determinism that characterized turn of the century Marxism.
In some cases this was the result of their own inadequate grasp
of Marxism, and here greater familiarity with the relevant texts
enabled Hu to dispose of the charges without difficulty. For
example, Eugenio Rignano, who had exerted an unfortunate influence
over Li Ta-chao’s early Marxism, had argued that an unresolvable
contradiction existed in Marx’s theory between the "economic
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process" and class struggle:
Either the struggle between the different classes . . . 
exists, and it follows that economic phenomena may be 
modified in one direction or another according as this or 
that class becomes preponderant; or, the economic process, 
as immutable as the orbits of the planets in the heavens, 
follows its inevitable course apart from any human influence 
whatsoever . . . .
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Rignano, as Hu pointed out, was completely unaware of the
degree to which Marx and Engels both emphasized the considerable
scope open for human activity, though always within certain
limiting conditions. Engels had stated late in his life that
he and Marx had been partly to blame for this exaggeration of
the economic factors in history since they had been waging
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battle against the idealists in the 1840s. However, as he
made clear in his letter of September 1890 to Joseph Bloch,
from which Hu quoted, blind economic determinism was unalterably
6 7
opposed to the theory he and Marx had created:
According to the materialist conception of history, the 
ultimately determining element in history is the production 
and reproduction of real life. More than this neither 
Marx nor I has ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists 
this into saying that the economic element is the only 
determining one he transforms that proposition into a 
meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. . . .
Another critique of Marxism based on a faulty understanding
of historical materialism was advanced by the Italian economist
Achille Loria. Loria is worth some words of introduction because
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of the very high esteem in which he was held by Hu. In the
1880s Loria had excited a minor controversy in European Marxist
circles because of his work on Marx and Marxism. Engels had
denounced a biography Loria had written of Marx as "brimming
with misinformation," and he had charged that Loria had "falsified
Marx’s materialist conception of history and distorted it with
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an assurance that bespeaks a great purpose." Engels may well 
have regarded this purpose as realized in The Economic 
Foundations of Society, which Loria published in 1886. His 
harshest words were directed towards this, since he believed,
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not without justification, that Loria not only had plagiarized 
Marx, but also had grotesquely simplified historical materialism 
by making the supply of land and the size of the population the 
dominant economic forces in history.^ Loria’s role in the 
late nineteenth century revisionist movement proved to be quite 
an ephemeral one. However, his survival, if not actual prosper­
ing in China during the May Fourth period, is an illuminating 
comment on the haphazard process of selection by which European 
social science was being introduced into China. It is also an 
interesting illustration of the curious collection of materials 
Chinese intellectuals had to contend with in coming to an initial 
comprehension of such a rich and complex theory as Marxism.
As will be shown later, Hu did adopt some of Loria1s ideas 
on the relationship between the interests of the governing class 
and the moral theories propounded by them. However, he shared
Engels’ disagreement with Loria’s particular "economic inter-
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pretation of history." Loria had based his critique of Marx
on the latter’s supposedly excessive emphasis on the technological
forces of production. Loria argued that these instruments were
themselves products of human invention; thus, man was placed
back at the centre of history. It may be said that Marx himself
was not overly careful about his use of the term "forces of
production." As Hu observed, the statement in The Poverty of
Philosophy that the hand-mill produced feudal society while the
steam-mill brought forth capitalist society certainly indicated
72the importance Marx attached to the instruments of production. 
However, a wider reading of Marx and Engels did make it clear
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that the forces of production were defined as consisting of more
than machinery. Land itself was one of these forces. Hu did not
disregard human inventiveness, but its effectiveness ultimately
depended on the social and economic environment. To this effect
Hu cited Kautsky’s illustrations that the introduction of
technology by the British and the French into their colonies had
not resulted in a sudden transformation of the mode of production
in these regions, because geographical and historical conditions
already in existence acted as impediments to or modifiers of these
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new productive forces. In Hu ’s view, instruments of production
could be introduced into a society, but in themselves they could
74not determine the course of that society’s development.
This question of the role of the individual in history 
received further elaboration by Hu in his discussion of one of 
the more curious'works to come to his attention, The Spiritual 
Interpretation of History, a book written by Shailer Mathews,
Dean of the Divinity School at the University of Chicago.
Mathews had objected to what he called Marx’s "simplistic monist 
interpretation of history," and he also felt that Marx had 
grossly underestimated the importance in history of the great 
political figure or moral leader.^ This claim Hu dismissed as 
displaying an obsolete eighteenth century attitude about the 
"greatness of the individual." It also had a distinctive 
"theological odour" about it. Hu repeated basically the formu­
lation employed in discussing Loria and the problem of human 
creation of the instruments of production. There was room in
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history for the great man, but he could realize his potential
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only under the right conditions. As Seligman put it, such a 
man is great "because he visualizes more than anyone else the 
fundamental tendencies of his society, and expresses to his
77fellow men the spirit of the age, which he embodies in himself."
Hu observed that Marx and Engels themselves were examples of how 
men struggled to alter their destiny: both were active propa­
gandists and both had worked in the First International. Yet it 
had to be remembered that these men were products of the age in 
which they lived, and Kautsky himself had admitted that such 
"deep thinkers" as Marx and Engels could not have produced their
philosophy in the eighteenth century, "before all the new sciences
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had produced a sufficient mass of new results."
A more stimulating challenge to Marx, and one that reveals
H u ’s own activist inclinations, centres around the question of
the part played by law in human history. The specific critique
in question here was written by Rudolf Stammler, a noted German
professor of jurisprudence and a member of the neo-Kantian 
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school. Stammler had distinguished between the "form" and 
"matter" of social life. Form, or more fully, "forms of 
external regulation" consisted of the juridicial norms that 
regulated man's activities, including all the ways in which he 
carried on production. Economic activity was defined as "matter," 
which was acted upon and determined by the legal regulations 
surrounding it. Stammler did admit to interaction taking place 
between legal forms and economic forces, but the effect of his 
hypothesis was to invert the fundamental Marxist concept that
102
the ideological superstructure, which included law, ultimately
responded to changes in the economic structure of society. Hu
refused to accept such a reformulation of Marx, but he was forced
to argue his position on empirical grounds. Historical evidence
indicated to Hu that the effectiveness of law was dependent on
economic conditions, In the Middle Age's, for example, Church law
had been unable to prevent usury when money was in scarce supply.
On the other hand, the important labour legislation enacted in
the late nineteenth century was a direct result of the rise of
the urban class which had been created by the great economic
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forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution.
These examples illustrated the ultimate responsiveness of
law to economic pressures. But Hu did not view law as solely a
passive response to these pressures. Engels had stated that
elements of the superstructure, such as constitutions, juridicial
forms, justice and philosophical theories all "exercise their
influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in
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many cases preponderate in determining their form." Hu himself
had pointed out in his earlier essay on Le Bon that law could have
a positive social function. In sharply disagreeing with Le Bon’s
pessimistic assessment of mass behaviour, Hu had argued that law
could influence society, and thus alter the behaviour of its
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individual members, H u ’s activist conception of law placed 
it almost in an educational role. (In fact, in this essay Hu 
went on to discuss the value of education in changing national
attitudes, and in adapting cultures to meet new historic
83
challenges in the way that Japan had done.) This interpretation
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of the value of law, or rather, of "progressive legislation" is 
not surprising. Law may have been dependent in the last analysis 
on economic factors, but short of that, Hu saw it as an important 
agent for the reconstruction *of the nation.
There is one final critique raised in H u ’s essay on 
historical materialism that is important to note, though this 
is because of what he fails to say in the rejoinder. Both the 
German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, and an American profes­
sor by the name of Charles Ellwood, shared similar misgivings 
about the primacy of the economic motive in history. Both
believed there existed many other equally decisive forces that
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determined human behaviour. Bernstein emphasized differences 
of race, religion and homeland as being more significant than 
economic relations. Ellwood, whose college textbook, Sociology 
and Modern Social Problems, is cited by Hu, pointed to the vital 
importance of psychological factors in shaping man’s social 
behaviour. He stated that the responses of people to environ­
mental stimuli varied on the basis of their heredity, instincts 
and habits. Ellwood concluded that "scientific sociology and 
scientific psychology" had found that there was "no reason for 
believing that economic stimuli determine in any exact way, or 
to such an extent as Marx thought, responses to other stimuli." 
Every social problem, therefore, consisted of a "multitude of 
factors or stimuli," within which economic ones were significant,
„  ■ 85but not dominant.
In reply to these charges, Hu stated that Marx had not 
proposed a theory of total economic determinism. Therefore,
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elements in the superstructure, such as a people’s attitudes 
towards religion and homeland, could react back on the economic 
base. Ellwood’s supposition that instinct and heredity were of 
great importance repeated what Darwin had said earlier. Hu said 
that he did not disagree with this, but he wished to note that 
these aspects of man’s self evolved over such a long time that
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they were not of immediate concern in discussing man’s history.
It seems probable that Hu believed these psychological factors 
ultimately to be responsive to economic forces. But this problem 
is a very difficult one, since the crucial question is not 
whether these factors existed, but rather the degree of autonomy 
they possessed. It is true, of course, that the scope allowed 
for activity by non-economic factors Is the most perplexing aspect 
of historical materialism. However, with respect to these 
psychological components of man’s makeup, the problem becomes a 
more difficult one, or certainly a more unpredictable one, as it 
touches on so much of man’s irrational self.
Hu cannot be reproached for failing to reply adequately to 
the above critique, since the concept of the irrational in human 
behaviour was only developing in psychology at the time. Yet 
it is curious that Hu should have failed to note here the power 
of nationalism, since he was so aware of the intensity of this 
emotion in the China of the May Fourth movement. This nation­
alism had been created from the Chinese sense of race and home­
land, and brought to fruition by the threat posed to national 
survival by foreign imperialism. Perhaps Hu underestimated the 
strength and intensity of nationalism at this time, when he was
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involved in the study of a philosophy which was a product of the 
scientific and rational world of the nineteenth century Europe. 
Whatever the reason might be for this, H u ’s position on nation­
alism in 1919 stands out in marked contrast to the critique of 
Marxism he developed several years later, a critique based in 
the first Instance on Marx’s neglect of this vital force.
In making an evaluation of H u ’s resolution of the tension 
between economic determinism and human will, it is apparent that 
Hu struck a judicious balance between the two, a position that 
reflected the Marxism that he had absorbed from Kautsky. This 
did not minimize the importance of economic forces, or their 
ultimately decisive power. One of the critiques examined by Hu, 
that of the eminent Russian economist, Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, 
had advanced the hypothesis that with the progress of civiliza­
tion the capacity of economics to influence history lessened.
Man became freer, and the human mind asserted an increasingly
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greater role in determining man’s future. This view Hu 
categorically rejected. Society had become more complex, and 
economic forces had become more subtle, but they were as dominant 
as they ever had been. It was in this context that Hu pointed 
to the recently ended Great War as an unchallengeable example 
of the economic fact: "all of the doctrines and all of the
slogans were mere window-dressing. The most important and 
genuine motives for it were the struggle for markets and the 
struggle for colonies.
Apart from providing an ultimate cause for historical 
events, the economic interpretation in Hu's application of it
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served to explain the great events of history. Hu definitely 
did not see it working in the determination of the lesser events
and the day to day activities of men. Thus there was consider­
able scope for the individual and the group to work out the
future, within the necessary preconditions. Political activism
was virtually an innate part of Hu’s character; however, his 
formulation of the degree of freedom permitted in Marxism 
probably owes as much to careful intellectual analysis of the 
texts as it does to his emotional promptings. Certainly there 
was no conflict here. But historical materialism was more 
than a methodology of history; it was a programme of social 
revolution. Its call for class struggle and the triumph of 
socialism presented quite a different set of problems to Hu 
Han-min.
Class Struggle and the Mode of Production
In Hu’s approach to the conceptions of class and class
struggle, there is apparent the same tendency of thought that
characterized his writings for Min-pao more than a decade earlier.
Kautsky’s exegesis of Marxism provided further support for this
attitude, and filled in some of the definition of the appropriate
Marxist terminology. Hu’s explanation of the origin of class is
derived from Kautsky: the division of labour and the production
of material goods gradually produced inequalities amongst men,
which at the outset of human society were minute, but with time
89widened into the class differentiation of today. However, in 
his understanding of the term ’’class,” Hu showed no change from
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his position of 1906, Society was divided into two camps, the 
oppressors and the oppressed, and these were defined politically 
rather than economically. The dominant group Hu referred to in 
many ways: its members were the "ruling class" (chih-p'ei chieh-
chi) , the "class with power" (ch’iang-yu-li ti chieh-chi), the
"powerholders" (chu-ch1 uan-che), the "conservative class" (pao-
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hu chieh-chi). In fairness to Hu, this lack of precision was
not always aided by the translations he utilized. In the excerpt 
from The Communist Manifesto that he quoted, "bourgeoisie" was 
rendered in its reasonably accurate Chinese version of "property- 
holders" (yu-ch1an-che). However, in an excerpt from Kautsky,
this term appears as "the class with authority and power" (ch’uan-
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li chieh-chi). And in Loria’s work, which exerted some
influence on Hu, the term "capitalist class" was used to describe
virtually any group holding power, as for example, when Loria
described as "capitalists" those who had oppressed the serfs in 
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the middle ages. Opposed to this ruling class was the equally
vaguely defined class of the oppressed. The term "proletariat"
is seldom used by Hu; it appears only in the translations of
passages from Marx and Engels. The terms "oppressed," "governed"
or "exploited" appear as descriptions of this class, but the one
expression used most frequently is "the class of the common
people" (p ’ing-min chieh-chi). This is the translation used
93for proletariat in all of the excerpts from Kautsky.
H u ’s understanding of class struggle is a logical consequence 
of two of his basic conceptions of Marxism: his generalized view
of class in terms of oppressors and oppressed, and secondly, his
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Kautskyite interpretation of change in evolutionary terms,
Marx had spoken in The Communist Manifesto of the history of
mankind being the history of class struggles, and Hu took note
of this in several places in his article on historical materi- 
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alism. This conception certainly could not have been novel 
to anyone surveying the long history of Chinese peasant 
uprisings, nor could it have gone without a response in one 
who had been at the centre of political struggle for as long as 
Hu had been. However, when Marx talked of class struggle he 
had in mind specific social groups opposed to each other at 
specific points in human history: for example, lord versus
serf in the feudal stage, capitalist versus proletarian in the 
present bourgeois era, Marx sympathized with the many social 
uprisings that had occurred throughout history, and he did see 
them fulfilling a certain function in undermining the old social 
order. Nevertheless, they did not play a significant historical 
role unless the mode of production of the old society was under­
going transformation. At this point class struggle was 
necessary to bring about the transition from the old historical 
epoch to the new one. Marx, then, clearly saw the working out
of history tied to changes in the economic substructure of 
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society. With this in mind, it can be seen that H u ’s more 
general view of class struggle simply being the struggle between 
rulers and ruled altered this crucial concept, and stripped it 
of its scientific socialist character, whether Hu realized it 
or not.
These varying terms present more than a question of semantics
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involved in the translation of concepts from one culture to 
another. The political character of the terminology chosen by 
Hu to describe these "classes’1 indicates a subtle shift away 
from Marx’s original conception. Although Marx spoke generally 
of two classes being opposed to each other at each stage in 
history, he defined these classes in terms of their relation­
ship to the means of production. In Hu Han-^min’s interpretation, 
these classes appear to be defined in terms of their relationship 
to political power. This defintion naturally encompasses
economic power; Hu often refers to the "exploiting and plunder-
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ing" character of the ruling class. However, this seems to be
more a result of the political strength of the class than a
result of its monopoly of the means of production.
The consequences of H u ’s political interpretation of
Marxism are considerable, for the oppressors of the mass of the
"common people" were now defined politically rather than
economically. In 1906 in his "Six Great Principles of the Min-
Pao," Hu had said that there were no economic classes in China,
97only the ruling class of the Manchus. In 1919 his interpre­
tation of Marxism continued this line of thought. In the view 
of Hu Han-min, Sun Yat-sen and the rest of the Kuomintang leader­
ship, China’s "class" of oppressors was composed of a small group 
of imperialists, compradores, warlords, and traitors. These four 
groups were not viewed so much in economic terms as they were in 
terms of their political strength. This was true even in the case 
of the two with obvious economic power: the imperialists and
the compradores. H u ’s interpretation of class, certainly
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as it applied to China, seems neither accidental nor capricious, 
but consistent with his viewpoint of the T ’ung-meng Hui period. 
That China was divided into two classes of oppressors and 
oppressed may have had some validity, and certainly may have 
been a political convenience, but the definition of the ruling 
class in terms that were primarily political, and only second­
arily economic, once more disguised disturbing realities about 
the nature of China’s society.
This tendency to see class struggle as the equivalent of 
any type of social struggle received confirmation, though not 
in a direct way, from Kautsky*s exposition of Marxism. As 
mentioned earlier, Kautsky had fused biological evolution with 
historical materialism, and at the same time had defined social 
revolution in terms that implied both its inexorability and its
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possible non-violent attainment. Hu explained this as follows:
Historical materialism realizes that social revolution is 
something that is bound to occur, sooner or later, and 
regardless of what methods may be employed. The seeds of 
its success already have been fertilized in the womb of 
the old society. . . . Historical materialism does not 
sever social revolution and social evolution into two parts.
Thus when it came to the concept of "social revolution," Hu fell 
back on what might be termed historical materialism in its grand 
and panoramic aspect, which saw change working itself out slowly 
and relentlessly in the womb of society. In this sense, as Hu 
stated, evolution and revolution almost became one. This formu­
lation admittedly poses difficulties for the notion of immediate 
social struggles, and this is not clearly resolved in Hu, but 
neither was it in the thought of his theoretical guide, Karl
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Kautsky. At this point, it may be best to sum up Hu ’s under­
standing of class struggle by saying that he did not see it in 
the apocalyptic terms of social upheaval as Marx did in the 
Manifesto, since he accepted the Kautskyite reading of the 
impersonal quality of the essential economic changes. At the 
same time, it may be said that Hu accepted the need for class 
struggle in the sense of social struggles of the oppressed against 
their oppressors, which were necessary for the righting of social 
wrongs, and more important, for the eviction of incompetent 
rules and the replacement of them by those who could rebuild the 
nation’s power.
The above characterization of Hu’s historical materialism
may become more plausible if one last question related to class
struggle is considered. This is the mode of production, defined
by Marx as "the totality of productive relations," each example
of which indicates a "different stage" in the history of mankind.
Hu was certainly aware of this concept: the definition of it
given here is taken from Wage Labour and Capital, which was quoted
99in Hu’s essay on historical materialism. However, it does not 
seem to have played a very important role in H u ’s thinking. The 
only place in Hu’s writing in which mention is made of the five 
stages of history formulated by Marx is in the material excerpted 
from the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy. But this 
sense of dynamic social development was compromised in the other 
quotations provided by Hu. For example, the reference in Wage 
Labour and Capital to "ancient, feudal and bourgeois society" 
is rendered into "ancient, feudal and present-day (chin-jih)
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society," and in the Manifesto, Marx’s statement about bourgeois
society emerging from the ruins of feudal society has been
altered to read "contemporary" (chin-shih) society emerging from 
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feudal society. It would appear then that the concept of the
mode of production and the progression of stages in history was 
definitely blurred and of secondary importance in H u ’s under­
standing of historical materialism.
This inattention on H u ’s part quite likely reflects the 
inapplicability of Marx’s framework to the Chinese historical 
experience. Hu ’s discussion of the Chinese past, particularly 
in its pre-imperialist phase, will be examined in the next 
chapter. It may be noted here that the only stage mentioned by 
Marx that Hu also utilized in his study of ancient China was that 
of feudalism. However, in this case the derivation from Marx is 
most unlikely, since the Chinese had referred to the period of 
their history from about 1000 B.C. to the Ch’in unification in 
221 B.C. as the feng-fen era, the period of "enfeoffments." Hu 
had no doubt that the Ch'in unification and the resulting
consolidation by the Han dynasty marked the most important
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transition in the history of China, What ultimately explains 
the Ch’in-Han divide in China’s history Hu does not venture to 
say, an omission shared by many students of that most perplex­
ing yet fundamental redirecting of Chinese government and 
society. The economic cause of the Ch’in-Han triumph Hu does 
not suggest; instead he seems to see this as a political pheno­
menon, military conquest followed by a political reordering of 
the state and of the intellectual lives of its subjects.
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It is apparent that Hu, also in company with many later
students of the Chinese past, viewed the period from the Ch’in
to the mid-nineteenth century as basically one. Hu did not put
forward a term to describe this period, but he did characterize
its economic features in the following manner
The Chinese people wavered between a household economy and 
a town-based economy. They did not reach the stage of a 
national economy. There was no great change in the mode of 
production. Therefore, there was no change whatsoever in 
the relations of society.
It was the European Industrial Revolution, brought to China as
a result of the changed nature of communications, that ended this
stagnant phase of the nation's history. With it came economic
and military oppression which China could not oppose. China was
now drawn into the world economy, and the old local character of
the Chinese economy had become a part of the past. The social
relations of Chinese society were being shaken and the lives of
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people were filled with great uncertainty.
To sirni up: Hu was prepared to allude to the mode of pro­
duction, although he did not go further than the above examples 
in defining the characteristics of each mode. It is interesting 
and quite revealing that Hu paid little attention to Marx’s 
Europocentric analysis of the stages of human society. Presum­
ably Hu saw these stages as a hypothesis limited to Europe in the 
way originally intended by Marx. When examining his own society 
in light of historical materialism, Hu saw a history different 
to that of Europe. The mode of production may have been a useful 
conceptual tool, but the social pattern it revealed was a uniquely 
Chinese one. This carried with it one further conclusion: if
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the mode of production and the stages of history in China were 
unique to China, then the social revolution would follow a 
different path from that sketched out by Marx and Engels for 
Europe.
Historical Materialism- and Ethics
What Hu found most suggestive in his researches into Marxism 
was the relationship Marx believed to exist between economic 
forces and man's ideological life. Because of his own thorough 
grounding in the Confucian classics Hu could not but find this 
question of the origins of social morality a most pertinent one 
to China. Through the mediation of Karl KautskyTs book, Ethics 
and the Materialist Conception of History, Hu largely derived 
his understanding of the Marxist conception of ethics. This was 
supplemented by excerpts from The Economic Foundations of Society, 
the work by the Italian economist Achille Loria. Hu devoted his 
last article for Chien-she, "The Ethical Views of Kautsky and 
Loria," to a summary and comparison of their respective ideas. 
However, Hu was certainly familiar with the work of these two 
men well before he wrote this article. Their conceptions clearly 
influenced all of Hu's own writings, and particularly his analysis 
of China's traditional ethical systems.
Hu's main interest lay in trying to understand the nature 
of that relationship that existed between the economic forces of 
society and the ideas held by society. Were the individual 
members of society determined in their beliefs by economic causes 
beyond their control? Or did there exist freedom of thought and
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freedom of choice, in other words, the scope for genuine ethical
behaviour? Kautsky's presentation of this question in terms of
Darwinian evolution had provided Hu with a convincing solution.
According to Kautsky, man's moral nature was derived ultimately
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from the existence in him of the "social instinct." This 
instinct displayed itself in man's membership in the group, 
since this was necessary for man's survival. As the needs of 
the group changed so did the specific forms in which the "social 
instinct" expressed itself. These were the different moral codes 
set up by the group for its own regulation. All morality, there­
fore, was relative to the time, place and practitioners of the 
particular code; there did not exist such a phenomenon as absolute 
morality or absolute immorality. Social demands formed themselves
into moral demands, and with changes in the economic structure of
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society these in turn underwent alteration. Kautsky believed
that a certain amount of interaction between the ethical and
economic components of society was possible, but that in the long
run "spiritual" forces always gave way to the economic forces.
Hu endorsed this interpretation; in his words, ideological forces
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were the "servants," not the "masters" of social needs. Thus,
autonomy of the human will was not denied completely by Kautsky 
or Hu, but it could operate only within limits circumscribed by 
social forces which ultimately responded to economic ones.
After establishing this basis for social morality, Kautsky 
then applied it to the class exploitation and class struggle that 
made up human history. Because of its more powerful position 
the ruling class often was able to exert moral demands on the
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exploited class that served to guarantee its own privileges.
This did not always result from the conscious design of a
specific ruling group. Moral demands frequently turned into
custom with the passage of time, and men came to observe them
without realizing the social demands that lay behind them. The
mode of production changed, social needs changed, but the old
moral "laws" preserved for some time their independent existence.
Thus they supported the entrenched ruling class, which stood to
gain from this check imposed on the newly developing social
forces. This explanation made a very strong impression on Hu,
particularly the point made by Kautsky about the tenacious
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survival of what Hu called "outdated" moral systems. The
reason for this is quite evident. No theoretical insight could 
be more applicable to the study of China’s own outdated moral 
system, which for too long had propped up the twin burdens of 
the imperial government and the Confucian family system.
One aspect of this question that intrigued Hu was that of 
how the ruling class made use of ideas of morality to strengthen 
its position. Kautsky believed this was done in a rather crude 
and domineering fashion. He felt that the force of "public 
opinion," by which term he seems to have meant something akin 
to conscience, was effective only within a specific class. This 
pressure could not be used by the ruling class to convince the 
oppressed class to act against its own interests. Thus the 
ruling class had to employ more forceful weapons, such as its 
superior armed or economic might, its better organization, its 
police, judges and any other possible means to extract obedience
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from the exploited. In addition, the ruling class propagated 
"moral principles,” though Kautsky is not clear how these were 
to be distinguished from "public opinion." In his view, the 
Church was assigned "the special task of conserving traditional 
morality." Without this support, Kautsky maintained that the
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moral authority of the governing class would soon disintegrate.
The final point that Kautsky had to explain was how the
oppressed class developed a moral sense if the dominant morality
was that of the ruling class. In his view, the oppressed
."uprising" classes always had possessed the ideals of freedom
and equality that drove them on against their exploiters. At
one point, Kautsky admitted that he did not know what the source
of these might be,^"^ but in another place he explained it as
"nothing more than the complex of wishes and endeavours that are
called forth by the opposition to the existing state of affairs."
This was the "motive power" in the class war, although ultimately
Kautsky had to assign this moral force to the economic conditions 
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of society.
Once he had accounted for the existence of this almost
natural morality in the exploited classes Kautsky found the
explanation of its historical development an easier task. The
social instincts and virtues possessed by the uprising classes
were sharpened by the class war. This happened because the
exploited had to put everything into the social struggle, while
the rulers fell into effeteness, content to leave their moral
defense to intellectual hirelings, or else fell into disarray
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among themselves fighting for the social surplus. In addition
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to this, there was an important role to be played by certain
individuals of high moral conscience, who left the ranks of the
ruling class and joined the uprising class because of their
awareness of the workings of society and the direction of its 
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development. As examples of such people, Hu mentioned 
"Russia's most famous personages; Tolstoy, Bakunin, Kropotkin
and Lenin, all of whom were of the nobility," and all of whom
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possessed "such fierce sympathy for the oppressed." Thus, ' 
there was room in historical materialism for the operation of 
the individual conscience. This was linked to an understanding 
of scientific socialism, which in Kautsky's view provided those 
gifted with political leadership and moral awareness the means 
to alter the lot of societys even if they were only able to 
‘immediately achieve limited reforms because of the prevailing 
social and economic realities.
Kautsky thus was going directly back to Marx in stating that 
man had to distinguish between what was necessary, and what was 
open to change. It was in his struggle for what was attainable 
that man could realize some of his voluntarist promptings. For 
Hu Han-min, Kautsky had made an effective reconciliation of the 
deterministic and activist elements in Marx, and had demonstrated 
that ethical conceptions and the striving for new ethical systems 
were human actions of social worth. Furthermore, by placing the 
social instinct on a Darwinian foundation, Kautsky, in Hu's 
estimation, had strengthened the theory of historical materialism. 
Hu did not accept all of Kautsky's argument that the uprising 
classes possessed their own virtually innate morality in defiance
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of that of the ruling class. This is a minor point, though.
Hu absorbed from Kautsky's exposition of Marxism the.emphasis
given by Kautsky to the relative nature of all moral systems,
and his belief in the close relationship of these moral systems
to class society. These ideas became important components in
H u ’s interpretation of China's own ethical tradition.
It was in the work of Achille Loria that Hu found a more
complex and satisfying explanation of the manipulative character
of moral systems in class society. Loria's interpretation,
which owed much to Marx, provided Hu with a conceptual framework
which he later utilized to analyze China's traditional ethical
system. Loria believed that there were two different functions
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served by the moral systems present in society. The first
was the imposition of restraints on the ruling class, so that 
its exploitation of society would not become so severe as to 
cause the oppressed to rebel. The other function served by 
morality was the inculcation of ideas of compliance and non- 
resistance into the oppressed class. In Loria's view, the 
expression of what he called "pure egoism" was the ultimate
social goal; that is, the realization by the group and by the
\
individual of the highest and most responsible interests of each.
The morality that was prevalent in capitalist society, for 
example, deliberately interfered with the "egoism" of the working 
class, since the realization of that would threaten the dominant 
position of the ruling class.
Loria regarded public opinion as the crucial force in the modern 
world for the propagation of this self-interested morality by the
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rulers of society. Following Marx's conception, Loria believed 
these moral ideas to be effective throughout society, and not 
just within the class generating them, as Kautsky seemed to 
believe. Hu followed Loria's explanation, though it is interest­
ing that he tried to mediate somewhat between the two positions 
by making the highly plausible suggestion that only when the 
members of a class developed "a very clear sense of self-
consciousness” would they cease to be influenced by the prevail-
116
ing ideas of the dominant social class.
Both Kautsky and Loria agreed that religion acted as a 
servant of the ruling class. Loria gave detailed attention to 
the changing forms of religious belief in western history,
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basing his analysis on the periodization conceived by Marx.
In the ancient slave societies, for example, moral standards 
were enforced through fear of immediate punishment. This did 
not prove effective in disciplining the oppressed of society, 
since as slaves their condition was already one of utter misery, 
Christianity, which Loria identified with the serf system, 
improved immeasurably on the ancient religions, as it deferred 
rewards and punishments to the future life. Salvation acted as 
a lure to make men act opposite to their actual "egoism" in this 
life. The moral system propagated by Christianity made the 
exploiter restrain himself, while it gave the exploited the 
illusion of eternal bliss to come. In recent times, according 
to Loria, religion had been supplanted by public opinion. This 
new moral force prevented the capitalist class from overreaching 
itself in exploitation, while it ensured the obedience of the
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workers by deluding them with notions such as the sanctity of 
property.
Loria thus arrived at the same conclusion expressed somewhat
later by Engels in his letter to Franz Mehring, that is, that men
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often act because of falsely perceived motives. In the case 
of the exploited of society this was frequently so. Morality 
was the product of the dominant class interest, but it was a 
product of a subtle and insidious sort. It was a prudential 
morality for the governors, and a morality of obedience and 
endurance for the governed. This conception by Loria of the 
dual function of moral systems Hu Han-min found highly suggestive, 
and he saw many applications of it in the ethical systems 
developed in imperial China.
The Historical Materialism of Hu Han-min
In his writings of late 1919 Hu Han-min embraced the theory
of historical materialism with unqualified enthusiasm. This
concept had transformed the disciplines of sociology, economics
and history, as well as the socialist movement. Thus he could
say that historical materialism had "virtually delineated a new
epoch." Its impressiveness was attested to by the highest praise
that could be given: it was ranked by Hu as equal to Darwin’s
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theory of evolution. However, it is apparent that the aspect 
of historical materialism that appealed to Hu was what might be 
termed its grand conception of history. Historical materialism 
could help explain the relationship between a society and the 
"mode" of thought prevalent in it. The theory could assist in
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the explanation of the evolution of such dominant ideas. Historical 
materialism was also of value because of the insights it provided 
into the workings of society itself: it revealed the function of
economic interest, and it indicated how society had always been 
divided into the two classes of oppressors and oppressed. But as 
H u ’s understanding of historical materialism is viewed in a closer 
focus, it becomes apparent that the revolutionary social content of 
the theory was given little prominence. This does not imply that Hu 
was fatalistic; quite the opposite, since Hu was a committed 
political activist. His activism, however, took him in a different 
direction than that outlined by Marx in his analysis of modern 
society. Hu’s direction was that of the nationalist movement, 
to which he had long dedicated his life, and which sought, in 
however flawed a manner, a Chinese route to China's regeneration.
Thus what is so striking about Hu's historical materialism
is its intellectual character, rather than its emotional urgency.
His major discussion of it in December 1919 has been described
by Benjamin Schwartz as "a more thorough treatment of the subject
than anything we can find in the writings of either Li Ta-chao 
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or Ch’en Tu-hsiu." The accuracy of this assessment is 
certainly beyond doubt. Yet, if the specific responses to 
Marxism on the part of two of these actors, Li Ta-chao and Hu 
Han-min, are compared, there becomes apparent an interesting 
irony. Li Ta-chao, probably through no fault of his own, mis­
understood at first the fundamental nature of historical materi­
alism, but within a short time the demands of his own political 
temperament led him not only to correct his mistakes, but to
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embrace Marxism-Leninism as a political movement. Hu Han-min in 
1919 had a much better grasp of the complexities of the theory, 
but his appreciation of Marxism was a-more cerebral one. Histori­
cal materialism impressed Hu as a great creation of the intellect, 
but it did not impinge on his political emotions as it did on 
those of Li Ta-chao.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao both committed themselves to 
the new Leninist turning. What drew them to Marxism was the 
revolutionary message which, in Lewis Feuer’s fitting characteri­
zation, "provides the most natural idiom and vision for the
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expolited persons in all societies." Ch’en and Li responded 
to the prophetic side of Marxism; Hu responded to its analytic 
quality. H u ’s loyalty remained with the national revolution, 
a goal profoundly different from the social revolution essential 
to Marxism.
CHAPTER XV
THE REASSESSMENT OF THE CHINESE PAST
Preliminary Guidelines
In October 1919, Hu Han-min published the first part of "A 
Materialistic Investigation of the History of Chinese Philosophy." 
This essay represented Hu ’s most extended and systematic analysis 
of the Chinese intellectual tradition. It also serves as an 
excellent illustration of H u ’s interpretation of historical 
materialism as a theory valuable primarily for the historical 
hypotheses it suggested. In this essay, and in shorter works 
written for Chien-she, Hu used Marxism to reinterpret the rich 
and varied Chinese past. At no point, however, did he attempt to 
force that past into a prescribed or mechanistic interpretive 
scheme.^
Throughout his study of Chinese philosophy, Hu stressed that
the complexity of the interaction between the economic base and
the ideological superstructure ruled out any analysis based on
rigid economic determinism. In the list of points prefacing this
essay, Hu made clear his balanced understanding of historical
materialism: "Social life and social needs govern (chih-p’ei) the
minds of philosophers, but once a specific philosophy is formulated,
2
it in turn influences society." Elsewhere in the essay Hu cited 
Engels’ late letters on historical materialism, and Seligman’s
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exposition of the theory in support of the argument that economic
factors could not explain each discrete event in human history.
As Hu phrased it: "When social change occurs the most important
cause is the economic one, but this is not to say that only
3
economics brings about social progress." This admonition should 
be borne in mind, since Hu's discussion of the Chinese philosoph­
ical tradition frequently focused on the relationship between 
political factors and the world of thought, rather than on the 
relationship between the mode of production and its ideological 
epiphenomena.
Along with this perspective on Hu's historical materialism, 
there are two other points to be noted about his treatment of the 
Chinese past. First of all, Hu called for a critical but dispas­
sionate examination of the intellectual tradition. This reevalu­
ation was essential in the case of Confucianism, since the ruling
class had exploited its teachings of obedience and hierarchy to
4
support its own privileged position. However, this was not H u ’s 
main concern. He saw the battle against the supporters of 
traditionalism as already won: their position he dismissed as 
"derisory." H u ’s worry was that the whole of the Chinese past 
might be swept away by the critical assaults of the May Fourth 
movement. Thus he warned that the past must not be viewed simply
5
as "meaningless tradition." In regard to his own particular 
interest, China’s philosophical heritage, Hu expressed the fear 
that the ancient systems of thought might be rejected without 
exception as intellectually empty and socially harmful.^ The 
past merited severe criticism, in Hu's judgement, but it held
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much that was of value, and this must not be lost to China.
The second aspect of H u ’s interpretation of the past which 
should be noted concerns the question of equivalence between the 
Chinese and western historical traditions. Hu did not express 
himself explicitly on this point; however, by adopting different 
perspectives it is possible to resolve the seemingly ambiguous 
positions he expressed. H u ’s basic belief, which is implicit 
throughout his essays, was that Chinese history followed its own 
path, and that it must be examined on its own terms. Western 
examples might be brought forward for comparative purposes, and 
western ideas of history might be highly suggestive, but neither 
should be applied literally to China. In his essay, "Mencius 
and Socialism," which was published in the first issue of Chien- 
she, Hu indicated at the outset the limitations within which any 
comparison of China and the West, past or present, must be 
conducted. Modern socialism, he stated, stemmed primarily from 
the social discontent rising out of the Industrial Revolution.
Since China had not undergone such an experience, ideas equivalent 
to those of modern European socialism had not been developed.
As Hu concluded: "Ancient methods cannot be applied to the present, 
nor can present European socialist ideas be applied exactly to 
China.
In a much more general sense, however, it was possible to 
compare China with the West. The social dislocations of the late 
Chou period of China’s history brought forth an attempt to solve 
the "social problem" which had certain parallels with the European 
response to the crisis of industrialism. Both periods were
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characterized by sharpened awareness of fundamental human concerns,
such as those of freedom, equality, and the satisfaction of basic
material needs. In addition, both periods.were~characterized by
a great intellectual response in the realm of social and political 
8
thought. Here it may be observed that the nature of the equiva­
lence between China and the West, which superficially appears to 
be the most general of all, actually may be the most significant. 
Hu may have rejected precise analogies with the West, but he saw 
in the Chinese tradition, particularly in the case of the great 
age of Chinese philosophy prior to the Ch’in unification, an
intellectual vigour and a degree of accomplishment equal to what-
9
ever the West had created. Although the cultural tradition of 
China required critical scrutiny, Hu always regarded it as a 
heritage which was most imposing in its scope and possessed of 
its own intrinsic value.
Historical Periodization and the Well-Field System
In his essay on philosophy, Hu took as his starting point
the political and social disorder which had become endemic in
10
China during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The origins 
of this problem were to be found as early as the eighth century 
B.C., when the Chou dynasty, the feudal overlord of all the 
Chinese states, was forced to move its capital to the east under 
the pressure of nomadic invasions. This signified the end of the 
Chou as an effective dynastic power, although the fiction of 
Chou sovereignty was maintained until the third century B.C. 
because of the symbolic religious functions which only the Chou
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monarch could carry out. With, the decline of the Chou, the many 
small feudatories began to vie with one another for territory 
and spoils. Out of these there eventually emerged several power­
ful kingdoms which possessed the military might to spread destruc­
tion throughout the land. By the late Chou, the time more
familiarly known as "the era of the.warring, states," China had
11become the scene of constant warfare among these kingdoms.
The conditions of life during this period were rued constantly
by the writers living at the time. Mencius depicted the age as
12
one in which the natural order of things had been reversed:
In wars to gain land, the dead fill the plains; in 
wars to gain cities, the dead fill the cities. This 
is known as showing the land the way to devour human 
flesh.
The miseries of the common people Mencius described in a similar 
13
passage:
There is fat meat in your kitchen and there are well- 
fed horses in your stables, yet the people look hungry 
and in the outskirts of cities men drop dead from
starvation. This is to show animals the way to
devour men.
It was to counter this breakdown of the social order, which
manifested itself in every type of crime, from regicide and
parricide to the exploitation of the common people, that Mencius
constructed his philosophical system. This was true of all the
thinkers of the late Chou. Hu Ts statement that these men were
responding directly to the well-chronicled conditions of their
14
time was hardly contentious. But what ultimately lay behind 
the political and social disorder? This was the most important 
question, and truly the most perplexing one to answer. Hu 
searched the classics, and found what he thought to be the
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underlying economic explanation in the disintegration of the 
ancient well-field system.
Before H u ’s discussion of the well-field system is examined, 
it is necessary to make a few comments on the historical materials 
available to him in .1919., . At this seemingly late date, the 
classics remained virtually the only source for the study of 
China prior to the Ch’in dynasty. This meant that any investiga­
tion of ancient China had to be drawn from works such as the 
Shih Ching (Book of Odes), and the Shu Ching (Book of History), 
which dated from the early and late Chou respectively. Some 
help also was provided by philosophers with'a historical interest, 
such as Mencius and Chuang Tzu. Apart from studying these pro­
ducts of the traditional literary culture, there was no alterna­
tive, for the archaeological discoveries which would serve to 
transform the state of knowledge about ancient China lay a few 
years in the future. It was in 1921, for example, that excava­
tions were begun as Yang-shao, which revealed the existence of 
a late neolithic culture possibly identifiable as the mythical 
Hsia dynasty. Not until 1928 was the capital of the late Shang
dynasty unearthed at Anyang, proving the historical existence
15
of the predecessors of the Chou. Thus the critical historian 
of the May Fourth period was placed in the position of attempting 
to reinterpret the traditional view of the past through the 
materials which served as the foundation of that tradition. In 
the absence of other sources of evidence, the historian had to 
examine the classics in exceedingly minute detail in search of 
a few neglected facts. Out of these he had to try to build a
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new interpretation of the historical tradition.
The thinness of the literary stratum of materials is nowhere
more evident than in the case of the well-field system. Mencius
provided the most complete description of it in the following
brief passage:
A ching is a piece of land measuring one 1 1 _  square, 
and each ching consists of 900 mu. Of these, the 
central plot of 100 mu belongs to the state, while 
the other eight plots of 100 mu each are held by 
eight families who share the duty of caring for the 
plot owned by the state. Only when they, have done 
this duty dare they return to their own affairs.
Apart from this, there is only one other place in which Mencius
alluded to the well-field. In a section describing the ideal
society of the early Chou, Mencius spoke of the two social orders,
the rulers and the common people. The former, he said, were
arranged into a hierarchy, with carefully prescribed privileges
and responsibilities attendant upon rank. The common people,
whose duty it was to obey the ruling elite, were distributed on
the hundred mu plots of land divided in the well-field pattern.
This arrangement guaranteed their self-sufficiency, and together
with the clearly defined social hierarchy, created harmony and
stability. Mencius concluded by observing that the feudal lords
had destroyed all this, so that by the time he was writing, the
18
ideal social structure of the early Chou lay far in the past.
In his opening reference to the well-field system, which
was made in the "Mencius and Socialism" article, Hu admitted to
the limited nature of the evidence available for the study of the
early Chou: "None of the social conditions of that age are easily 
19
ascertainable." Apart from Mencius, there was "no other
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reliable testimony" to the existence of the well-field. However,
at this point in August 1919, Hu did not appear to be overly
concerned whether or not the system actually had existed. The
main argument he wished to advance was that, regardless of the
historical authenticity of the well-field, Mencius had responded
to the "social problem" of his age by looking back to the Chou
20
for the ideal social order. This non-committal attitude on the 
part of Hu did. not last long, though. Two months later he 
published the first part of his essay on the Chinese philosophical 
tradition. In this Hu advanced the claim that the well-field in 
fact had existed, and that its disintegration was responsible for 
the decay of the Chou social order, and the eventual social chaos 
of the warring states period. Such an avowal immediately prompted 
a response from Hu Shih, who professed skepticism about the well- 
field, or any system of land tenure remotely resembling it. As 
a consequence, a debate was initiated which not only touched on 
the authenticity of the well-field depicted by Mencius, but more 
importantly, ranged into the much wider question of the periodiza­
tion of China's ancient past.
In outlining the position taken by Hu Han-min in the contro­
versy, it is necessary to begin with his general characterization 
of early Chou society, Hu accepted the traditional Chinese 
description of this period as being feudal in nature. The feudal 
system (feng-chien chih-tu; to use the modern term) had been set 
up in the eleventh century B.C. by the Chou conquerors in order 
to facilitate the administration of their newly won kingdom.
By means of the process known in Chou times as feng-fen, or
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"division on the Tenfeoffement’ basis," the Chou monarch split
the realm into approximately one hundred vassal states, and these
in turn were subinfeudated into hundreds of lesser fiefdoms 
21
(fu-yung). A sharp divide existed between this ruling class
and the mass of the common people. It was to this latter group,
Hu argued, that the well-field pattern of land-holding applied.
He defined the system as one of "communal property" (kung-chTan)
created by "the equal distribution of land on the basis of popu- 
22
lation." In this formulation it is unclear whether Hu meant 
that the land was commonly owned and worked, or whether it was 
divided into equal but privately owned allotments worked on a 
cooperative basis. Hu never resolved this ambiguity. However, 
regardless of what precisely he had in mind, the import of his 
argument remained unaffected: the well-field system was the
underlying cause of the social stability of the early Chou 
because of the basic subsistence it guaranteed to the mass of 
the people,
Hu made it abundantly clear that the feudal political
structure and the well-field system were intimately bound
together. In the early stage of their development they
"supported each other"; later they "dragged each other down to 
23
destruction." There were two factors primarily responsible 
for the breakdown of the well-field system. The first of these 
was the inevitable growth in population. This argument, which
Hu had drawn directly from Malthus, found support in Han Fei
» 24Tzu's depiction of late Chou China:
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But nowadays no one regards five sons as a large 
number, and these five sons in turn have five sons 
each, so that before the grandfather has died, he 
had twenty-five grandchildren. Hence the number 
of people increases, goods grow scarce, and men have 
to struggle and slave for a meager living.
As a result of the pressure of population the hundred mu allot­
ments were no longer sufficient to support much larger families; 
while at the same time many of the allotments were being frag­
mented into units too small to guarantee subsistence. The second 
reason advanced by Hu for the demise of the well-field was the 
rise of the merchant class. With the development of specializa­
tion, called "the hundred crafts" by Mencius, the merchants 
gained wealth through their monopoly on the exchange of products. 
Evidence from the Tso Ghuan indicated that, by the early eighth 
century, merchants held great power. As time passed, the merchant 
class was able to gain control of the peasants’ land, and the
weakened Chou state could do nothing to prevent the alienation to
25
the merchants of the old land allotments. Hu felt that by the 
time the Chou capital was moved to the east in 771 B.C., the 
well-field system was badly decayed. By the beginning of the
warring states era in the fifth century B.C., it had long ceased
• +. 26 to exist.
As soon as Hu had published the first part of his article 
on the Chinese philosophical tradition, he was challenged by 
Hu Shih on his well-field hypothesis. The latter advanced three 
major criticisms of H u ’s position. First, Hu Shih questioned 
the nature of the evidence Hu had cited. In Hu Shih’s opinion, 
the absence of sufficiently detailed and reliable accounts from
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the early Chou made it impossible to draw an accurate picture of
the well-field system. In fact, Hu Shih said, he suspected that
the system was nothing more than a "utopian" fantasy of the
warring states period, which Mencius had further elaborated in
order to "praise the past and diminish the present." Hu Shih
then went on to argue that, in the event that the well-field was
not a spurious creation of the late Chou, it still remained
unlikely that the system detailed by Mencius could have existed.
The "half-tribalized, half-civilized" society of the early Chou
was incapable of implementing such a precise and methodical type
of land division. If attempted, it could be no more than a crude
27
approximation of the social structure Mencius had outlined.
The final point of contention concerned the relationship 
between the feudal rulers and the common people. In the discus­
sion of Hu's well-field hypothesis, Hu Shih was supported by a 
new participant in the debate, Chi Jung-wu. Both of these men 
agreed with Hu that the feudal political order formed the ruling 
class in the early Chou. Where they disagreed sharply with Hu 
was over his contention that a system of communal property owned 
by the common people could exist alongside this class structure. 
Hu Shih stated that if the hundred mu allotments had existed, 
they did not represent the equal distribution of land on the 
well-field pattern, but rather the apportionment of a feudal 
lord's estate to his tenants. Instead of providing the people
with a basic level of subsistence, the well-field actually stood
28for their exploitation.
Chi Jung-wu carried this argument further in his article.
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He said that he found it difficult to believe that the concept 
of private ownership of land was unknown in the early Chou. Chi 
quoted extensively from Jenks' History of Politics to explain 
man's prehistoric evolution. As far as the development of pri­
vate property was concerned, the key stage was the pastoral, for 
it was during this time that 'private ownership of moveable goods, 
such as cattle, came into existence. This led to the creation 
of wealth, and the beginnings of class differentiation. In the 
next stage, which was that of agricultural society, private
ownership was extended to include land, and this in turn widened 
29
disparities. Since the well-field system represented a form 
of land-holding in an agrarian society, Chi asked how such a 
system could escape the influence of private property relation­
ships. In his understanding it could not; therefore, he shared
Hu Shih's position that the well-field was nothing more than a
30
form of land-tenantry. In Chi's words, the inescapable fact 
which had to be confronted was that "a system of communal property 
.,. could be spoken of only if there first existed equality among 
the people.
In replying to Hu Shih's charges that the well-field was 
either a spurious creation or only a rough approximation of the 
social order Mencius had portrayed, Hu admitted that insufficient 
evidence made it impossible to describe the early Chou with any 
precision. He conceded that the system outlined by Mencius may 
not have been literally accurate in its details. However, he 
completely rejected the suggestion that Mencius had arbitrarily 
fabricated the historical record. Hu then went on to say that
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Hu Shih had gone to extremes by dismissing the well-field on the
grounds that the early Chou could not create such a minutely
detailed structure. It was one thing to question the degree of
complexity possible in the well-field system; it was quite another
32
to dismiss the system out of hand. Hu believed that the limited 
materials available pointed to the existence of some type of 
communal land system, and until further evidence came to light 
he was prepared to work with them.
When it came to refuting the interpretation advanced by Hu 
Shih and Chi Jung-wu that the well-field represented a form of 
land tenancy, Hu was forced to spell out his own argument in more
detail. First of all, he indicated where the well-field belonged
33in the evolution of society:
The well-field system was a type of common land owner­
ship (kung-yu-chih) which existed in ancient China prior 
to the development of private land ownership. We must 
distinguish it from the systems of equal land ownership 
which are dated subsequent to the development of 
private property.
Therefore, the farmers of the equal allotments were not tenants
or serfs. According to Hu, they possessed the right to use the
land, while the feudal rulers possessed only the right to collect
taxes, which, as Mencius had said, were drawn from the central
34
allotment of the well-field. Hu also took exception to the 
statement that a communal land-holding system could not coexist 
with a class society such as that of the early Chou. In this 
regard, Hu said that Chi had distorted the concept of social 
evolution, when he implied that private property in land abruptly 
came into existence once man moved beyond the pastoral stage.
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Chi had ignored the transitional period, when characteristics 
of both societies might be found. There was no reason, then, 
why communal property in land, a characteristic of the pastoral 
stage, should not be found in the initial phase of the agricul-
i - 35tural stage,
Hu also made the point that Chi had relied excessively on
Jenks' History of Politics for his interpretation of prehistory.
While Jenks had much of value to offer, Hu said that his hypotheses
could not be accepted without reservation, since China's social
36history displayed its own unique characteristics. This was 
true of the subject under discussion. Travellers among the 
minority peoples in southern China had reported the common culti­
vation of land, with division of produce taking place after the 
tribal chieftains had been given their share. Why did this form 
of social organization still exist? It was not because the tribes­
men believed in some philosophy of absolute equality, Hu stated, 
but because their mode of production had undergone virtually no 
change from primitive times. With such a low level of technology, 
and such restricted utilization of the land, these peoples had
progressed little beyond the pastoral stage, with its very rudi-
37
mentary communal agriculture. Thus contemporary evidence could 
be found within China to prove the reality of the ancient well- 
field system.
With the presentation of this rebuttal of Chi Jung-wu, Hu's 
participation in the debate came to an end, and shortly after the 
controversy reached its unresolved termination. In weighing the 
materials of the debate, how should Hu's case for the well-field
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system be judged? The first question to arise is that of the
historical existence, at least in rough outline, of the social
system which Hu believed to have characterized the early Chou.
On this point the current assessment of that distant time provides
a mixed response. With the exception of official Communist
historiography, which views the early Chou as a slave society,
there is little disagreement concerning the feudal political
38
structure established by the Chou conquest. What form of social
organization was to be found beneath this feudal elite is much
more problematic, although the presence of such a precisely
organized structure as the well-field is highly dubious. There
is also agreement that the common people provided some form of
support for their feudal overlords. Where the disagreement is to
be found is on precisely the same question which Hu debated with
Hu Shih and Chi Jung-wu, that of the relationship between the
feudal ruling class and the common people who worked the land.
Apart from the official Communist, view, which holds the
well-field to be part of Chou slave society, there are three
modern interpretations of the ancient system which are of note.
In his study of Chinese feudalism, Derk Bodde states that there
may have been an arrangement whereby peasants privately cultivated
their own land and commonly cultivated that belonging to their
overlord. According to his surmise, the well-field system depicted
by Mencius may represent a memory of an early Chou administrative
39
and economic unit. Hung Vu-lan also admits to the possible 
existence of the well-field, but in contrast to Bodde, he inter­
prets it as a system by which the feudal overlords allocated
139
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labour duties to their serfs. On the other hand, Hu ’s belief 
that communal property-holding existed under a feudal chieftain 
receives support from the Chinese historian, Hsii Chung-shu, who 
noted that certain frontier peoples, such as the Li-shu in south­
eastern Yunnan, carried on "extensive agriculture accompanied by 
per capita allotment of land." This practice he described as 
having "many features similar to the well-field system." In 
sum, the evidence is inconclusive, but the existence in the early 
Chou of some form of general cultivation of the land on behalf 
of the feudal overlords appears likely. It may not be possible 
to reach any closer to the well-field than this.
The second, and more intriguing, question to be answered 
concerning H u 's well-field hypothesis is whether it represents 
a historical materialist analysis. On this point there already 
exists some confusion with respect to Hu's role, a consequence 
of an otherwise brilliant article on the well-field in twentieth 
century historiography by the late Joseph Levenson. In this 
essay, Levenson states that Hu interpreted the well-field as a 
"society of primitive communism." As a result of Hu's periodiza­
tion, Levenson states, the way was opened up "to document a
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general phase of history from famous Chinese sources." Now, 
there is no doubt that Hu's studies of historical materialism 
during 1919 influenced him to attempt to find an economic basis 
for social change, and to define the relationship which existed 
between social conditions and the ideas they created. This was 
stated by Hu at the outset of his essay on the philosophical 
tradition of China. However, it is a considerable leap from
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this position to the claim that Hu was attempting to fit China
into the Marxist scheme of historical periodization.
This characterization of H u ’s position may be documented
from the statements Hu himself made in the course of the well-
field controversy. To begin with, Hu did not use the term
"communism" in discussing the well-field society; he referred to
43it as the "communal ownership" (kung-yu-chih) of land. Lest
this seem semantic quibbling, Hu stressed the point that, when
he spoke of the communal society of the well-field period, he
had not implied that "the Chou was a communist (kung-ch’an)
society, nor that some kind of absolute egalitarianism in .
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property had existed." Furthermore, Hu not only noted the 
presence of the feudal political order, but he expressly tied it 
together with the well-field system. He also said in reply 
to Chi Jung-wu, that the existence of communal land-holding did 
not necessarily mean the absence of social classes. All of these 
remarks serve to indicate that Hu definitely was not advancing 
a case on behalf of a primitive communist stage in China's history.
If Hu did not intend to impose a Marxist historical stage 
on the Chinese past, to what extent can it be said that his 
analysis reflected a more general Marxist interpretation of 
history? It has been shown that Hu may have been correct in his 
belief that some kind of communal working of the land existed in 
early Chou society, and that the feudal ruling class received 
support from this system. However, in describing this social 
order, Hu failed to specify the nature of the relationship 
existing between the commoners and their feudal rulers. It is
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this omission which ultimately makes Hu’s argument difficult to
h o t
pin down. Hu did/\provide an adequate answer ho:the objection 
raised by Hu Shih and Chi Jung-wu that a genuinely communal form 
of property-holding, that is one which benefited only the property- 
holders themselves, could not exist in a class society. This 
objection, it may be noted, possessed an even more telling effect 
when applied to the well-field system, since the class society 
with which it supposedly coexisted was the intricate and rigid 
feudal hierarchy of the early Chou.
If social classes existed, as Hu admitted, then'it is 
difficult to understand how a non-exploitative relationship 
could have existed between the ruling class and common people 
working the land. Although Mencius, in his depiction of the 
well-field, said that the state received the product of the 
central field, while the eight surrounding families enjoyed the 
product of their own labour, it would be optimistic indeed to 
believe that such a system could work with the scrupulous honesty 
and self-restraint Mencius imputed to it. Since the common people 
not only lacked political and military power, but also were 
confronted by a military ruling class, the balance between rulers 
and ruled could only be of momentary duration, if it were even 
conceivable. Hu ’s failure to consider this point is puzzling, 
all the more so in light of his clear understanding of the mili­
tary character of the Chou feudal elite. H u ’s references to 
backward tribal societies which practised communal agriculture 
did not provide an answer, since he again neglected to define 
the relationship between tribesmen and their chieftains. Tribal
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land farmed by primitive agricultural techniques may have 
produced little surplus wealth, but this did not mean that exploi­
tation was absent from these societies.
In conclusion, Hu's essay on early Chou social history must 
be judged from the perspective of the intellectual world of May 
Fourth China. Regardless of the accuracy of his portrayal of the 
well-field system, the debate Hu initiated was a significant part 
of the reexamination of the national past then under way. When 
Hu presented the hypothesis that the well-field had flourished 
and decayed, thus bringing about great changes in the social 
order, and eventually in the world of thought, he was presenting
China’s history in a manner which Levenson called "socially 
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evolutionary. For Levenson, this sense of dynamism imparted
to the ancient tradition was of more significance than the 
literal accuracy of Hu's interpretation of one aspect of that 
tradition. This may be the most fitting assessment of Hu's role 
in the well-field debate.
The Philosophical Response of the Late Chou:
The Three Schools
The thesis put forward by Hu, then, was that the disintegra­
tion of the feudal order and the well-field system of the early 
Chou took place simultaneously. With the development of 
specialized crafts and the increase of commercial wealth, the 
feudal lords were able to wage wars of a longer and more 
destructive nature. At the same time, the pressure resulting 
from the increasing population, and the exploitation practised
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by the rising merchant class had deprived the common people 
forever of that basic measure of subsistence they had formerly 
enjoyed. Because of the incessant feudal warfare, and the 
inescapable economic insecurity, life for the mass of the people 
in the late Chou was precarious indeed. China had developed 
what Hu termed its own "social problem" which was reflected in 
a complete breakdown of the old order of social relationships 
and personal morality. But there was one beneficial feature in 
this otherwise bleak picture. The late Chou generated "an 
extraordinary re^onse in social thought": it produced the great
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age of Chinese philosophy.
As indicated in the opening words of his essay on the
philosophical tradition, Hu proposed to analyze this response
from a historical materialist viewpoint. Despite this professed
aim, however, Hu did not state at the outset precisely what
methodology he had in mind when utilizing this concept. It is
necessary, then, to extricate from his discussion the guiding
principles of his analysis. First, and not unexpectedly, Hu
approached Chou society in terms of the familiar "two-class"
model of governors and governed, oppressors and oppressed.
Throughout his consideration of the social problem of this era,
these terms continually reappear to describe the two combatants
of the class struggle. In fact, many of the terms cited in the
preceding chapter to illustrate the various translations of
"oppressors" and "oppressed" are drawn from Hu’s discussion of
47late Chou society and thought.
The division of ancient and imperial society into these
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two groups provided a general framework for H u ’s analysis, but
one that did not of itself go far as a Marxist approach. At a
minimum, a historical materialist analysis should consider the
class origins of the philosophers, and secondly, it should
define their relationship to the prevailing class structure. In
Hu’s study of Chinese thought, the first question was given
little emphasis. At one point Hu made reference to the Marxist
concept, elaborated on more fully by Kautsky, that in a time of
social disintegration, elements of the "intellectual proletariat"
broke free from the ruling class and took a stand on behalf of 
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the oppressed. In this context, Hu mentioned the wandering 
scholars (shih) of the Chou period. However, he did not go any 
further in describing the characteristics of this group, nor did 
he attempt to pinpoint its specific class origins.
Now, it is true that vagueness and uncertainty surround the 
problem of the class character of the various Chou philosophical 
schools. Fung Yu-lan, for example, describes the shih of the 
time of Confucius as unengaged in any form of productive 
activity, and reliant completely on government office and teach­
ing for survival. Originally the shih had been military officers 
of the Chou state, but with the breakdown of the Chou feudal 
order they lost this status, and merged with the ju, the term 
applied loosely to those with an interest and competence in 
education and the arts. Confucius, in Fung’s terms, was "if
49not the originator," at least "the great patron" of the shih.
To give one further example, the origins of the school of Mo Tzu 
have been located in the middle and lower levels of society,
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perhaps among the urban craftsmen and professional guilds. This
produced a type of thought which, to use Frederick Mote’s
admittedly facetious description, ’’reeks of what we like to
50consider lower middle class virtues." However, whether or not 
Hu was in a position in 1919 to reach more than tentative conclu­
sions regarding the social origins of the philosophical schools 
is not really the question. The one which is of importance is 
that Hu did not search for their class origins. Although he 
made reference to the high degree of activity on the part of the 
"intellectual class" during times of political and social collapse, 
he did not take a Marxist line of analysis by investigating how 
the prevailing social disorder had affected the security and 
status of the members of the "class." In handling the great age 
of philosophy of the late Chou, Hu did not go beyond treating 
the specific schools of thought as more than a general response 
to the chaotic character of the age.
Where Hu more evidently tried to apply Marxist notions of 
class was in analyzing the attitude of the philosophers towards 
prevailing class relationships within the Chou. This allows 
some scope for discussion, since Hu worked out "positions" on 
this question for each of the three major schools. The first 
to be considered is that of Lao Tzu. In H u ’s estimation, Lao
Tzu was the most "revolutionary" of the ancient philosophers,
51
since he wished "to smash the whole class system." Hu
characterized Lao Tzu’s philosophy as one that "embraced the
doctrine of thorough destruction." Lao Tzu believed the
52
"political process to be the root of evil." As a result of
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the growing complexity of society, the political class had become
more powerful, and had acquired more extensive and more highly
specialized means to carry out its arbitrary and ruthless acts.
Politics, then, was for Lao Tzu the root of the "social problem."
The solution to this lay in a return to the simplicity of the
distant past: the population of the state should be reduced;
people should lay down the tools of war, shun the use of ships
and carts, and live peacefully and contentedly in their own
53small states without any contact with their neighbours.
According to Hu, Lao Tzu regarded civilization as the enemy.
He opposed material progress, the development of knowledge, and
54
the creation of new human wants. Therefore, he advocated the
curbing of individual desire, whether for material possessions,
or more importantly, for knowledge itself, to be the key to
55recapturing the long-lost age of peace and contentment.
The best summation of Lao Tzu’s philosophy, Hu suggested,
was contained in one phrase: "The way never acts yet nothing is
56
left undone." This concept, translated usually as "non-action" 
or "doing nothing," was in the first instance a philosophy of 
government. Although Lao Tzu wished to destroy the "whole 
political class," this did not suggest to Hu that the destruc­
tion of government itself was implied. The function of govern­
ment in Lao Tzu’s ideal society was "to refrain from interference"
57
in the lives of the people. Although Lao Tzu’s philosophy 
possessed an important mystical component, Hu viewed it primarily 
as political in nature: a formulation shared, it may be noted, 
by A.C. Graham, who has stressed that "doing-nothing" is
advised by Lao Tzu as "a means of ruling,-not as an abdication 
5 8
of ruling." However, because Lao Tzu’s ideal society could be
realized only if enough people could be prevailed upon to forsake
civilization and return to the simple past, Hu saw his political
philosophy as completely impracticable. That this "revolutionary
transformation of society back to an earlier stage was impossible
did not detract from Lao Tzu's importance as a political thinker.
His radicalism had to be understood as a significant, although
highly idealistic and escapist, response to the pressing social
problem of his a g e.^
If Lao Tzu counselled a dismantling of civilization and a
return to primitive simplicity, Mo Tzu, according to Hu, was
concerned only with practical matters of the present time. Mo
Tzu neither lamented nor praised the social system; he was
concerned with "doing no more than preserving existing conditions
Therefore, he had created an ancient Chinese form of "pragmatism.
In evaluating the worth of any set of teachings, Mo Tzu applied
the "three tests," those of "basics," "verifiability," and 
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"application." Mo Tzu was interested only in providing 
practical answers to ease the life of the people of his day.
This included the training of the people in the arts of self- 
defense, since security of their city-states was the matter of 
foremost importance in the age of the warring states. On a 
more philosophical plane, Mo Tzu advocated a mixture of teach­
ings, though the thrust of these was towards the elimination of 
extravagance, not so much because simplicity was the ultimate 
social goal, but because calculations of "profit" and "utility"
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should guide the people, Hu quoted the list of practical
reforms which the sage should draw from in advising on the
particular malady afflicting a state: exaltation of the
virtuous if confusion were present; simplicity in funerals if
the country were in poverty; condemnation of music and wine if
the people were over-indulgent; reverence of Heaven if insolence
were widespread; and universal love and the condemnation of
offensive war if the country were engaged in conquest and
oppression. This last doctrine, that of universal love, was
6 2
termed by Hu an answer to the problem of "class struggle,”
As far as Hu’s argument goes, it may be noted that the
depiction of Mo Tzu as being indifferent to whether the class
system should be maintained or eradicated amounted to support of
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the existing social order. Hu did not comment on this point, 
perhaps because he regarded it as implicit in his argument.
More likely, though, Hu felt that the principal object of this 
exercise was to indicate the position taken by the Chou philoso­
phers towards the class system of their day; he was not assessing 
"praise or blame" for the particular positions. It was this 
lack of a clear-cut position on the desirability of the class
system that, in Hu ’s view, made Mo Tzu stand out in contrast to
64
Lao Tzu and Confucius.
In view of the central role played by Confucianism through­
out most of China’s history as the official creed of the ruling 
class, it is not surprising that Hu devoted particular attention 
to it in his study. In contrast to Lao Tzu, Confucius believed 
that the development of civilization was both natural and
149
desirable. Speaking of the good fortune of the people of the 
state of Lu, Confucius said: "Chou could survey the two preced­
ing dynasties. How great a wealth of culture! And we follow 
upon Chou."^ This heritage was not to be rejected; it was only 
to be purified of the corrupt elements which had compromised its 
moral excellence.
In terms of his class orientation, it followed then that
66Confucius "upheld the whole class system." Hu stated that
Confucius proposed two essentially reformist means by which the
society of his day might be restored to its ancient grandeur.
First, he advocated the rectification of names (cheng ming), or
in Arthur Waley's more pointed translation, "the correction of 
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language." With the correct use of language the ruler would 
know how to behave as a true ruler, the minister as a true 
minister, the father as a true father, and the son as a true 
son. Not only each official of the state, but each member of
68
society would carry out his proper functions in the hierarchy.
No longer would the feudal lords and ministers usurp the rights
and powers of the Chou monarch, nor would the common people
meddle in the affairs of their rightful governors: ' "When the
Way prevails under Heaven, policy is not decided by Ministers;
when the Way prevails under Heaven, commoners do not discuss 
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public affairs," As a result of this correction of language, 
confusion would no longer exist, only harmony.
The second reform advocated by Confucius, "rule by moral 
force" (wei-cheng i-te), was also directed at the rulers of 
society. Superficially, this concept bore a resemblance to
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70Lao Tzu’s idea of non-action:
Govern the people by regulations, keep order among 
them by chastisements, and they will flee from you, 
and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral 
force, keep order among them by ritual and they will 
keep their self-respect and come to you of their 
own accord,
What was characteristically Confucian about this approach,
however, was that its goal was the creation of a good governing
class, and not the reduction of this class to virtually nothing,
71
as Lao Tzu had desired. Confucius believed that the excesses
of his day stemmed primarily from a lack of virtue on the part
of society’s rulers. Since he recognized that the common
people did not have the power to resolve the social problem, it
was necessary that the ruling class be inculcated with virtue,
if the welfare of the people were to be ensured. In Hu’s
summation, Confucius accepted the existence of class society,
but in order that this society not destroy itself in "class
struggles," the governing class had to learn once more how to 
72
govern properly. Far from being a "revolutionary" like Lao
Tzu, Confucius was, in Hu words, an advocate of "peaceful 
73reformism."
This analysis of Confucianism receives further treatment 
in H u ’s discussion of Mencius. The latter, it may be recalled, 
was the subject of one of H u ’s first Chien-she articles,
"Mencius and Socialism." In it, Hu endeavoured to show that 
Mencius harboured certain ideas which might be termed socialistic, 
although he could not devise a political mechanism to ensure 
their realization. According to Hu, Mencius indicated some
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inklings of a historical materialist approach in his philosophy,
since his first assumption was that man’s basic material needs
must be satisfied before his intellectual and spiritual nature
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could be developed. Such an analogy, it may be observed,
was rather crude, as well as being inaccurate. Marx had stated
that it was the manner in which the production of man’s material
needs took place that determined his social relationships and
the content of his ideology. He definitely had not implied
that once these basic needs were satisfied, men had the freedom
to engage in educational and cultural pursuits: this freedom
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was absent as long as class society existed. This misreading
may represent nothing more than an initial difficulty Hu confronted
in grasping the theory of historical materialism; on the other
hand, as will be discussed later, it may indicate a basic failure
to understand fully what Marx meant by the mode of production.
However, from this point, Hu went on to argue more persuasively
that Mencius proposed to ensure the basic welfare of society
through what Hu termed "the management of the people's production."76
There were two parts to this. First, Mencius advocated
the restoration of the well-field system, since it guaranteed the
common people self-sufficiency, and thereby promoted social
stability. In H u ’s rather optimistic words, "its implementation
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would have solved nine-tenths of the social problems." Second, 
the state should restrict its activities, and interfere in the 
lives of the people only to conserve resources and provide aid 
in time of emergency. Incidentally, in regard to this second 
set of measures, Hu for once broke his own admonition about
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finding specific parallels between ancient China and the modern
West: with some hyperbole he stated that these programmes of
’’conservation" and "benevolent intervention" were "the same as
78
those practised by modern civilized countries."
How did Mencius propose to implement this programme? As 
far as his first policy was concerned, Hu said it was most 
unlikely that the ancient well-field system could be restored 
with anything approaching the precise mathematical equality it 
demanded. This was only part of the problem, though. The 
major obstacle confronting Mencius was his own conception of 
human nature, since he believed mankind to be divided by funda­
mental differences of intelligence, morality, and skill.
Mencius joined this assumption to his belief in the division of
labour— "the hundred crafts"— and produced the classic statement
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of his political philosophy:
There are affairs of great men, and there are affairs of 
small men.,.. If everyone must make everything he uses, 
the Empire will be led along the path of incessant toil. 
Hence it is said, ’There are those who use their minds 
and there are those who use their muscles. The former 
rule; the latter are ruled.' Those who rule are 
supported by those who are ruled.
Mencius admitted quite willingly, then, to the existence of
the "two classes" of society, the governors and the governed.
However, as Hu argued, Mencius could suggest no practicable
means of regulating the relationship between them. On the one
hand, he stressed that authority was essential to society and
that the people were obligated to acknowledge it; on the other
hand, he emphasized that the ruler held grave responsibilites
and that the people had the right to overthrow him if he abused
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his trust. The only resolution of this dilemma which Mencius
could suggest was the earlier Canfucian one of inculcating the
members of the governing class with virtue, so that they would
80
always be aware of their obligations to their subjects.
However, this was an inadequate solution. Hu concluded by
stating that the inability of Mencius to provide a political
mechanism to link the governors and the governed created the
basic impasse in his system, and prevented the realization of
81his commendable social goals.
Although Hu did not make the point, it may be seen that 
Mencius had taken the same line on the "class system" as had 
Confucius. If his utopian scheme of reinstituting the well- 
field is set aside, Mencius may be seen to share the Confucian 
reformist position which was directed towards preserving the 
status quo. Hu's failure to make explicit the conclusions of 
his analysis of Mencius probably reflected the fact that in 
August 1919 he had not worked out fully his argument on the 
"class orientation" of the philosophers. This had to wait until 
the fall of the year, and his longer articles on the entire 
heritage of Chinese thought. Regardless of this, the direction 
of Hu's analysis is clear. Apart from the Taoists, who looked 
back with utopian hopes to a distant time of primitive simplicity, 
the late Chou philosophers supported the existing class structure 
of governors and governed, and sought only to remove the abuses 
which had compromised the effectiveness of this social order.
As seen above, Confucius and Mencius tried to do this by the 
cultivation of noble qualities of self-restraint and benevolence
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in each member of the ruling class. However, this dual emphasis 
on "class society" and social responsibility, or "reformism," 
made Confucianism more than a philosophy for individual better­
ment. It was also a political philosophy which could be well 
utilized to protect the interests of the ruling class, and to 
support the power of the state. In his discussion of the 
imperial epoch in China’s history, Hu went on to show how 
Confucianism was developed to serve those ends, and how it acted 
as a burden which crushed the free spirit of the Chinese people.
The Ch’in-Han Divide: Politics Dominates Philosophy
Hu was in no doubt that the great age of speculative thought
came to an end with the Ch’in unification of 221 B.C. With the
triumph of the Ch’in, and the consolidation of the imperial
system by the succeeding Han dynasty, the state became the
ideological arbiter in Chinese life. As a result, China entered
two thousand years of intellectual stagnation, when, as Hu put
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it, "the world of thought showed no advance." However, to 
judge by Hu's analysis, the reason for this significant turning 
point in China’s intellectual history appears to have been 
fundamentally political in nature, and not economic. Here it 
may be appropriate to review briefly the argument advanced by 
Hu about the changes which had occurred earlier in the Chou 
economic substructure. In this view, the early Chou was 
characterized by the existence of common property in land, 
although the ruling political structure was feudal. With the 
growth in population, and the rise of the merchant class,
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this system disintegrated,, bringing about great hardship for the 
mass of the people. At the same time, the collapse of the old 
order of rigid social relationships, and the rising level of 
wealth and military technology made it possible for the feuda­
tories to engage in constant warfare. The eventual outcome of 
this process was the victory of the state of Ch’in, and the 
inauguration of the imperial age.
From this outline, it is apparent that Hu regarded the Ch'in
and Han dynasties as the political culmination of the economic
transformation of the Chou. What is not so clear, however, is
the character of the new mode of production. Hu referred to it
83on only one occasion:
The Chinese people wavered between a household economy 
and a town-based economy. They did not reach the stage 
of a national economy. There was no great change in the 
mode of production. Therefore, there was no change 
whatsoever in the relations of society.
This is not too helpful, apart from indicating Hu ’s conception 
of the localized character of the traditional economy, and 
emphasizing once more his belief in the stagnation of the 
imperial epoch. What Hu seems to have held responsible for this 
unchanging mode of production, regardless of its precise form, 
was the dominant power of the state. This, admittedly, is some­
what speculative, since Hu never filled in the details of the 
different sets of productive relationships which had occurred 
in China’s history. However, there is reason enough to argue 
that Hu, in effect, believed politics to be capable of deciding 
much more than the immediate course of history, even if 
economic forces acted as the final determinants. This certainly
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is the case Hu presented with respect to the overpowering and 
long-lasting influence on Chinese society of the state orthodoxy 
created in the early Han.
Hu shared the traditional view that the final development
of the state Confucian ideology came about only after trial and
error on the part of the ruling class. First came legalism,
which supposedly had been applied in the state of Ch’in in the
fourth century B.C. by Shang Yang, and theoretically elucidated
in the following century by its most famous advocate, Han Fei Tzu.
Hu stated that Han Fei Tzu had "arrived at the philosophy of
legalism through an economic investigation of s o c i e t y . T h i s
claim Hu based on a quotation cited earlier: "But nowadays no
one regards five sons as a large number, and these five sons
have five sons each.... Hence the number of people increases,
goods grow scarce, and men have to struggle...for a meagre 
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living." This speculation may not be defensible on the basis 
of such slender evidence. However, Hu’s statement that all of 
the philosophical schools of the late Chou were moving in a 
legalist direction is more convincing. Because of the social 
disorder of the late Chou, men had come to feel that "evil laws 
were better than no laws at all.” Han Fei Tzu dismissed the 
primitive simplicity of Lao Tzu, the universal love of Mo Tzu, 
and the paternalistic benevolence of Confucius, replacing them 
with his doctrine of the absolute authority of the state, 
enforced through harsh penalties.^ In order that society never 
fall into such chaos again, Han Fei Tzu said that everything 
should be done to make "the state wealthy" and "its armies
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powerful." Because of this subordination of every citizen to 
the interest of the state, and the practice of all the strata­
gems of "statecraft" to ensure the survival of the state, Hu
characterized legalism as a philosophy of "narrow utilitari- 
„87anxsm.
It was this legalistic creed which the Ch'in attempted to
implement throughout the empire after the conquest. Mass
uprisings broke out because of the severity of legalism, and the
Ch'in dynasty quickly came to an end, to be followed by the Han.
Taking advantage of the experience of its predecessor, the Han
governing class, according to Hu, worked out an official
philosophy much more subtle than that of the crude Ch'in
legalism. Hu stated that this philosophy, which later became
known as "state Confucianism," was much more effective since it
was directed towards both the governors and the governed, an
88argument, it may be noted, which Hu had drawn from Loria.
Because it taught the ruler that he had certain obligations to
fulfill, Confucianism acted as a check on his absolute power,
thus restraining him from reckless actions which might drive his
subjects to rebellion, and bring about the overthrow of the
"powerful class" (ch'iang-che chieh-chi) . At the same time,
Confucianism taught the members of the "weak" or "powerless
class" (jo-che chieh-chi) that acceptance and obedience were the
virtues they should cultivate. He summed this up by saying:
"Whenever class society exists, the ruling class will make use
of a morality of 'compromise and mediation' (t'iao-ho che-chung),
89
as this is most in its interest." As a consequence, the Han
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ruling class invested the original philosophy of Confucius with
a "religious" character, and in turn, this newly created state
Confucianism became the support for an "authoritarian monarchical 
„90
regime.
Hu attributed the extinction of the great age of the 
philosophers primarily to the suffocating effect of this state 
orthodoxy. Traditional explanations, such as the burning of the
91books by the Ch’in, he did not regard as particularly convincing. 
The state utilized the intelligentsia, or in Hu ’s words, the 
"learned class" (chih-shih chieh-chi) , to defend its own class 
interests. The Han established the doctorates in the five 
classics, the C h ’ing added further degrees to the examination 
system, and, even in present-day Europe and America, "the
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scholars and professors have been suborned by the capitalists." 
There were exceptions to this pattern, of course. Following 
Kautsky’s explanation, Hu said that some members of the intel­
lectual class took the side of the oppressed when "social 
conditions were in upheaval," and "the authority of the ruling 
class could no longer reach out" to restrain them. This point 
he illustrated with examples from China's own tradition. The 
philosophers of the late Chou, the Tung-lin Academy of the late 
Ming, and the overseas students of the late Ch'ing, the group
to which Hu had belonged in his youth, all represented this
93uncorrupted and uncompromised part of the intelligentsia.
However, despite the integrity of their thought, and even their 
momentary political importance, they remained peripheral to the 
main course of Chinese intellectual history which was dominated
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by the orthodox tradition.
It is quite apparent from Hu ’s major essay on the history 
of Chinese philosophy that his own intellectual sympathies for 
the tradition became decidedly less enthusiastic when he moved 
into the imperial epoch. This is also revealed in his handling 
of the material under examination. For the pre-Ch’in part of 
his study Hu was prepared to throw out hypotheses on such 
questions as the economic and social character of the early Chou, 
the change in the mode of production in the late Chou, and the 
political response of the great thinkers to the social problem 
of the warring states period. His treatment of post-Ch’in 
philosophy lacks this provocative quality. It seems, rather, to 
reflect the undifferentiated nature of the social and -ihtellhc-- 
tual order which Hu believed had remained basically unchanged 
for two millennia. As a result, the second half of his study of 
philosophy does not, on the whole, go beyond summarizing the main 
ideas of the principal thinkers of the imperial age.
Throughout his discussion of the post-Ch’in period, it is
apparent that Hu was forced to explain the philosophers under
consideration in terms of their response to problems which were
fundamentally of a political nature. Hu himself emphasized that
the writings of certain figures, such as the late Han recluse,
Wang Fu, were prompted directly by the political instability of
the day. Wang Fu, a harsh critic of the contemporary government
and society, advocated a return to the pure strain of
philosophical Confucianism which had existed prior to the Han
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adulteration of it. Similarly, Chung-ch’ang T ’ung, who lived
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in the troubled times of the third century, looked back to the
pre-Han era, but he believed that a return to legalism would
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bring order and justice to society. Both of these men were
products of the age of political and social chaos which had set
in with the disintegration of the eastern Han in the second
century. These conditions of instability lasted for four
centuries, the period of the Six Dynasties, during which northern
China was subjected either to continuous barbarian attack, or
direct barbarian rule. The most significant response to the
"social problem" of the Six Dynasties was the rise of Buddhism.
This faith, Hu observed, offered salvation in another world, a
prospect which held out hope both to the mass of the common
people, and to members of the aristocracy broken in the political
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struggles of the day. Once order was restored by the Sui and
the T Tang in the early seventh century, Buddhism slowly went into
decline, and under the patronage of the state, Confucianism once
again enjoyed a resurgence of strength. In the twelfth century,
Confucianism reached its apotheosis as the state philosophy,
when Chu Hsi laid down his readings of the classics. Now finally
restored to their former eminence, the classics, along with Chu
Hsi’s commentaries on them, became the essential components of
the imperial examination system, which both served and supported
97the state for the next seven hundred years.
The above statement indicates that H u ’s survey of post- 
Ch’in philosophy did not embrace any interpretations of a 
particularly unconventional nature. This by no means implies 
that the second part of Hu ’s study is lacking either in scope or
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erudition. Hu Shih in fact complimented Hu on his treatment of
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the orthodox and unorthodox schools of Han thought. However, 
in terms of his avowed historical materialist purpose, Hu was 
unable to explain the philosophers of the imperial age apart 
from their reaction to events which were political in nature. 
This is illustrated, for example, in his discussion of the 
escapist response to the social problem of the third and fourth 
centuries, a problem which Hu saw caused by the disintegration
<
of the Han dynasty, and the accident of the barbarian invasions. 
What this points to is that Hu seemed to believe that the 
virtually unchanging mode of production of the imperial age made 
politics the decisive factor in social and intellectual life.
From a Marxist point of view, there was nothing incorrect 
about viewing these two thousand years in such a way: Engels
had written that a direct economic cause could not be associated 
with every event in the phenomenal world, though ultimately 
economic factors asserted themselves in determining change.
The question is one of balance. To what extent did politics, 
in other words, one part of the superstructure, become virtually 
independent, and in turn, come to dominate other elements of 
the superstructure, not to mention the economic base? Hu's 
argument that the pre-Ch'in tradition of speculative thought 
was replaced either by official Confucianism, which served the 
interests of the state, or mysticism which sought escape into 
another existence, implies that the course of two thousand years 
of Chinese intellectual history was directly the product of a 
political cause. However, if politics could determine the
162
thought of an age, then politics could change it as well. The 
stagnation which Hu saw in the imperial era superficially may 
indicate a pessimistic outlook on the nation’s history, but 
the belief that political action could alter that tradition, 
and build a new one, held out a much more optimistic prospect 
for China’s regeneration.
The Tasks of the Present
In the course of the May Fourth assault on Confucianism, 
it is not surprising that Hu also directed his attention towards 
the age-old patterns of Chinese family life. This he did in 
his article of May 1920, "An Enquiry from an Economic Standpoint 
into the Family System." At the outset, he stated the two 
positions which had formed with respect to this institution.
The defenders of the patriarchal family said that it should be 
preserved, since it provided for mutual assistance and the 
expression of feelings of mutual warmth on the part of its 
members. Opposed to this stance were those who said that the 
traditional family system should be destroyed, both in the 
interests of its individual members and of society at large.
They dismissed the old system because of its domestic authori­
tarianism— what Hu termed its "class dictatorship," its encourage­
ment of dependant and parasitic behaviour, and its hypocritical 
standards of morality. Hu declared, though it was scarcely
necessary, that his sympathies were completely with the critics
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of the old family order.
Although Hu obviously felt that the Confucian family could
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be attacked, because of its intrinsic oppression and injustice, 
he preferred instead to show its irrelevance to the modern age 
by applying a historical materialist analysis. There were three 
components to this in Hu ’s study of the family, two of them made 
explicit by him, and the third stated not quite so forcefully. 
Hu’s most important objective was to show how the Confucian 
norms of family behaviour, which supposedly reflected unchang­
ing moral principles, were in fact nothing more than the product 
of economic forces which had operated in the distant past. 
Secondly, while the Confucian family system had come into 
existence originally because of the social demands of the time, 
it no longer corresponded to the economic or social realities 
of China. Although Hu did not phrase it precisely in this way, 
the Confucian family illustrated how one part of the super­
structure not only had acquired a great measure of independence, 
but also possessed sufficient power to influence the course of 
social development. This is the implication of Hu ’s statement 
that old beliefs and customs tended to persist long after their 
original social usefulness had passed. This phenomenon Hu 
explained in terms of a basic intellectual inertia in man’s
makeup, which may have had its distant beginnings in the
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biological need of the organism for rest. The third point 
Hu set out to demonstrate was the role of the state in propping 
up and extending the life of this obsolete system of values.
As in his analysis of the philosophical tradition, Hu saw the 
unification of China as the great turning point. In regard to 
the family, the Han used the authority of the state to formalize
164
and preserve the hierarchical, male-dominated family system 
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of the Chou. As a result, there had survived into twentieth- 
century China a moral code which by the beginning of the imperial 
age was already out of date.
In explaining the origins and development of the family,
Hu accepted the stages of prehistory laid down by Engels in
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, and
further elaborated by the late nineteenth century sociologist,
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Ernst Grosse. According to Grosse, who was quoted by Hu, 
the primitive age consisted of five stages: lower and higher
level hunting and fishing, pastoral society, and lower and higher 
level agriculture. In the first two stages, all property was 
communally owned and the clan, which was determined by blood 
relationship, acted as the basic unit of social organization.
It was in the pastoral stage, described by Engels as "the first 
great social division of labour," that private property came 
into existence in the form of movable goods, usually cattle.
With'this development, men arrogated to themselves a superior 
position, and destroyed the former equality which had charac­
terized relations between the sexes. In the following stage, 
that of communal agriculture, patriarchal authority asserted 
itself fully within the clan, although the rough egalitarianism 
of labouring in the fields somewhat mitigated the effects of 
male superiority. The final phase of primitive society, 
higher level agriculture, was marked by the development of 
private property in land, the rise of the merchant class, and 
the division of labour through craft specialization. During
165
this stage the old clan system completely disintegrated, since
the common ownership of property which had underlined the blood
relationship no longer existed.
Hu identified the communal form of agriculture, that is,
the lower level phase, with the well-field system. This meant
that the early Chou was a clan society displaying increasing
male predominance. The transition from the lower to upper stage,
and the attendant demise of both the clan and the well-field
system, Hu associated with the end of the western Chou in the
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eighth century B.C. However, the disintegration of the
communal society of the early Chou was not accompanied by a
basic change in family organization. While the clan itself may
have disappeared, to be replaced by the large family, the
concepts of male supremacy and patriarchal authority not only
survived, but prospered until the present time. Hu attributed
their persistence throughout this long age to the fact that
China remained essentially an agrarian society, with little
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change in the economic substructure occurring. The Ch’in 
unification strengthened the patriarchal system, since the 
stability of the state was furthered by family relationships 
which clearly defined precedence and obligations. Under the 
Han dynasty were promulgated the three bonds, which specified 
the duties of subject to ruler, son to father, and wife to 
husband. It was during the Han as well, that the inferior 
position of women was clearly defined in the law codes. From 
this time dated the seven traditional reasons for a husband 
divorcing a wife: disobedience to his parents, failure to
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produce a male heir, adultery, envy, jealousy, talkativeness
j  ^  107and theft.
Because of the virtual standstill of the agrarian mode of 
production for more than two thousand years, this antique 
family structure had managed to survive into the twentieth 
century. Its foundations, however, had become very shaky, and 
the entire Confucian social order was ripe for overthrow. But 
the May Fourth attack was not to be justified primarily on 
moral grounds, although they were very persuasive. More 
specifically, Hu explained that the time was most propitious 
for challenging the old order, because the mode of production 
which had underpinned it was now undergoing radical change. Hu 
did not see this development as having been generated within 
China. His comments on the subject are brief, but they indicate 
clearly his view that the economy began to change only with the 
impact of the West in the nineteenth century. China had been 
forced into the world market. This had produced much disloca­
tion, especially in the villages, where the former partly house­
hold, partly town-based economy had lost its local self- 
sufficiency. At the same time China was experiencing a new 
economic phenomenon, the growth of large urban industrial and 
commercial centres. In both city and countryside, the economic 
order which had supported the patriarchal family system either
was no longer to be found, or else was in a state of decomposi-
108
tron.
Hu based the claim that the large, patriarchal family was 
doomed to destruction on the experience of the industrial West.
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There the capitalist demand for individual units of labour to 
man the factory work forces had broken the old village-based 
family group. This had two consequences. The nuclear family 
itself had been placed under strain because of the demands 
placed on it by the struggle to make a living. However, at 
the same time, the capitalist economy had brought about a legal 
system designed to define and protect the position of the 
individual. Hu pointed to the emphasis on individual rights 
and legal equality in America and western Europe, where the 
nuclear family, unencumbered by parasitical relatives, was the 
basic social unit. Monogamy was the law everywhere; concubinage 
was nowhere to be found. Marriage took place through freedom 
of choice, and women possessed the same rights as men regarding 
divorce. Children, once they had reached maturity, were able to 
leave the family home, and were able to own property in their 
own right.
Hu was under no illusion that these legal rights could be
exercised unless there were the economic independence present
to support them: that point he had made more than a decade
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earlier in his article, "Unmarried Women in Kwangtung."
However, the enactment of legal change was an important step in 
"the progress" of the family, and in the improvement of the 
position of women. While the reduction of the family to its 
nuclear size was, in Hu's description, an "inevitable" conse­
quence of economic change, his advocacy of the creation of 
legal safeguards indicated his belief in the fruitfulness of 
human activity, an illustration once more of H u ’s resolution
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of the stress between the deterministic and voluntaristic
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elements within historical materialism.
The time had now come, Hu said, to press the attack on the
traditional Chinese family order. In the world at large there
was a "socialist tide" which had been spreading throughout all
nations since the end of the First World War. All of the
exploitative powers of the pre-war period were in crisis.
Within these nations, the war had led to great changes in the
position of women, placing them into many occupations formerly
reserved to men. The basic question of work to support the
independence of women had been "half solved." In 1906 Kautsky
had predicted the eventual disappearance of the traditional
family structure which was based on the restriction of women to
nothing but household work. Writing in 1920, Hu said that
Kautsky not only was right, but also that his hopes would be
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realized in the very near future.
Hu in fact appeared to be in a highly optimistic mood at 
this time, perhaps because the great political and economic 
changes resulting from the First World War portended the break­
down of the old order throughout the world, and the arrival of 
the "socialist tide." Nothing more can be said about the 
reasons for his buoyant hopes at this point, since he said 
nothing further to explain them. He did, however, close the 
discussion of the family system in China with a statement 
uncharacteristically utopian for him, and one which seems more
expressive of the Confucian Great Harmony than it does of the
113communist society envisaged by Marx:
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The transformation of the economic organization of 
society will bring about the realization of a 
cooperative democratic society, where inequality 
in property has come to a natural end. At the same 
time, man’s instinctive love for self and for others 
will attain its fullest development, while the bonds 
that imprison both men and women, parents and 
children, will be replaced by the pure and honest 
emotion of love.
In a postcript Hu promised that at some later date he would
discuss the ideal society of the future. Unfortunately, the
opportunity to do this never came. The demands of politics
once more interfered, and after the publication in August 1920
of his summary of the ethical views of Kautsky and Loria, Hu
wrote nothing more for Chien-she. Shortly afterwards, the
journal ceased publication, when all its major contributors
followed Sun Yat-sen to Canton. Thus, there came to an abrupt
end the remarkable set of articles which Hu had composed for
Chien-she over the course of little more than one year.
Historical Materialism and the Chinese Past
Hu Han-min had declared that his intention in discussing 
the Chinese past was to subject it to a historical materialist 
analysis. To what extent can it be said that this was borne 
out in his articles? There are three areas which immediately 
come to mind for an evaluation of Hu’s work: first, the
periodization of Chinese history; secondly, his conception of 
class struggle; and thirdly, his view of the relationship 
between economic and non-economic factors. To some degree these 
topics overlap; they are not meant to be self-contained 
categories. In examining the first of these, it is obvious that
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Hu's discussion of the well-field system brought him directly 
into the question of periodization. Hu described the ruling 
structure of the early Chou as feudal, while the common owner­
ship of property was enjoyed by the mass of the people. The 
objection that two such structures could not exist simultaneously 
has been made earlier; the existence of a class, in terms of a 
Marxist analysis, implied that the commonly worked fields were 
demesne land rented in some form from the feudal overlords. If 
this objection is granted, then the society Hu depicted was 
feudal in nature, that is, feudal in the sense understood by 
modern scholars such as Bodde, Gernet and Levenson, and for that 
matter, by Hu Shih at the time of the well-field debate.
Where Hu's claim for the feudal-communal.system ran into 
trouble was precisely in the'significant area of class relations. 
As mentioned earlier, Hu believed that a genuinely communal 
system of property-holding (for that indeed was the import of 
his conception of the well-field) could exist within a class 
society. On this point, Hu's application of historical materi­
alism compromised the essential character of the theory. This 
vagueness, or even lack of concern, in regard to the concept of 
class is one of the most striking aspects of Hu's treatment of 
the Chinese past. The terms "governors and governed,"
"oppressors and oppressed," it is true, appear many times in 
the course of Hu's writings. There is nothing objectionable 
in the use of such terms. In The Communist Manifesto, a work 
with which Hu was very familiar, Marx spoke repeatedly of the 
two opposing camps of the exploiters and the exploited. The
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point of contention about Hu's analysis, certainly from a
Marxist point of view, is the way in which Hu altered the concept
of class struggle so that it became both diffuse, and primarily
political in nature. Throughout his essay on philosophy, for
example, Hu referred frequently to the "class struggles" of the
Chou: Confucius advocated, the correction of language
and the inculcation of virtue "in order to end the class
X1A
struggles" of his time. However, the struggles of the late 
Chou, in fact, were struggles among the ruling class, not 
between the ruling class and the mass of the people. The latter 
appear in Hu's analysis as the suffering victims of the 
interminable, internecine conflicts going on within the ruling 
elite. That the mass of the people during the late Chou played 
only a passive role does not constitute a flaw in Hu's analysis. 
Rather, it is Hu's definition of class struggle in terms of the 
power struggles within the ruling class that divests his 
analysis of that essential message of the inevitable conflict 
between the oppressed and the oppressors.
If Hu's imprecise conception of class is admitted, and it 
is one which seems to reflect a life-long unwillingness"’ on his 
part to approach class in the Marxist sense, it may then be 
stated that his analysis of the Chinese political and intellec­
tual heritage has much to commend it. In terms of the correla­
tion of economic factors and intellectual responses, Hu's 
interpretation certainly was not a crude or vulgar Marxist one.
Hu recognized the importance in China's history of the power of 
the state to create an official ideology, which in turn
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maintained the authority of the state and the ruling elite.
It may be objected that Hu went too far in this direction, that
he separated politics too much from the mode of production. As
has been indicated, H u ’s description of the agrarian mode of
production which lasted from the late Chou until the nineteenth
century is very sketchy in its outline. In addition, it may be
noted that Hu did not pay sufficient attention to the changes in
the forces of production, as illustrated by his attribution of
the rise in population during the Chou solely to natural
increases in population, rather than to the greater productive
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capacities made possible by new instruments of production.
However, this absence of detail, and the neglect of certain
/nafwia.lts.f'
components of the historical^methodology, may result from 
nothing more than the early stage of Hu’s study of Marxism,
The issue cannot be settled, for the termination of Hu's Chien- 
she period, and his return to intensely demanding political 
work, removed the possibility that he might further sharpen and 
deepen his understanding of Marxism.
There is one final comment of H u ’s which should be noted 
because it serves as a bridge between his intellectual and 
activist careers, and also illuminates his conception of the 
role of the elite to which he belonged. In the course of his 
discussion of Mencius, Hu remarked that there was great room 
for diversity in society, and that inequalities among men in 
regard to ability did not imply an unjust society. What modern 
socialists sought to achieve was the removal of artificial 
inequalities, and not the levelling of society to a common
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plane. The similarity here between Hu s statement to Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao in 1907 that the equality proposed by'the T ’ung-meng
Hui was "psychological," and not "mathematical" is indeed
striking. However, Hu was quite definite that an intellectual
elite was necessary even when artificial inequalities were 
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eliminated:
A society in order to live, must rely on many who 
work with their physical strength. But if scholars, 
thinkers, artists are all absent from that society 
it will only be able to imitate, never to create.
It can only regress, never advance, only experience 
material enjoyment, and never spiritual fulfillment. 
Economically speaking, these creators may be said to 
be the producers of a kind of invisible property.
It is not difficult to trace the link between "the producers of
invisible property" and the revolutionary elite, "those who
understand in advance," who provided the leadership for Sun
Yat-sen's. political and social revolutions.- As with the ideal
governors portrayed by Mencius, the political elite to which
Hu belonged was supposed to act disinterestedly on behalf of the
common people. Mencius, Hu observed, had failed to discover an
adequate political mechanism for joining the interests of the
governors with those of the governed. During the 1920s, it was
the turn of Hu Han-min and the Kuomintang to try to find this
elusive mechanism which would realize the true political and
social aspirations of the Chinese people, without creating the
irresponsible and privileged "governing class" which had
existed throughout all of China's past history.
CHAPTER V
THE LESSONS OF THE UNITED FRONT
Introduction: The Significance of
the United Front Period
The period from 1922 to 1927 is one of great complexity in 
the history of modern /China. Its significance in the development 
of the Chinese revolution of this century is incalculable. During 
these years the Kuomintang entered into an alliance with the 
newly established Chinese Communist Party and with that party’s 
ideological meritor, the Soviet Union. This "United Front" 
brought with it aid to the Kuomintang of both an organizational 
and material kind, such that by 1927 the revolutionary movement 
in its nationalist guise had reimposed a larger measure of unity 
on China than had existed for more than a decade. But this 
triumph of the Kuomintang armies at once brought into the open 
in the starkest form the social implications of the revolutionary 
movement. To what extent should the masses be taken into the 
movement? Which party should exert hegemony over the revolution? 
For even enlightened leaders of the Kuomintang such as Hu Han-rain, 
there were limits beyond which they would not go in fomenting 
the social upheaval that might sweep aside the party to which 
they had committed their lives.
Throughout much of the United Front period Hu was close to 
the centre of the political scene. This was especially the case
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in the two formative years of the alliance from 1922 to 1924.
It is evident from the record that Hu supported the alliance at 
its inception, since he believed that the organizational capabil­
ities of the Soviet model would strengthen the Kuomintang, and 
thus make possible the realization of Sun Yat-sen's ideals: the
reunification of the nation, the reassertion of national dignity 
against the imperialist powers, and the reform and regeneration 
of China’s political and social structure. However, within a year 
of the official reorganization of the Kuomintang, Hu came to 
experience serious doubts about the party’s relationship with 
both the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Which of 
these two ’’allies’’ came to trouble him first is difficult to 
determine, particularly since they must have appeared at the time 
to possess such a symbiotic relationship. There is no doubt, 
though, that H u ’s nationalism was the vital underlying force 
that drove his misgivings to the surface, and compelled him to 
break away from the alliance.
This change in political position on H u ’s part was accom­
plished by a new focus in his political writing. It now became 
necessary for Hu to refute the claims of Marxism, as it provided 
the theoretical underpinning for the Communist movement, whether 
in the form of the Soviet ’’model" or the local Chinese party.
It also became necessary for him to stress the ideas of Sun Yat- 
sen to a degree he had not done earlier, since they had to become 
the ideology which would unite and inspire the Kuomintang towards 
the building of a new China. It should be emphasized, though, 
that the theoretical position that Hu reached by the end of the
176
United Front period does not appear to have been primarily the 
result of any abstract intellectual evolution on his part. 
Rather, it was the result of experiences he underwent in his 
participation in the United Front. To a large extent, then,
Hu's changing responses to Marxism and Communism must be sought 
in the record of his activities in the complex world of United 
Front politics.
Background to the United Front: 1920-1923
Hu's period of intellectual retreat in Shanghai came to an
end in late 1920 when a group of "progressive" warlords under
Ch'en Chiung-ming regained control of the Canton region and
invited Sun Yat-sen back to work with them. Hu accompanied Sun,
and in May 1921 assumed the positions of Chief Counsellor, Chief
of the Civil Affairs Bureau, and Chief of the Political Affairs
Bureau. However, this government proved to be of little signi-
1
ficance in light of the warlord control of Kwangtung. As in
1917-1918, Sun was directing an administration on the sufferance
of others. Once again the experience turned out to be equally
short-lived, as Ch'en expelled Sun's government from Canton on
June 16, 1922. Both Sun and Hu found their way back to Shanghai
to set about regrouping once more.
In the months following the explusion from Canton Sun's
career seemed to have reached its nadir. According to one
assessment, "many of Sun's friends and followers advised him
to give up political life completely in view of his demonstrated 
2
inefficiency." Sun's indestructible optimism prevented this
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from happening, but the unpromising political situation did make
him receptive to any new methods that might promise hope. It
was against this background that the Comintern representative
Maring (Henrik Sneevliet) met Sun in August 1922 with a proposal
for a United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). This type of tactical alliance between
Communists and "bourgeois nationalists" Maring first had promoted
in the Dutch East Indies in the form of the Sarekat Islam. Now
3
Maring sought to create a similar type of alliance in China.
This Chinese version of the united front strategy had been 
several months in the making before Maring presented his plan 
to Sun Yat-sen. His first contact with the Kuomintang leader 
had come in December 1921 at Sun’s military headquarters in 
Kweilin. In the course of their discussions Sun enquired at 
length about conditions in the Soviet Union, while Maring 
stressed the need for mass organizational work on the part of 
the Kuomintang. Maring may have made suggestions to Sun about 
the reorganization of the KMT, and may have proposed some form 
of cooperation between the KMT and the CCP. It is apparent that 
Maring was impressed by Sun’s interest in the Soviet Union, and 
by Sun s somewhat socialistic ideas. Since the KMT seemed to 
be a possible ally, Maring next had to convince the Chinese 
Communist Party of the value of this alliance. This he attempted 
to do at a party plenum called in April 1922 at Hangchow. On 
his own initiative Maring proposed a United Front, by which the 
Communists would abandon "their exclusive position towards the 
Kuomintang" and would develop instead "political activities
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inside that party." CCP members would enter the KMT, but at the 
same time the party would retain its own separate organization. 
As far as the KMT was concerned, its loose structure would make 
possible the rapid development of Communist organized mass 
activities. Ultimately, the CCP would be able to seize control 
of the KMT."*
Despite Maring1s arguments in favour of the advantages of 
a United Front with the Kuomintang, the CCP leadership was 
lukewarm in its reception of the policy. Maring set off to 
Moscow, where he received official Comintern endorsement of his 
plan in the form of a directive on July 18 instructing the CCP 
to join the KMT. Maring then returned to China with this 
message, called a second plenum at Hangchow in August, and there 
presented the CCP with his united front strategy.^ This was 
fully accepted by the CCP leaders. Since this plenum coincided 
with Sun Yat-sen’s return to Shanghai after his eviction from 
Canton, Maring was able to meet at once with Sun, and to advise 
him that the Comintern had instructed CCP members to join the 
KMT. Sun was agreeable to this arrangement, and shortly after­
wards CCP members began to enter the Kuomintang on an individual 
basis.^
In making this important decision to admit the Communists 
into his party, Sun was supported by his long time associates, 
Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai and Hu Han-min. Hu certainly 
realized that the KMT was in desperate straits, and so he was 
most ready to accept a working relationship with the Soviet 
Union. This prospect of Soviet aid was what gave the United
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Front its main appeal to the KMT. As far as the Chinese Communists 
were concerned, Hu supported Sun’s decision to admit them to the 
KMT, although he did not display great enthusiasm for this policy. 
He did accept it as a political necessity, and the record shows 
that he was prepared to take an open attitude towards the alliance,
g
and to see how it would work out in practice. In addition, Li
Ta-chao’s assurance that the CCP would take the Three Principles
of the People as the ideological basis of the alliance may have
convinced Hu that the Communists would not try to wrest power 
9
from the KMT.
Along with the new arrangements for cooperation with the 
CCP and the Soviet Union, the KMT set into motion a programme 
of party reorganization. This slow process began in September 
with a conference in Shanghai attended by senior KMT personnel 
and two CCP delegates. This conference approved the United 
Front agreements made by Sun, and set up a committee to plan 
further details of the reorganization. Hu and Wang Ching-wei 
were appointed to draft the declaration on party reform. This 
manifesto was published on January 1, 1923. It began by recount­
ing in brief the history of the party, and then provided an 
outline of the Five-Power Constitution, the plan suggested by 
Sun for the division of government into five mutually balancing 
parts. Sun’s programme for the equalization of land rights and 
the government management of "natural monopolies" was advanced,
along with a list of measures, all very moderate in nature,
10
directed towards the economic betterment of the nation. A 
party constitution was drafted to supplement this document. It
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outlined the administrative structure of the KMT: annual party
congresses, the first of which was scheduled for January 1924;
various committees on the national level, and a network of branch
committees on the lower levels of the province and district.
Sun’s preeminent position was safeguarded. He was granted supreme
power over the party in his capacity of Tsung-li (Director-
general) , and he was also given the right to name his own 
11
advisory council. Shortly after these reorganization meetings
took place Sun further strengthened his position in the new
alliance through a series of negotiations with the Soviet
emissary, Adolph Joffe. In a joint declaration issued on
January 26, 1923, Joffe promised Sun the assistance of the
Soviet Union, while assuring Sun that neither Communism nor the
Soviet system was suitable for China at that time. To Sun, and
to those older members of the KMT such as Hu, this admission
12
seemed to guarantee KMT hegemony over the United Front.
With his party in the process of reorganization, and with
the Soviets prepared to render him aid, Sun only required a
territorial base. This soon materialized, once again in Canton,
and this time it proved durable. In late January 1923 Sun's
forces, helped by those of two local warlords, drove Ch’en
Chiung-ming out of Canton. The next month Sun returned to set
up his "National Government." He took the title of Generalissimo,
and Hu was appointed his special assistant, with the title of
13General Adviser to Headquarters. Throughout the year, the 
consolidation of the base area took place. The most important 
task that now faced Sun and his supporters was the completion of
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the party reorganization. This received a great stimulus with
the arrival in October of Michael Borodin, the envoy of the
Soviet Communist Party. Borodin immediately became a special
adviser to Sim, and helped to direct the Kuomintang towards its
forthcoming First Congress.
After Borodin’s arrival, Sun appointed a nine-man committee
to draft the new party manifesto, and the final version of the
party constitution. Hu was named a member, as was Liao
Chung-k’ai, T ’an P ’ing-shan was the only Communist on the
14
committee. Borodin acted as adviser. Very quickly there
appeared a split on the question of social policy. Borodin
proposed radical policies of labour reform and land confiscation
which met with opposition from the KMT members. Sun persuaded
Borodin to settle for milder measures, such as rent reduction
and the formation of peasant associations. This programme was
adopted for the party manifesto, and the breach between the two
15
sides was momentarily closed.
At the same time as he was facing this challenge from the 
left, Sun also had to contend with an attack on the United Front 
from veteran members of his own party. In December Sun was 
presented with an impeachment of the Communists by Teng Tse-ju 
and several representatives of the newly forming "right." This 
motion called for the expulsion of the Communists, who were 
charged with being agents of Moscow and proponents of social 
revolution. Sun used his great authority to reject this motion, 
and to force the members of the right to accept the alliance.
He told them that at all times the Soviets would have to
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cooperate with the KMT. If they did not, the alliance would be 
X6
terminated. Hu supported Sun in all of these measures. He
did not share Liao Chung-k'ai's enthusiasm for the United
Front, but he felt, as did Sun, that the alliance was of value
to the KMT. He was prepared to give the CCP a full opportunity
17to prove its intentions. At the First Congress of the 
reorganized Kuomintang, Hu established his centrist position 
more firmly.
The First Year of the United Front:
January 1924-March 1925
On January 20, 1924 the First Congress of the Kuomintang
met in Canton with 160 delegates in attendance. Sun appointed
Hu to a five-man presidium to guide the deliberations of the
congress. The policies of alliance with Russia and cooperation
with the CCP in the form of a United Front were accepted. In
addition, the Leninist principle of centralized organization
was imposed on the party, though the effect of this was somewhat
compromised by SunTs reservation to himself of final authority
on all questions. Within the KMT itself there was some
opposition to the specific terms of admission granted to the
Communists, Towards the end of the congress the party
constitution came up for debate. One of the delegates, Fang
Jui-lin, proposed a motion prohibiting KMT members from holding
membership in any other party. In this he was supported by a
young representative of the Canadian overseas Chinese, Huang 
18
Chi-lu. This motion would have forced the CCP members to
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renounce their own party membership if they were to join the 
KMT.
Li Ta-chao replied to this challenge. He stated that the
CCP had entered into the alliance with the KMT in order to bring
about the national revolution, and not to change the KMT into
the CCP. He and his colleagues joined the KMT as individual
members of the Third International and the Communist Party, and
not as a bloc intent on implementing its own policies. However,
some members of the KMT were unconvinced by these assurances.
They demanded that special measures be taken for the supervision
of the Communists. Hu then intervened in the debate. He sought
to avoid a split appearing in the newly formed alliance. Hu
advanced the suggestion that further regulations were unnecessary,
since the party constitution made adequate provisions for party
discipline. If problems should arise they could be settled
within the existing framework. This motion was accepted, and
for the moment the contentious issue of Communist participation 
19was laid to rest.
At this initial stage in the history of the United Front, 
it is abundantly clear from the evidence that Hu fully accepted 
the need to work with the Communist Party, and that he had an 
open mind about the future of the alliance. For him the most 
important benefit of this new arrangement was the organizational 
reconstruction of the Kuomintang. In this respect Hu seems to 
have been more of a scientific revolutionary, or "natural 
Leninist," than Sun Yat-sen, who may have had a more enterprising 
spirit but who lacked the inner discipline and consistency to
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20make the revolutionary movement effective. Thus it was that
the concept of democratic centralism especially appealed to Hu
as a way out of the party's previous difficulties. He defended
21
its adoption in one of the early sessions of the Congress:
If our party wants to attain the goal of the national 
revolution, and become the party of the masses, then it 
cannot rely solely on a spirit of self-imposed discipline 
on the part of its membership. A revolutionary mass 
political party must possess a universal and coercive type 
of discipline. . . .  If we lack the organization and the 
discipline that is based on democratic centralism we 
absolutely will not succeed. A political party without 
organization might as well be an anarchist club. In no 
way can it be a vanguard for the people, nor can it 
struggle for the liberation of the nation.
To the KMT this structure offered a striking alternative to the
extremely individualistic and often disorganized parties of the.
past. Hu had always emphasized that these flaws had arisen
from the loose structure of the T'ung-meng Hui and the Chinese
Revolutionary Party, and he had also frequently drawn attention
to the mistake that had been made in turning the T'ung-meng Hui
into an open political party in 1912. This explains why he
readily adopted the new form of organization taken by the party
in 1924, and why he was willing to work with the CCP in the
United Front. But his acceptance of the reorganization was
completely for the purpose of securing the national revolution
in China under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang.
There was no compromise that could be made with this fundamental
belief.
Throughout much of the year and a half following the First 
Congress, Hu was involved in United Front work at the centre, in 
the city of Canton itself. Hu's position in the KMT was a key
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one. At the congress he had been elected to the five-man standing 
committee of the Central Executive Committee (CEC). Because of 
his seniority in the party Hu was detailed temporarily to 
Shanghai for organizational work. This was the head office of 
one of the five regional bureaus of the party that had been set 
up immediately after the First Congress, and next to Canton it 
was the most important. On February 25 the first meeting of the 
Shanghai Executive Bureau was held. Hu, Wang Ching-wei and a 
member of the party right, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, formed the standing 
committee which supervised the Bureau’s functions. In addition,
2
Hu took on the directorship of the important Organization Bureau.
It was while he was in Shanghai that Hu came into contact
with the young Mao Tse-tung, who had been named his deputy in
the organization office. Mao also acted as secretary to the full
Executive Bureau, over which Hu presided as chairman. What effect
this working relationship may have had on the two men is difficult
to say, especially as Hu was called back to Canton less than
four months after his arrival in Shanghai. Mao certainly
was an enthusiast about United Front work at this time, to the
extent that one of his rivals in the party, Li Li-san, later
23
referred to him unflatteringly as "Hu Han-min's secretary."
Robert Payne, in his sometimes rather fanciful account of Mao's
life during these years, states that Mao held Hu in esteem
because the latter had edited and written for Min-pao in the
formative period of Mao’s youth. Furthermore, Mao supposedly
gained from Hu "a close knowledge of the workings of the 
2
Kuomintang." Neither of these claims is implausible; in fact,
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Hu’s writings on Marxism in 1919, taken along with his impressive 
revolutionary career, do make it possible that Mao may have held 
Hu in high regard at this time.
Whether or not the above speculation is true, it does seem
most unlikely that, conversely, Mao made much of an impression
on Hu during the Shanghai period. Mao’s position was much
too junior, the gap between the two men too great for anything
but the formal working relationship, and contact was probably
limited to official meetings, where Mao took the minutes.
According to Huang Chi-lu’s recollection, the only occasion on
which Mao’s name came up during the United Front years was in
1926, when in a conversation Hu dismissed Mao as being simply
25
"a little Communist devil" (kung-ch’an-tang hsiao-kuei) . Not 
too long after Hu left Shanghai, probably by the end of the . 
summer, Mao himself retired from the Bureau on the grounds of 
ill health, though it is more likely that criticism from his own 
party colleagues, and increasingly hostile activity by Yeh 
Ch’u-ts’ang and his anti-Communist supporters, made Mao’s 
position untenable."^
During his brief stay in Shanghai, then, it is apparent 
that Hu Han-min worked for the attainment of the United Front 
objectives. Iri addition, he defended the alliance publicly. Hu's 
attitude is displayed clearly in an article that was published 
in the March issue of the Bureau’s journal, Min-kuo jih-pao 
(The National Republic Daily). Under the title, "A Criticism 
of Criticisms of the Kuomintang," Hu responded to charges 
levelled at the KMT by several Hong Kong newspapers. In more
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detail he also discussed some points raised the previous December
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Hsin ch’ing-nien by the noted Communist, ChTu Ch’iu-pai. In 
his article, which was called "From Democracy to Socialism," Ch'ii 
attacked the secret society type of organization of the old 
Kuomintang, a style he dismissed as being characterized by the 
use of such "playthings" as finger-printing of members and oaths 
of allegiance to the leader. Hu took this particular criticism 
with some sensitivity, since he had been involved closely with 
Sun in all the earlier unsuccessful revolutionary movements. 
However, he willingly accepted Ch’u's criticisms about the overly 
loose structure of the party at that time. Hu stated that, from 
these earlier experiences, the KMT had recognized that lax disci­
pline had resulted in individual members interpreting party 
doctrine to suit their own interest. Such derelictions went 
uncorrected, since the party did not have the means for super­
vision and control. However, the recent KMT reorganization marked
a major step forward, and Hu said he hoped that Ch'ii’s misgivings
28would now be laid to rest.
Hu then went on to discuss matters beyond those of organi­
zation. The party was to appeal to the broad mass of people. He 
dismissed as absurd the rumours propagated by some Hong Kong 
papers that the KMT was being "Bolshevized," and he pointedly 
welcomed into the party the Communists or any other sympathetic 
group, so that all could work for a "movement of all the people." 
Hu also called on "all progressive thinkers" to join the party.
In his formulation of the "movement," Hu expressed the fundamental
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Kuomintang viewpoint on the class question. Since Sun Yat-sen
had made the definition that all Chinese, with the exception of
the compradores, warlords and a few other renegades, suffered
from a common fate of oppression, then the way into the KMT was
29
open virtually to all. Class cooperation was essential in the
struggle against imperialism. There was a vital necessity for
a United Front to carry out this mission.
In this article, however, Hu agreed that the above call
for cooperation might not prevent conflict between the CCP and
the KMT. He admitted that there were the two distinct groups in
the alliance, but he attempted to gloss over the difference by
referring to their adherents as the "new" and the "old" party
members. Hu quoted Li Ta-chao’s assurance to him that the only
thing to separate the two groups was the time of their entry
into the KMT. Any policy disagreements, Hu went on to suggest,
would occur simply over the speed with which decisions should
be implemented. These differences would be minor ones, and would
cause no problem to the alliance since party regulations and
party discipline were accepted by all members. Hu again invoked
Li's promise that CCP members were working for the good of the
KMT as a whole, a promise seized on regularly at this time by
30KMT defenders of the United Front, In summary, it may be said 
that at the beginning of his work in Shanghai Hu definitely 
wanted the alliance to function, but he was under no illusion 
about possible tensions developing between the two partners.
He may well have been trying to convince himself of the feasi­
bility of an ultimately unworkable political alliance. However,
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it was not the theoretical position of the CCP but the political
actions of that party that primarily determined HuT s assessment
of the United Front during its formative stage.
There is evidence offered by two quite different sources,
Chang Kuo-t’ao and Huang Chi-lu, that by the end of his stay in
Shanghai Hu had come to experience some definite doubts about 
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the alliance. There had been friction between KMT and CCP
members in Canton and Shanghai since the First Congress. The
presence in Shanghai of such members of the KMT right as Hsieh
Ch’ih and Yeh Ch’u-ts’ang may account for difficulties created
on the KMT side in that city. However, the main cause of the
growing estrangement between the KMT and the CCP was the success
of the latter in organizing mass movements among the students
and workers, the more volatile sectors of the urban population.
With its tightly knit organization and idealistic social message
the Communist Party could not but achieve impressive results on
the grass roots level, and this in turn threatened the hegemony
of the Kuomintang over the whole nationalist revolutionary
movement. To discuss this growing friction in the United Front
the CCP called a plenum in Shanghai in May 1924. Chang Kuo-
t’ao’s recollection of a conversation with Ch’en Tu-hsiu is most
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revealing of H u ’s position at the time. Ch’en happened to 
mention that Wang Ching-wei and Chang Chi had just called on 
him to make known the feelings of Hu and Hsieh Ch'ih on the 
growth of "fractions" within the alliance. Both Hu and Hsieh 
believed that this development contradicted the assurances given 
earlier in the year by Li Ta-chao. Ch’en admitted privately to
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Chang that he understood why they were concerned. From his own
point of view Ch’en said that the early manifestation of these
misgivings troubled him greatly. Chang relates: "He (Ch’en)
felt that Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei and Chang Chi were in a
position to represent the whole KMT.... These three could not
be considered rightists; they supported the reorganization of
the KMT." This indicated to Ch’en the seriousness of the
differences that were beginning to show.
In the same vein, Huang Chi-lu remarks that by the summer
of 1924, that is, just after his return from the Shanghai Bureau,
Hu was becoming "anti-Communist" in the sense of wanting
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"limitations" placed on the CCP’s activities. Hu did not want 
the CCP expelled from the United Front. As long as Sun was 
alive he believed the Communist Party could be managed. However, 
doubts certainly were arising in Hu’s mind about the participa­
tion of the Communists in the KMT, There was a contradiction 
here that could not be resolved as long as the CCP continued to 
develop its own organization and popular support. As a result,
Hu Han-min and those other party members who originally belonged 
to the centre became increasingly more uncertain of the policy 
of "toleration," and began to move slowly towards a position on 
the right.
Before Hu had further opportunities to confront the growing
problems in Shanghai, he was summoned back to Canton on May 13.
Sun named Hu and Tai Chi-t’ao as political instructors at the
Whampoa Academy, which was then accepting its first class of
34
cadets. Both men were to lecture on Sun's theories. The more
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important reason for H u ’s sudden return to Canton lay in Sun's
deteriorating health. Sun always seems to have regarded Hu as
his first administrative deputy. Hu was placed in charge of
Military Headquarters while Sun was absent from the front, and
later was named Chief of Staff. Sun also created a new advisory
and executive body, the Central Political Council, and appointed
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Hu to this intimate inner group. The creation of this body, 
incidentally, represented a diversion of authority from the 
Central Executive Committee, which supposedly was second to Sun 
himself in terms of power within the party, although at this 
time the Political Council did not play a noticeable role in 
party affairs. At the initial meeting of the Council a Military 
Affairs Committee was formed, with Hu as one of the nine members. 
In the proliferating committee system of the Canton government 
Hu continued to collect political positions, but this system 
made for a confused and dangerous dispersion of power which only 
Sun Yat-sen was capable of holding together.
Hu's loyalty to party policy and his continuing attempt to 
maintain in public a centre position towards the United Front 
are confirmed by his reaction to an attempted impeachment of the 
CCP. In June 1924 three members of the KMT Central Supervisory 
Committee presented this bill, and withdrew it only when Sun 
showed his displeasure. Hu backed Sun's decision. However, the 
whole matter of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation required further 
discussion. This took place at the second plenum of the KMT, 
which was held in mid-August. As chairman of one of the sessions 
Hu presented the problem that existed for the party. There were
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three positions that had established themselves by that time.
One was full support of the alliance; a second was that of
complete opposition to it. The third position, which was the one
held by Hu himself, favoured CCP participation in the KMT as
long as the former did not form a "fraction" carrying on
clandestine activities. The question, as always, was how to
ensure that the CCP would keep itself in the open. The plenum,
in its communique, repeated the admonitions against secret
activity in the KMT, and emphasized again the leading position
of the KMT in ideology and politics. Hu also suggested the
creation of a body to act as liaison between the KMT on the one
hand and the CCP and Comintern on the other, as he thought that
this might allow for more direct and forthright contact between 
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the two partners. This proposal was mentioned in the communique
as well, but it seems never to have been acted upon. Hu did not
follow up his suggestion. Once more, military problems became
pressing in Canton, and these demands, taken with his work as
Sun's deputy, took up Hu's attention in the ensuing months.
With the plenum scarcely finished Sun set about organizing
his latest military endeavour, a northern expedition designed to
push up into Hunan. As he was leaving for the front he appointed
Hu to the positions of Acting Generalissimo and Governor of 
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Kwangtung. Both titles Hu retained until the formation of 
the National Government in July 1925. This dual appointment 
superficially made Hu the second most powerful man in the 
Kuomintang administrative structure. However, the political 
infrastructure in Canton was by no means a highly integrated one,
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and authority often could not be enforced on the lower levels, 
particularly the military ones. Sun had complicated the whole 
problem by his own compulsive committee forming, which played 
havoc with the party's organization. All of these entangled 
strands are to be seen in the episode of the Canton Merchants' 
Corps in October 1924. Moreover, this event throws another 
interesting sidelight on Hu's growing doubts about the United 
Front.
The Canton Merchants' Corps was a para-military body financed
by compradores with Hong Kong connections. It posed a serious
threat to KMT control of Canton. In early October the decision
was taken to disarm the force, and Hu issued the command to do
so. The order was not complied with. At this point the picture
becomes somewhat obscured, but the evidence does show Hu being
pushed into the background despite his presumably supreme position 
38
in Canton. On October 9 Sun ordered Chiang Kai-shek to organize 
a Revolutionary Committee to deal with the Corps. When Borodin 
heard of this he met with Chiang and "expressed himself strongly" 
against the inclusion of Hu and Wang Ching-wei in the Committee. 
Chiang neglected to take Borodin’s advice, and.wrote to Sun 
requesting the inclusion o f 'the two in the Committee. Sun then
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completed the exchange with the following significant comments:
The Revolutionary Committee must be formed at once to meet 
all kinds of emergencies. It is unnecessary to include 
Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei in the Committee. Today 
our revolution must follow the Russian pattern, and Hu 
Han-min has lost faith in this.,.. Henceforth our revolu­
tion can never succeed unless we follow Soviet Russia as 
our model. I am afraid that both Hu and Wang cannot 
bring themselves to accept this policy.
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In typical fashion, the next day Sun changed his mind and named
Wang to the Committee, Hu was also allowed to attend, but with-
40
out voting rights. The KMT troops were mobilized, and two days
later the Corps had been removed as a threat to the city and the
party. In this military operation the Whampoa cadets under Chiang
Kai-shek played a conspicuous part, which was an indication of a
new source of power being forged at this time. In a much more
negative way, however, the political side of the Canton Merchants1
episode was a clear revelation of how officially delegated power,
in this instance Hu ’s, could be so easily undercut.
The Revolutionary Committee imbroglio may have been a rather
insignificant event in itself, but it is of note for providing
Sun’s assessment of Hu ’s changed attitude towards the Russian
alliance. At this time Hu ’s point of view remained private to
his colleagues in the upper levels of the party. Sun’s statement
41did not appear publicly until 1926. Hu ’s loyalty to leader and 
party kept him in official support of the United Front despite 
his now apparent misgivings. His growing disillusionment with 
the United Front and the Russian alliance was not a response, 
primarily, to the social policies being promoted by the CCP. It 
is true that Hu was becoming concerned about CCP influence over 
the mass organizations, but this was prompted more by the ques­
tion of power than it was by the question of social policy. The 
motive force driving Hu towards a break with the CCP was his 
nationalism. He feared that both the CCP and KMT were being made 
subservient to Russian direction. This was more so regarding the 
CCP, since it seemed to be a willing victim. However, Sun was wrong
195
when he said that Hu no longer wanted to follow the Russian model. 
Hu welcomed the lessons to be learned from that model, and this 
is made obvious by Hu ’s words and actions before and after the 
reorganization of 1924, But he refused to accept any foreign 
direction of the revolutionary movement to which he had devoted 
his life, regardless of the value of the model offered.
Shortly after the resolution of the October incident, Sun 
set off for Peking at the invitation of the warlords there to 
discuss the possible unification of China. His illness was in 
its terminal stage. While in Peking Sun died, and the KMT was 
deprived of the one man who, despite his many faults, had held 
together and pushed forward through sheer tenacity and force of 
personality the Chinese nationalist movement.
The Political Eclipse of Hu Han-min:
March-September 1925
The death of Sun Yat-sen cast a long shadow on the 
Kuomintang and on its relationship with the Chinese Communist 
Party. Sun’s death also spelled the end to any hopes that Hu 
Han-min might have possessed that he would succeed to the leader­
ship of the party. In less than four months Hu had lost his 
position as second man in the party, and had been named foreign 
minister in a government that had virtually no foreign relations 
to manage. Shortly thereafter, he was sent to Russia as an 
emissary of the Canton-based National Government on a mission 
that euphemistically disguised his position as a temporary 
political exile. After his return to China in the spring of
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1926 Hu did play a role intermittently in the Kuomintang as a 
result of his close former association with Sun Yat-sen, his long 
revolutionary career, and his own talents as an ideological 
spokesman for the party. However, he had little in the way of 
a personal power base to fall back on. His later participation 
in the Nationalist Government in Nanking came about largely 
through Chiang Kai-shek's need for an ally. In view of Hu's own 
sense of seniority in the party, and his own independence of 
mind, it is not surprising that after 1926 he spent only three 
of the remaining ten years of his life in office. Whatever Hu 
might have brought to the Kuomintang in the form of enlightened, 
uncorrupt and nationalist leadership had been lost by late 1925 
with his displacement from the Canton political stage.
It is possible to trace back to Sun Yat-sen himself one of
the main factors that undermined Hu's position. Although it is
true that Sun occupied such a preeminent position in the Kuomintang
that there was no obvious successor to him, he had contributed
greatly to this problem by treating the KMT as his own personal
political preserve. At the time of his death, no clear line of
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succession had been established. In addition to Hu, there were 
three other men who possessed a claim to recognition by the party, 
and who were reluctant to grant to any of their peers a position 
equal to that occupied by Sun. First among the three was Wang 
Ching-wei, whose association with Sun went back to 1905, though 
it was not as close or unbroken a relationship as Hu's had been. 
Second was Liao Chung-k'ai, who was gifted in administrative 
ability and was favoured by the party left and the Communist
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allies. Third was the most recent addition to the inner circle
of disciples, Chiang Kai-shek, the builder of the party army.
Hu Han-min stood opposite to them as the most senior administrator'
after Sun's death, occupying the posts of governor of Kwangtung
and Acting Generalissimo. These offices in themselves by no
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means gave Hu an undisputed claim to the succession, but in 
March 1925, when the new political situation had to be resolved, 
they placed Hu in a starting position certainly somewhat more 
equal than that of the other three contenders. For them the 
problem was this: if Hu could be neutralized or removed from
power by constitutional means, party harmony might not be 
disrupted, but if illegal means had to be used the party might 
be split irreparably due to the strength of Hu's civilian 
following. Unfortunately for both Hu and the future course of 
the Kuomintang it was the second course that was the one more 
probable of realization.
In accounting for the removal of Hu from the centre of the 
political stage there are two important contributing factors 
that can be identified, The first of these was the hopeless 
confusion that existed within the different policy-making organs 
of the KMT. As already mentioned, Sun Yat-sen had subordinated 
to himself the whole party apparatus, and in so doing, had also 
obliterated the lines of authority that were supposed to exist 
between himself and the lower levels. He continually bypassed 
constituted organs such as the Central Executive Committee 
through the creation of ad hoc bodies. The most important of 
these was the Political Council, which was formed by him in July
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1924 to act as his chief advisory and executive aide. Theoreti­
cally this body was subordinate to the CEO, but in effect Sun 
allowed it to assume the powers earlier vested in the larger 
body. The consequence of actions of this sort was that Sun had 
concentrated all power in his own hands and in those of a few 
close associates. The problem of the Political Council was made 
worse by Sun’s frequent changes of its membership. James Shirley 
has commented that Sun’s practice of haphazardly enlarging the 
Council had a most unstabilizing effect on it, and that after
his death its members took upon themselves the right to expand
44or contract their numbers at will. The chief "constitutional 
threat to Hu Han-min’s position lay in the existence of this 
shadowy but powerful inner-party body.
The second factor that brought about Hu's demotion was the 
changing Kwangtung military situation, which ironically was 
improving for the KMT at this time. An attack that Ch'en Chiung- 
ming had launched on Canton shortly before Sun’s death had just 
been repulsed by the counter-attack known as the First Eastern 
Expedition. This had been led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Soviet 
military advisers, although Hu exercised nominal civilian control. 
Once again the small party army of Whampoa cadets played a vital 
role in the victory. This success took the pressure off the 
eastern front for the KMT forces. Next in line was the effective 
restoration of Kuomintang control over the city of Canton, where 
the garrison consisted largely of the armies of two petty warlords 
of rather dubious loyalty to the nationalist cause.
It was ostensibly to resolve the Canton military situation
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that a conference was held in eastern Kwangtung at Swatow in
early May. At this meeting two leading KMT generals, Chiang
Kai-shek and Hsu Ch1ung-chih, were present, along with Liao
Chung-k’ai and Wang Ching-wei. According to James Shirley’s
investigation of this little known conference, the decision was
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taken there to push Hu into the background. In Chiang1s
diary mention is made of a discussion between Wang and Chiang
about "political affairs," and about "plans to put an end to
individualistic actions" within the party. Chiang stated that
Wang "only wanted my word to decide." Although nothing more is
known about this conference it is perhaps significant that all
of its participants gained substantially when the government
reorganization took place. Chiang, HsTi and two other allied
generals held the military power in Kwangtung, but as Shirley
has observed, they did not wish to replace H u ’s government with
an overtly military regime. Liao and Wang, in addition to
offering their undoubted political and administrative skills,
provided "the necessary respectability associated with the
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traditional civilian followers of Sun."
The showdown with the two militarists in Canton took place 
in early June. The troops of Chiang and Hsft made short work of 
the old style warlord armies. The stage was now set for the 
solution of the "political problem." This began with the 
convocation of a plenary session of the Central Executive 
Committee. At this session it was decided that there would be 
no successor to the position of Tsung-li and that a collective 
leadership organ, the National Government Council, would be
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created to manage governmental affairs. With respect to party
affairs the continued existence of the Political Council was
sanctioned, and it was stated that the Council would supervise
the National Government on behalf of the CEC. These decisions
all met with Hu's approval, as he had been involved in discussions
since Sun's death concerning the reorganization of the government
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on a more regularized civilian basis. On June 24 Hu gave
public notice of the impending reorganization and transferral
of his powers. Four days later the sixteen member National
Government Council was named, with Hu, Liao, Wang, Hsii Chung-
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chih and Tai Chi-t'ao the major figures in it.
As the reorganization of the government moved on to 
completion, Hu obviously assumed that he would be continuing to 
serve in it in an important capacity. Here he was completely 
mistaken. Quite suddenly, on July 1, the Political Council, 
without having consulted Hu, announced the executive of the new 
government. Wang Ching-wei became the Chairman of the National 
Government Council, Liao became Finance Minister, Hsii took on 
the Defense Ministry, while Hu received the almost meaningless 
post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, an appointment that he 
later suggested was inappropriate in view of his lack of know­
ledge of "foreign etiquette" and of any foreign language apart 
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from Japanese. Two days after the reorganization, Liao Chung- 
k'ai strengthened his hand further by succeeding to Hu's other 
former position as governor of Kwangtung. The only significant 
influence Hu retained was that of membership in the five-man 
standing committee of the Government Council.
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This sudden and sweeping change in the balance of power
within the Kuomintang had serious repercussions in the party.
Many objected to the role played by the Political Council in
deciding such an important matter, and in such a conspiratorial
manner as well. Hu actually was a member of the Council, but
had not attended the crucial meeting as he was completely unaware
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of any important business to be discussed. An attempt to
question the Council's action was made at once by two of Hu's
old friends, Tsou Lu and Teng Tse-ju. Tsou, a member of the CEC,
challenged Wang Ching-wei on the Political Council's unexpected
move. Tsou did not have sufficient strength to overturn the
decision. Wang promised future abstention on the part of the
Political Council from such decisions in return for approval of
51
the reorganization. Thus the conspirators gained legal sanction
for their coup after the event.
The matter did not rest here, though. Splits in the party
soon began to appear, both on ideological grounds, because of
the supposedly leftist orientation of the new government, and on
factional grounds, because of the resentment of the older party
members towards the arrivistes on the Canton political scene.
Hu Han-min accepted his demotion temporarily out of loyalty to
the party, and in his inaugural address as Minister of Foreign
Affairs he tried to convey his satisfaction at taking on what
he referred to as the important foreign responsibilities of the 
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new administration. Privately he set about trying to reverse
the Political Council's decision. For this he had much support, 
especially among the Kwangtung members of the KMT, who resented
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the manner in which Hu had been deprived of his former position 
of importance. Huang Chi-lu, the opponent of Communist partici­
pation in the United Front at the First Congress, states that Hu 
sent him as an emissary with a "secret letter" to various members
of the Central Executive Committee to bring them to Canton for a
53
full plenary session. Some of these men already had arrived 
when the murder of Liao Chung-kTai on August 20 radically changed 
the political situation. This allowed Hu’s opponents once again 
to move first, and to assume emergency powers which were not 
responsible to the party machinery. This closed for good any
opportunity that Hu might have had to regain some of the former
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power he had enjoyed.
It is worth noting that in all these machinations that went
on in Canton the CCP played no role. Its Central Committee
actually regarded Hu with some favour. According to Chang Kuo-
t’ao, Hu was seen as the representative of the middle of the
road faction in the KMT, a man willing to support the policies .of
alliance with Russia and acceptance of the CCP even if he was
not overly enthusiastic about them. Ch'en Tu-hsiu told Chang
in May 1925 that there would be trouble if Hu were "forcibly
dragged down from his position of Acting Generalissimo," since
55Hu’s influence in the Kuomintang was "very deep rooted."
This view was not one shared by Borodin, however. By this time 
there existed between Hu and Borodin the most intense antipathy 
and suspicion. Chang mentions that Borodin did not speak of Hu 
in particularly flattering terms when they met in Canton in the 
spring of 1925. He also states that Borodin obviously had "no
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confidence" in Hu, and that "when the opportunity presented
itself, he would certainly suppress Hu."“^  Further evidence of
the strained relations between these two men comes from the
erratic but useful source, Tang Leang-li, who states that Hu
asked Borodin to become an adviser to the Foreign Ministry after
his assumption of the portfolio, but that in a short time Borodin
57had "practically severed relations with Hu." Chang Kuo-t’ao's
belief that Borodin would move against Hu if the opportunity
presented itself was borne out in the events that followed Liao’s
assassination. But it must be emphasized that Borodin’s role in
internal Kuomintang affairs was extremely limited. Hu’s fall
from power resulted completely from a conspiracy within the KMT
leadership. Whatever Borodin might be able to contribute to
this could do nothing more than support decisions already taken
by Hu ’s own political rivals.
The Liao Chung-k’ai affair marked the termination of Hu ’s
participation in the Canton government and led directly to his
"mission" to the Soviet Union. Much has been made of Hu ’s
supposed involvement in Liao’s death, although to this date not
a shred of evidence has been produced to support this accusation.
The major cause for suspicion has simply been one of guilt by
association resulting from the fact that Hu ’s cousin, Hu I-sheng,
was a suspect in the crime. (This purported involvement of Hu
Han-min has been furthered by the mistaken notion held by many
historians that Hu I-sheng was his brother, and therefore a
59presumed political intimate of H u ’s.) The Liao Chung-k’ai 
case probably will never be resolved. What is known is rather
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limited. Hu I-sheng was a memoer of the right in Canton, an 
editor of a newspaper there, and a definite political malcontent. 
He was able to find some support for his opposition to the 
National Government among troops in Hsti Ch?ung-chihTs Kwangtung 
Army, and with them formed a secret society named the "Culture 
Circle" (Wen-hua t 1ang) .^  This came to the attention of the 
Canton government, but before anything could be done, Liao was 
murdered on August 20. One of the assassins was caught, and 
soon the trail led to Hu I-sheng, though it is uncertain whether 
he had participated directly in the assassination plot. Two 
other men, one of whom was a former secretary to Sun Yat-sen
and an acquaintance of Hu Han-min’s, were arrested, but Hu
6XI-sheng eluded capture and escaped to Hong Kong.
This assassination had great consequences for the balance 
of power within the Kuomintang. As soon as the murder occurred 
an emergency meeting of its different committees delegated 
dictatorial powers to a three-man Special Committee composed of 
Wang, Hsii and Chiang. For Chiang this was the first post of a 
civilian nature that he had held in the Nationalist movement.
The immediate tasks of the Committee were to settle the Liao 
affair and prevent any further right-wing terrorist activities. 
However, the plenary powers granted it also spelled the end of 
the period of broadly based collective leadership in Canton.
One of the first acts of the Committee was to grant Hu Han-min 
refuge at the Whampoa base. Because of the involvement of his 
cousin, and the antagonism that existed between his followers 
and those of the Wang-Liao faction, suspicion fell on Hu in the
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excited days following the murder. This was aggravated by some 
of the local Communists, who took a more hostile attitude towards 
Hu than did their Central Committee in Shanghai.
The problem that presented itself then to the Special 
Committee was what should be done with Hu in view of the tense 
political scene in Canton. Borodin, who was the adviser to the 
Committee, wanted to have Hu put under arrest, but this was 
vetoed by Chiang and Wang. Borodin then offered another solution. 
Hu was to be sent to Moscow as the- KMT representative to the 
Comintern, which was scheduled to meet in plenary session early
the next year. This proposal was readily adopted by the Commit-
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tee. It also removed from the Canton political scene the man
Borodin most wanted out of the way. According to Harold Isaacs,
the "skilful manoeuvring" by which Borodin accomplished this was
6 3
something of which he was "evidently very proud." Borodin 
intended more than a short, investigative trip for Hu. On the 
eve of Hu's departure for Russia he sent a telegram to the CCP 
Central Committee in Shanghai which explained the nature of 
H u ’s mission, and which stated that he hoped that the Comintern 
would keep Hu in Russia and not permit him to leave. Borodin’s 
request for support for this proposal met with a mixed reception. 
According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, the Central Committee always had 
regarded Hu as "a representative of the centre of the KMT." 
Voitinsky, the Comintern representative, opposed Borodin’s 
suggestion. He stated that if Hu had been involved in the Liao 
plot he should have been punished in Canton; otherwise he would 
have to be treated as innocent. Apparently Borodin agreed to
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send this contradictory formulation of the case to Moscow, which,
as Chang remarked with understatement, "would give the Comintern
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a difficult problem to deal with." Thus, in a strange turn of 
events, Hu's relationship to the Liao affair was inconclusively 
settled by the CCP in Shanghai, and Hu was to go to Moscow as 
the representative of the KMT, with little about the background
to his mission sent on ahead to the Soviets.
The Russian Experience: October 1925-March 1926
The arrival of Hu Han-min and his party of five in Moscow 
on October 18 was greeted with great fanfare and a massive 
public reception, Pravda gave full coverage to the event and 
described Hu as "one of the most eminent leaders of the Chinese 
revolutionary m o v e m e n t . F o r  the Soviet regime Hu in fact was 
one of the most senior men from a sympathetic but non-Communist 
Asian party to have been sent on a mission to Moscow, and 
throughout his stay Hu was treated as a great revolutionary 
celebrity. Whatever suspicion, however unjustified, there had 
been cast on Hu because of the Liao affair obviously had not 
penetrated very deeply into the Russian leadership.
This point is worth a few words of elaboration, since the 
question naturally arises that both Moscow and Hu Han-min simply 
played out a game of mutual self-deception, one which renders 
meaningless all of the political statements made by each party. 
However, on the "Hu question" Moscow certainly had little 
information to go on. As previously mentioned, the CCP Central 
Committee had given up trying to resolve the problem, and had
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sent an ambiguous telegram ahead to Moscow. Karl Radek, the 
Comintern member who was H u Ts principal host, apparently knew
6 7
nothing of the immediate political background to Hu's mission. 
Some vague inklings about something being amiss were present, 
though, as Pravda published a rumour printed in a Tientsin news­
paper to the effect that Hu had been tricked on board a Soviet 
ship and would not be permitted to return to China. According
to the Pravda account, Hu "declared that this was a lie from 
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beginning to end." There the matter rested. If in fact the 
details of the Liao case were known in Moscow, then one might 
assume that some type of cover-up had taken place in the highest 
circles. It is impossible to know. The Russians either regarded 
Hu as a bona fide delegate, or else they made the necessary 
allowances because of the political importance of his mission.
As for Hu himself, he was a skilled political figure in his own 
right, a man who had to play a careful hand on behalf of the 
political movement that had sent him to the Soviet capital.
Some mutual deception was to be expected on both sides.
Having made the above argument, it may then be said that 
the message Hu brought to Russia was one in which he put the 
Kuomintang position in the most obvious and emphatic way. A 
certain amount of rhetoric did accompany the substance of his 
case, but this consists of slogans and exhortations natural to 
the heated professional revolutionary scene in Moscow. Divested 
of these embellishments, his words clearly spelled out the 
hegemony of the Kuomintang in both the ideological and political 
spheres of the Chinese revolution. One searches in vain for any
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references to the Chinese Communist Party, despite H u ’s being a
guest of the Comintern. Hu stressed that the Chinese revolution
was a multi-class, anti-imperialist movement directed by the
KMT, and that what assistance the Russians could provide was in
the area of revolutionary strategy and tactics. This message
was put so forthrightly that it is difficult to see why some
historians have seen Hu duping the Russians with his slippery 
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rhetoric. This misreading seems to result largely from the
erroneous assumption that when Hu left for Moscow he was either
a reactionary, which he never was, or a disguised rightist, which
at that time he was not. To be precise, Hu left Canton in
September 1925 as a man with serious doubts about the ability
of the KMT to work with the CCP and the Russians in the United
Front. However, it was his experiences in Russia that confirmed
these doubts. But whether in Canton, in Russia, or back in
China after his mission, Hu was first of all a representative
of the Kuomintang, and a man with an unshakeable belief in the
unique role that the KMT had to play in the Chinese national
revolution. This was the touchstone of his political faith, and
this never changed, regardless of the tactical shifts necessitated
by the political situation.
From the beginning Hu laid emphasis on the investigative
purposes of his trip. Pravda printed a statement by Hu on this
point in its coverage of his arrival in Moscow. The ideas that
Hu gave expression to throughout this time in Russia were stated
70here with transparent clarity:
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We have come to the USSR in order to study on the spot the 
political and economic situation of the USSR, as well as 
to study the changes in the social and economic structure 
of the state that have taken place since the Revolution.
We wish to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks the tactics 
and the strategy which should be followed by the revolu­
tionary organization in China during this epoch of the 
national-revolutionary movement in the East.
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Hu then went on to describe the situation in China:
The Chinese people must continue their national- 
revolutionary struggle against the imperialists, and in 
this work they must go arm in arm with the world prole­
tariat.
The movement is now reaching deep into the popular masses 
of China. The goal of this movement is the complete 
liberation of China from the imperialist yoke. It is not 
true that this movement is presently weakening. It is 
going deeper and deeper, taking in newer and newer strata 
of the people all the time.
Shortly after his arrival Hu was asked to contribute articles 
to Pravda and The Workers1 Gazette. The longer of the two he 
wrote was entitled "Impressions of the Soviet October Revolution." 
It had been submitted to Pravda in time for the November cele­
brations in response to an invitation from Bukharin, then editor 
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of the paper. In the November 7 issue the opening paragraph
of the Chinese text was reproduced, along with the Russian
translation, and a promise that the balance of the article would
soon follow. The exuberant tone of Hu's greetings is conveyed
xn thxs excerpt:
The Soviet October Revolution is the greatest event of the 
twentieth century: it is the first cry of proletarian
liberation, the first court to proclaim the death sentence 
on capitalism, the first gospel for the oppressed peoples 
of the world, the first act in bringing about the success 
of the Marxist revolution. It is the first chapter in the 
true history of mankind. Those of us present on this day 
. . . have impressions so countless . . . that it is possible 
for me at the moment only to discuss the four most important 
aspects of the relationship between the October Revolution 
and the Chinese Revolution.
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After this heady rhetoric, certainly fitting to the occasion,
the four points were presented in a much more sober manner, and
one which implied Chinese dependence on Russia for no more than
advice on how to carry out the revolution. These comments
appeared in Pravda on November 19. The introduction and the
first point made by Hu were omitted from the Russian text, but
this seems likely for want of space. A comparison of that part
of the text printed in Pravda with the full Chinese text, which
was not published until May 1927, shows no significant differences,
although the Russian text does read more like a precis. The
agreement between these passages leaves no reason to doubt that
the later complete Chinese text is not a faithful version of the
74article Hu submitted to Pravda. Because of its completeness, 
the Chinese text is used here to convey Hu's views on the 
Russian revolution.
According to Hu, the first form of assistance rendered the 
Chinese revolution was to be found in the inspiration provided 
by its Russian counterpart,^ As a result of the Russian 
experience, the Chinese could see more clearly the future course 
of their own revolution. It is interesting to note that Hu 
admitted that the chief flaw in the Chinese revolutionary move­
ment during the early years of the century was its overly 
political focus. This had come about because the overthrow of 
the Manchus had preempted all other concerns. The force of 
imperialism had been completely ignored. The masses had not 
counted for enough in the calculations of the revolutionaries, 
and had been neither organized nor trained. Therefore, the
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Republic proved a fiasco, undermined by its weak internal 
foundation and by its inability to withstand external pressures. 
The Russian example had pointed out how much deeper-a revolution 
must go in order to succeed, and how much more militant a stand 
against imperialism it must adopt. With regard to the question 
of imperialism, Hu stated that the greatest example of revolu­
tionary leadership provided by the Russians was to be found in 
their renunciation of the unequal treaties. The imperialists 
had accused the Russians of stirring up the Chinese to engage 
in revolution. In fact, said Hu, they were completely correct. 
However, it was not material assistance but the moral example 
set by the Russians that had provided such a stimulus to the 
Chinese revolution.
76Hu next discussed China’s workers and peasants. Here he 
elaborated on the point made above that the failure of the 1911 
Revolution was in large part due to the minimal involvement of 
these people. From the Russian experience the Chinese revolu­
tionaries had learned that, since these people provided both the 
basis and the rearguard of the revolutionary forces, their 
consciousness had to be developed, and their cooperation with 
the workers and peasants of other countries had to be furthered. 
For the workers the development of this consciousness was not 
so difficult. They realized that the Canton national government 
was "their government." The peasants, however, presented more 
of a problem, as they were "lacking in education" and were 
"extremely conservative." They were scattered about the country­
side in many small villages, far from the centres of political
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life. But they did account for eighty percent of the population.
It was encouraging to note that they were beginning to display
greater political awareness, as well as accepting the leadership
of the revolutionary party, that is, the Kuomintang. Here Hu
cited the involvement of the Kwangtung peasants in fighting
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Ch'en Chiung-ming as an encouraging example of this trend.
However, these new developments could be furthered only by party 
direction. The lesson that the party must involve itself in 
this type of work had been one taught most effectively by the 
Russians.
In discussing how the Russians helped bring about a better
understanding of the role to be played by the workers and
peasants, Hu revealed a significant gap in his own comprehension 
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of the problem. He credited the rising political awareness 
of both groups to their recognition that imperialism lay at the 
root of their misery. The urban worker suffered capitalist 
exploitation directly, while the peasant suffered the depredations 
of the warlords, who were tools of the imperialists. Hu certainly 
could argue that foreign imperialism did have an effect on the 
peasant in this way, but the explanation did not go far in 
accounting for the poverty and wretchedness of the peasant1s 
life. And warlordism itself owed as much to internal Chinese 
conditions as to foreign sponsorship. What stands out in H u ’s 
assessment of the peasant’s lot is the absence of any reference 
to the immediate and crucial problems affecting the peasant’s 
survival. In this discussion the concepts of landlordism and 
usurious exploitation of the peasantry never appear. The whole
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oppressive social and economic system of rural China is missing
from H u ’s depiction of the peasant problem, a notable omission
in view of the Russian audience he was addressing. Why then did
Hu want to mobilize the peasantry? There was one .major reason
for this, the destruction of the imperialists and their henchmen.
The introduction and practice of proper organizational techniques
would facilitate this. Although he could not say it bluntly,
the possibility that this newly organized power might be directed,
or might move spontaneously, towards social revolution was a
concept he could not accept, because for Hu the necessary social
betterment could only come about in an orderly manner under the
supervision of the Kuomintang.
The third and fourth points raised by Hu were quite
straightforward examples of what Melville Kennedy has called
"operational guidelines" that the Russians had outlined to the 
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Chinese. These concerned the reorganization of the Kuomintang
in 1923-1924 and the creation of a party army. Hu reiterated
many of the observations he had made elsewhere about the loosely
organized, ill-disciplined character of the nationalist movement
prior to the reorganization. In this respect there is an
interesting comment made by Hu to the effect that the excessively
individualistic actions of the members of the earlier parties
resulted from their backgrounds either in the intelligentsia or
80
petty bourgeoisie. One other comment is worth noting because 
of its unintentional foresight with respect to the future of 
the KMT. In the conclusion to his fourth point, Hu ventured 
the opinion that "in the history of the Chinese revolution the
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value of creating the party army will be as great as .that
81
of reorganizing the party."
H u ’s Pravda article flattered the Russians without saying 
much about the current Chinese situation. His other article
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published at the time, "The True Meaning of the Kuomintang,"
laid out the theoretical position of the KMT with complete lack
83
of ambiguity. At the outset he stated that:
The programme of the Kuomintang is derived from the Three 
Principles of the People. The KMT is the only organization 
for those taking part in the Chinese revolution. . . .
The KMT is based on the workers and peasants, and it acts 
in the interest of all the people.
Following Sun Yat-sen’s lead, Hu defined the present task of
the Chinese revolution as being the overthrow of warlordism and
imperialism. The means by which this would be achieved was an
alliance of all the oppressed within China. Hu spelled this out
, , 84xn more detail:
/
In the period of the national revolution all the Chinese 
people make up a class suffering bitterly under imperialist 
oppression. Apart from that class of militarists and 
compradores which intrigues with imperialism, all other 
classes strive for China’s freedom and equality. . . .  We 
certainly shall bring together the strengths of the 
different classes in order to advance the revolution. We 
certainly shall not treat any class with disdain, nor 
refuse to work with any class.
Here may be noted once again not only the familiar two-class
formulation of Chinese society, but also the extremely imprecise
use of the term "class." In this passage, specific groups such
as compradores are described as members of a class. Hu refers
to classes in such a way as to indicate that he had in mind
several different classes within China. Perhaps they might be
better termed "sub-classes," since Hu never abandons the general
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framework of the two classes of oppressors and oppressed. These 
various lesser classes seem to represent interest groups more 
than anything else, though of course there was a connection 
between the interest group and its economic position. With the 
exception of the pawns of the imperialists, all these groups 
sought a free and equal China. The common national aim completely 
overrode whatever internal divisions might exist among them.
Force was necessary only against those "classes," or more 
accurately, groups, that opposed the national interest. Thus 
the concept of class, as displayed here, was not only used 
indiscriminately by Hu, but more important, it was used in a 
manner that divested it of its vital Marxist sense of irrecon­
cilable social struggle.
The final point of note in this article is Hu's statement 
of the doctrinal supremacy of Sun's teachings within the KMT.
In ideological matters, there could be "no divergent interpre- 
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tations." Hu spoke briefly on min-sheng-chu-i , quoting Sun's
beliefs that this principle embraced both socialism and communism,
and that the ultimate goal of communism could be realized only
through the application of his own ideas. Hu also proclaimed
that this principle of the people's livelihood would not be
allowed to degenerate into the reformist socialism of the Second
International, a ringing promise obviously designed for the
edification of his Russian hosts. What is of more concern is
86
Hu's concluding statement on the question of KMT ideology:
We absolutely shall not allow anyone to cut off (ko-lieh) 
one part of the Three Principles of the People in order to 
use it in the interests of his own class. This would mean 
the rejection of the doctrine in its entirety.
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Given the above definition of the Kuomintang position, it is 
impossible to see how there could not be conflict between the 
KMT and the Chinese Communist Party. Only for immediate polit­
ical reasons could this difference be ignored. However, in 
light of what he wrote in Russia, Hu cannot be charged with 
furthering a deception that the United Front alliance would last 
indefinitely, or would last even in the short run on anything 
but the Kuomintang’s own terms.
These two articles, together with the statements made to 
Pravda immediately after his arrival in Moscow, constitute the 
principal public record of H u ’s activities in the Soviet capital 
during the fall of 1925. In December, Hu had some informal 
meetings with the Soviet leaders, and late in the month he con­
veyed the official greetings of the Kuomintang to the Fourteenth
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Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. For the most part, 
though, he was biding his time until the scheduled February 
convening of the sixth session of the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern (ECCI), to which he had been accredited as the 
Kuomintang representative. It was during these months that Hu 
was inactive in Moscow that there occurred two events in China 
which cast a revealing light on Hu's attitude towards the 
United Front, and, conversely, on the attitude of the United 
Front participants towards Hu. The first of these events was 
the Western Hills Conference of November 1925. The growing 
Communist influence in the alliance had caused a group of senior 
KMT members, which included Tsou Lu, Chang Chi and Tai Chi-t'ao, 
to set up their own Executive Committee and expel the Communists
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in the name of the Kuomintang. Most of the men involved had
been members of the Shanghai Executive Committee, which tends
to confirm the view that Shanghai was the place where the United
Front ran aground most quickly. According to Huang Chi-lu, Hu
"sympathized" with the aims of this group of dissidents, most of
whom had been on their way to Canton in support of Hu when the
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Liao affair occurred the previous August. However, when Hu
heard of the Western Hills Conference, he despatched a telegram
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to Wang Ching-wei denouncing it. Without doubt, political
constraints made him adopt this position publicly. But it is
also possible to argue that, whatever his sympathies towards
the breakaway group may have been, Hu was compelled to draw the
line when the unity of the party was threatened. Limitation of
the Communists was one matter; fragmentation of the movement he
had worked so long to build was quite another.
The other event of importance was the Second Congress of
the Kuomintang, which was held in January 1926. Hu was elected,
in absentia, to the Central Executive Committee, and then to
the Standing Committee of the Political Council. What is
noteworthy about these elections is that Hu was tied with Chiang,
Wang and T ’an Yen-k’ai for the highest number of ballots, 248
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out of a possible 252. At this congress the influence of the 
CCP and the left wing of the KMT was at its strongest. Hu was 
still regarded, evidently, as one of the most eminent United 
Front leaders, and as a man of a centrist political position 
not identified with either wing of the KMT. He may well have 
been seen as a symbol of unity, as well as a party representative
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doing good ideological work in Russia. In this respect, the
leftist delegate Teng Yen-ta reported to the congress on his
recent meeting with Hu in Moscow. According to Teng, the
Russians regarded Hu with the greatest respect due to his work
for the Chinese revolution, Hu, for his part, had come "to
understand the fundamentals of the Russian revolution," and had
taken note in particular of the strict discipline that prevailed
within the Soviet Communist Party. Teng passed on to the congress
a message from Hu expressing his concern over the unwillingness
of "some comrades" to accept party discipline. Hu also felt that
the time was favourable for the national revolution because of
the conflicts among the militarists. In keeping with his Moscow
style, Hu concluded his message by declaring that the revolution
must be carried out with the aid of foreign revolutionary parties
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and the revolutionary masses of China. This report by Teng
was well received, testifying to H u ’s continued high stature in
the alliance, at least while he was conveniently out of the
political storms then building in China.
In February Hu was drawn back into the world of Moscow
politics, at least in an honorary capacity. On February 10, he
was received as the guest of the Krestintem (the Peasant
International), and its research body, the International Agrarian
Institute. At this meeting he was introduced as "a senior member
of the Kuomintang, who has given much study to the peasant
question." Five days later, Hu was appointed to the presidium
of the Krestintern’s executive body, the International Peasant 
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Council. This position carried with it no obligations or
219
powers, as the Krestintern possessed little organization beyond
its head office in Moscow. Of the many international Communist
bodies set up in the Soviet capital, the Krestintern owns one
of the least substantial histories, with its formal activities
94limited almost completely to the two years from 1923 to 1925.
At the special reception arranged for Hu the Krestintern limited
itself to exhortation. Organizational work among the world’s
peasantry should be intensified, and the Chinese peasantry should
be brought into "close contact" with the peasant movements of
other Asian countries in the common "struggle of the peasants
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against imperialism." This appeal for the mobilization of
the peasantry as part of the anti-imperialist campaign was one
which Hu fully supported, as long as peasant activity did not
exceed this role.
Two days later, on February 17, the Sixth Plenum of the
Comintern held its opening session. H u ’s attendance at this
congress had been the ostensible purpose of his despatch to
Moscow the previous fall. This session of the Comintern was the
last in which Zinoviev was able to exercise any of the power
belonging to him as head of that body; in the December plenum
later that year, he was shouted down in the hall by his Stalinist
opponents. On the opening day of the session, Hu was featured
as the distinguished guest. Zinoviev began the proceedings by
declaring that the Comintern would have to devote increased
attention to the revolutionary movements of the East. H u ’s
96reception was lavishly described in Inprecor:
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The Congress Hall presented an unforgettable picture when 
the generalissimo of the Canton Army Hu Han-min stepped up 
to the tribune in military uniform. For several minutes 
the speaker was unable to commence speaking on account of 
the renewed applause. The solidarity between the 
revolutionary proletariat of the West and the oppressed 
peoples of the East was expressed here with striking 
clearness.
A brief synopsis of Hu's remarks followed. Apparently "an even
greater pitch of enthusiasm” was reached when Hu conveyed his
greetings, and demonstrations of support "punctuated nearly
97
every sentence of the Speaker." However, in the transcript
reproduced in Inprecor, Hu seemed to be giving away little of
substance. In words echoed by Chiang Kai-shek himself later
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that year, Hu declared:
There is only one World Revolution, and the Chinese 
Revolution is part of this world revolution. The slogan 
of our great leader, Sun Yat-sen, is identical with the 
slogan of Marxism and Leninism. No one has faith any 
longer in the II International. The influence of the III 
International has considerably increased in China of late.
The movement embraces intellectuals as well as large sections 
of workers and peasants, the entire proletariat. The 
Kuomintang slogan is: For the masses, i.e. seizure of
political power together with the workers and peasants! All 
these slogans coincide with the policy of the III Interna­
tional. The III International is the headquarters, the 
general staff for the Revolution.
After offering these generous greetings Hu had nothing more to
contribute to the official record of the plenum. He did have
several private meetings with Trotsky, Zinoviev and Stalin in
which the possibility of the Kuomintang being granted membership
99in the Comintern was discussed. According to Hu's account, 
Zinoviev favoured this, and it appeared as if the KMT would be 
allowed to join, but Stalin intervened. Stalin expressed to Hu 
his concern over complications arising from the activities of
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the KMT right wing in the event that the party entered the 
Comintern. He also questioned the attitude of the imperialist 
powers to such a move. Hu felt neither of these was. a serious 
problem, but he did not push the case too far. It had become 
evident to Hu that the problem was not being discussed on its 
own merits, but rather had become entangled in the growing 
struggle between Stalin and his opponents. With Stalin’s power 
clearly in the ascendency at this time, the only resolution of 
the issue lay in Zinoviev backing down. The ECCI voted to defer 
the decision on the admission of the Kuomintang until later in 
the year, and with this the problem was in effect indefinitely
i j 100shelved.
The official justification for H u ’s mission to Moscow had 
been to act as KMT delegate to the Comintern. Now that the 
plenum was drawing to a close, Hu prepared to return to Canton.
On the eve of his departure he addressed a gathering attended 
by Joffe, Radek, Trotsky and other party leaders to mark the 
first anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s death. Hu spoke in memory 
of the deceased leader, and then closed his remarks by proclaim­
ing, "Long live the union of the Chinese people and the working
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masses of the world.' Long live the world revolution!" On 
March 13 Hu left by rail for Vladivostok. Although his departure 
did not receive the festive crowd participation that had marked 
his arrival five months earlier, Hu was still regarded as a 
celebrity. Pravda published his final message, "Parting Words 
to the Workers and Peasants of the Soviet Union," which summed 
up well what Hu had been saying consistently during his stay in
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Moscow. Hu began with the reason for his coming:
Since we recognized Moscow to be the world revolutionary 
centre X came here first of all to study revolutionary 
methods, and secondly to establish closer ties between 
our revolutionaries and the world revolutionary centre.
He went on to emphasize the unique role played by Sun's political
teachings, and by implication, the unique role of the Kuomintang.
In a manner that might have seemed presumptuous to the leaders
in the Kremlin, Hu almost equated the Chinese revolution to the
Russian revolution:
Our great leader Dr. Sun Yat-sen has traced out for us the 
path of revolution: from the national to the world scale,
in other words, from the liberation of the worker-peasant 
masses in China to the liberation of the masses in the 
whole world. This is why our victory shall prove to be 
your victory and the world's victory, and our defeat to be 
your defeat and the world's defeat. And similarly, your 
attainments shall prove to be ours, your sufferings ours, 
and your problems our problems.
After paying his respects to the impressive achievements of the
Soviet government both in material construction and in fostering
"the growth of a proletarian culture and civilization," Hu turned
to the most important question, that of the struggle against
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imperialism:
At present the struggle in China between imperialism and 
the oppressed masses has caught fire, and we have come to 
the point where the question of whether the world will be 
imperialist or proletarian must be decided. Thus the 
world imperialists have been concentrating all their 
strength against China. . . .  We hope that we shall 
struggle together not only with the worker and peasant 
masses of the Soviet Union but together with the workers 
and peasants of the imperialist countries. For this it is 
necessary to have in Moscow a revolutionary centre, and we 
choose you as leaders and teachers not only for ourselves 
but for the worker-peasant masses of all the world.
With this last message Hu set off, reaching Vladivostok a week
later. There he had to wait a month for a boat to take him to
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Canton. Borodin was also en route to the same destination, and
105together these two unlikely companions set sail on April 20.
Hu had been in Russia just over six months.
During these months in the Soviet capital, Hu obviously had 
had to keep his own conclusions to himself. When he returned to 
Canton he soon made them evident to the other senior leaders of 
the Kuomintang. Doubts he had entertained earlier about the 
Chinese Communist Party, the USSR, and the relationship between 
the two had been confirmed by his recent experiences in the 
"world revolutionary centre." In many respects H u ’s reactions 
were akin to those of Chiang Kai-shek three years before. Both 
men had been impressed by the power of the Soviet state and the 
discipline of the Soviet party, and both men emerged from their 
first-hand experiences with a profound mistrust of Soviet inten­
tions in China, The organization, iron discipline and dedication 
of the Soviet Communist Party particularly impressed Hu, which 
was understandable in view of his long involvement in the 
frustrating history of the Chinese nationalist movement. He 
never lost this respect for the technique of revolutionary 
management that the Russians practised so effectively.
What turned Hu away from the Russian alliance was his 
unshakeable conviction that not far beneath all the protestations 
of world proletarian revolution lay the vital driving force of 
Russian imperialism. Furthermore, this imperialism did not even 
result from actions taken by general agreement of the Communist 
leaders gathered in Moscow; instead, it was the product of a 
small elite that had gained a' monopoly of power over the Soviet
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party. One year later Hu explained his belief in the following 
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manner:
When X went to Russia . . .  I believed that the Third 
International was the general organ of world revolution, 
not something managed by Soviet Russia, or manipulated by 
one or two men, but impartial and honest towards all small 
and weak peoples. . . . The Third International was manipulated 
by the Russian Communist Party, and the leaders of the 
different Communist Parties all were under the shadow of a 
few men in that Party. How the Russian Communist Party 
finally will take over the world is known only to these few 
men; the rest are kept in the dark.
Hu's protestations of openminded innocence may be discounted as
disingenuous, but his conclusion about the way in which the
Comintern worked has a genuine ring to it. The time of his stay
in Russia was an ideal one for exposing how all political
questions were subordinated to the power struggle in the Kremlin.
The dispute over the admission of the KMT into the Comintern
furnished Hu with an apt illustration of this process. In H u ’s
estimation, the Chinese national revolution was treated by the
factions contending for power in Moscow as nothing more than a
"tool" in their struggle. Furthermore, once this struggle had
been decided, the victorious faction then would utilize the
Chinese revolution for the extension of Soviet influence in 
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China. This conclusion about Moscow’s role in China made Hu 
regard the Chinese Communist Party as a much more dangerous 
threat to the Kuomintang than he had hitherto imagined, since 
the growing strength of the CCP not only posed a danger to the 
social order, but also challenged the very independence of the 
national revolution. These two themes of preserving the social 
order and reasserting full Kuomintang control over the revolutionary
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movement came to dominate Hu1s political thinking after his 
departure from Russia.
Retirement from and Return to Political 
Life: April 1926-August 1927
On April 29, 1926 Hu arrived back in Canton to find a much
changed balance of political forces in existence. A little more
than a month earlier the March 20 Incident had occurred. The
exact circumstances surrounding this event have not yet been
fully explained, but the implications it possessed at the time
for relations between the Kuomintang and its United Front allies
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soon made themselves apparent. The Incident itself resulted 
from Chiang Kai-shek's charge that a coup had been planned 
against him when a gunboat moved towards his headquarters without 
any prior warning. He reacted by placing the Soviet advisers 
under detention, and by arresting the leading Chinese Communist 
cadres, particularly those attached to the army as political 
commissars. All of these people were soon released, and Chiang 
apologized to the Soviets for these excessive measures, which 
he blamed on his subordinates. However, the freedom of movement 
of the Soviets and Chinese Communists remained restricted, 
especially in the army.^^
In the civilian government, Wang Ching-wei, the leading 
spokesman of the Kuomintang left, was forced into virtual 
retirement after the Incident. However, Chiang still needed 
Soviet support for the proposed northern expedition; it was 
therefore necessary for him to make a show of rejecting the
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right. He did this by turning down a proposed reconciliation
offered by the Western Hills group and by making a great display
110
of his support for the mass organizations. Chiang also
needed support within the Kuomintang for his ambitions, since 
his political position at this time was by no means unchallenge­
able. But the allies he was searching for would have to be men 
dependent on him. Those who were older and more distinguished 
in party service than himself would have to be manoeuvred out 
of the way. In retrospect, it is apparent that the return of 
Hu Han-min to the complex Canton political scene was too unset­
tling a factor to be tolerated.
What happened precisely between Chiang and Hu in early May 
1926 remains unknown, but it is possible to reconstruct some of 
the currents that prevailed in Canton then. By the time of Hu’s 
arrival the right had realized that Chiang was not going to turn 
towards them as they had expected after the March 20 Incident. 
According to one of the secret documents seized in the 1927 raid
on the Soviet embassy in Peking, a report by the military
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attache, Seifulin, the Canton right had gotten Hu Han-min 
"as their ’Chief Advance Commander’ and organizer." They 
apparently made plans to erect a triumphal arch for him, and to 
demonstrate on behalf of his reentry into the Canton government. 
Hu was supposed to have met with Wu Ch’ao-shu, Sun Fo and Li 
Chi-shen, all of whom were regarded as reactionaries by the 
Canton CCP. It is likely that Hu met with these men, who were 
old colleagues of his, but the claim that the right tried to 
monopolize Hu cannot be substantiated, nor the claim that Hu was
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receptive to any such overtures. It is clear that a large
faction of party members loyal to Hu did remain in Canton, and
wished to see Hu back in power in a Hu-Chiang alliance. Some
of these may have wanted to see more stringent measures taken
against the Communists. However, the complexity, if not the
confusion of the Canton political scene, is revealed by the fact
that some party members actually thought that H u ’s experiences
in Russia would give him a better understanding of how the
Kuomintang could most effectively carry out the United Front
policies with the Russians and the CCP. Furthermore, as far as
the CCP Central Committee was concerned, Hu was still regarded
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as a representative of the KMT centre. In the brief period 
of his return to Canton Hu refrained from public statements.
Since he had not committed himself openly he could appear as 
all things to all factions in the struggle for power.
In private, however, Hu did make his change of mind about 
the Russian alliance and the United Front apparent to the upper 
echelons of the Kuomintang. Liu Lu-yin, a very close friend of 
H u ’s, stated a year later that it was at this time that Hu 
denounced the machinations of the Comintern, the Soviet 
Communist Party, and the Stalin leadership. He made these 
accusations in the Political Council and to a conference of high 
level Kuomintang officials, Hu also stated that the CCP was 
nothing but a tool of the Russians, and that the Russian inten­
tion was to reduce the KMT to the same role. He advanced the
slogan, "No party outside the party, no factions within the
113
party’.," but this and other warnings fell on deaf ears. Since
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Liu brought this to light only after the break with the CCP in
1927, it might be argued that H u ’s statements may have been
exaggerated to help justify the repression of the Communists then
taking place. This is unlikely in view of what is known of Hu’s
meeting with Chiang in early May shortly after his return to
China. According to the account given by Borodin, Hu told
Chiang to arrest him so that he would be unable to remove the
severe restrictions placed on Communist activities as a result
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of the March 20 Incident. However, Chiang refused to do this,
as he was still balancing off the right against the left in
his public actions. This careful political juggling by Chiang
is best seen in his release shortly before H u ’s return of Sun's
letter of October 1924, in which Sun had pointed out Hu’s loss...
115of faith in the Russian model. In this instance Chiang was 
playing to the left, while at the same time preventing an eminent 
rival from regaining a political base. When Hu met Chiang an 
impasse soon developed. Less than two months after his arrival, 
Hu departed for Shanghai, ironically sharing the same boat into 
"exile" with another victim of Chiang's manoeuvrings, Wang 
Ching-wei.
After his return to Shanghai Hu retired temporarily from 
active political life, and devoted his time once more to 
literary work in order to make a living. He edited Tsou L u ’s
History of the Canton Revolution of March 29, an account by that
JL16party veteran of the famous Huang-hua-kang uprising of 1911,
Hu also began to prepare a definitive edition of Sun’s works.
This was to be his major editorial project, one that was not
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completed until 1930. H u ’s work, however, was not restricted
to Kuomintang materials. It is interesting to note that the two 
major translations he did during this time were on the topics of 
historical materialism and Marxian economics. The first of these 
was the translation Hu made from the Japanese edition of part of 
Max Beer’s General History of Socialism and Social Struggles. 
Beer’s wide-ranging if rather.elementary work was a general 
survey of European socialist and proto-socialist thought from 
antiquity to the First World War. As the title indicates, Beer 
gave emphasis to class struggles in light of a general historical 
materialist approach, though it should be remarked that this 
work was primarily narrative and not theoretical in content.
Hu translated the two volumes that covered the history of modern 
Europe. These appeared under the titles of Socialism in the
1'
Age of the Industrial Revolution and Society in the Age of Marx.
In the first of these, which in the original version 
was called Social Struggles and Thought, Beer outlined the 
history of England and France from the mid-eighteenth century 
to the rise of Chartism, described as England’s "first social 
revolutionary movement," and the Paris uprisings of 1848, which 
toppled the monarchy but fell victim to the bourgeoisie. 
Physiocrats and Adam Smith, the Luddites and Robert Owen,
Fourier and St, Simon, all received passing mention in this 
survey. The second volume, Social Struggles and Modern Society, 
focused primarily on Germany, containing an account of early 
nineteenth century Germany social and political movements, the 
revolution of 1848, and a biography of Karl Marx. Attention was
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also given by Beer to the First and Second Internationals, and
the collapse of the Second International at the outbreak of war
in 1914. A few pages were devoted to the economic roots of
imperialism, and Lenin’s name and the Bolshevik Revolution were
mentioned, but these topics seem to have been too close to the
time of writing to have received a considered interpretation.
Hu published his translation of Beer in late 1926. A few
years later he explained that there were two reasons for his
119decision to choose this work. First, he wished to provide
Chinese readers with a general account of European history and
socialist thought over the preceding two centuries. Secondly,
he sought to make more widely known the concept of historical
materialism, and its application to concrete historical problems.
This latter reason, he said, explained as well the publication
in 1925 of six of his essays from Chien-she in a collection
12o
entitled, Studies on Historical Materialism and Ethics. It
is quite evident, then, that H u ’s own break from the Communist 
alliance in 1926 had not prejudiced his interest in Marxism as 
a general method of historical enquiry. However, his selection 
of Beer’s work, which is restricted to the history of western 
Europe, may indicate that Hu believed that area to be the most 
fruitful field for the application of Marxian analysis.
H u ’s continuing interest in Marxism as an intellectual 
system is also apparent in the second translation that he worked 
on at this time. In January 1927 he completed Tai Chi-t'ao’s 
retranslation from the Japanese of Karl Kautsky’s Economic 
Doctrines of Karl Marx. Tai had begun this in the November 1919
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issue of Chieh-shea and had continued it in each successive
number until the magazine ceased publication in the summer of
1920. He had left uncompleted the final three chapters of the
third part. These included the "iron law of wages" and "the
industrial reserve army" of the poor, as well as Kautsky’s
concluding explanation of the rise and fall of the capitalist
mode of production. Hu completed the translation of these
chapters, and the book was published in October 1927 under Tai
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Chi-t'ao’s original title, An Introduction to TCapital.’
In his preface to the book, Hu stated that he had finished the 
translation and arranged for its publication because of the high 
regard he had for Kautsky’s introduction to the study of Marxian 
economics. According to Hu, Kautsky provided the necessary back­
ground to Marx in a manner which simplified the subject but did
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not treat it superficially. Hu also considered Kautsky's
book to be doctrinally sound, despite the attacks levelled at
the man by Lenin and the Soviet Communists. Hu was quite aware
of the nature of the charges against Kautsky. In this regard,
a comment made by Hu is of particular note because it shows that
by this time Hu had clearly identified the gradualist political
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character of Kautsky’s interpretation of Marxism:
For the most part, his political thought cannot be 
separated from the German social environment of the 
late nineteenth century. Because it often displayed 
a compromising tendency, it has been labelled as 
opportunist.
Hu quoted Lenin’s words that Kautsky and his colleagues "had 
distorted the true theories of Marx" by turning the concept of
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revolution into the belief that it was possible to co-exist with
the bourgeoisie. Hu did not develop this point. He did state
that, whatever the merits of the later charges directed against
Kautsky, there was no doubt as to the depth of his knowledge
about the economic theories of Karl Marx. In Hu’s view, Kautsky's
book on Marxian economics was free from the faults of compromise
that Lenin had attributed to Kautsky and his democratic 
124
followers.
In completing the Kautsky translation and in seeing to its 
publication six months after the purge of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Hu Han-min obviously showed that his intellectual fasci­
nation with Marxism was a calling that he did not confuse with 
the immediate political demands of destroying the Communists and 
severing the alliance with the Soviet Union. Marxism the system, 
impressive but open to reasoned criticism, was one matter. The 
Chinese Communist Party, with its sponsorship of social upheaval 
and its ideological dependence on Russia, was quite another.
Over the winter of 1926-1927, Hu proceeded in each of these 
directions simultaneously, and without seeming to experience any 
sense of conflict. Although he had withdrawn from open political 
activity, the record that can be reconstructed makes it plain 
that after his departure from Canton in May 1926 he continued to 
keep in close touch with those of his Kuomintang colleagues who 
were seeking to bring the United Front to an end. This group
included such party veterans as Lin Sen, Wu Ch’ao-shu, Wu Chih-
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hui, Li Shih-tseng and Tsou Lu. All of these men had been 
associated with Sun Yat-sen since the early days of the nationalist
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movement, and all now shared H u ’s antipathy towards the young
Communist Party which seemed to'-threaten'-.the hegemony of the
KMT over the revolution.
The tension that existed between the two partners in the
United Front could be disguised no longer once the Nationalist
armies launched the Northern Expedition in July 1926. Very
quickly what had been an uneasy arrangement in the relatively
static political scene of Canton became a struggle for the vast
territories and great population that fell to the advancing
armies, Both social revolution and the prospect of losing
control of the whole revolutionary movement confronted Chiang
Kai-shek and the other Kuomintang laeaders. By late 1926 the
signs of a Nationalist suppression of the Communists were
becoming evident: in Kiangsi, which then marked the forward
position of Chiang’s armies, assassinations of Communist and
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peasant union leaders were taking place. When Chiang’s
forces reached the outskirts of Shanghai on March 26, to be
welcomed by the General Labour Union whose insurrection had
driven out the local warlord, the forthcoming showdown between
Kuomintang and Communists for control of Shanghai, and of the
revolution itself, should have been apparent to all.
Two days after Chiang’s arrival a few members of the KMT
General Supervisory Committee met to propose a motion to purge
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the party of the Communists. Within a few days Hu was
brought back fully into the political manoeuvrings. On April 3 
he met with Wang Ching-wei, who was en route to Wuhan, where he 
hoped to recoup his political fortunes with the aid of the
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left-leaning wing of the Kuomintang there. The decision had been
taken to purge the party of the Communists, and Hu tried to
prevail on Wang to remain in Shanghai and join in the restoration
128of Kuomintang supremacy. Wang prevaricated, then went on to
Wuhan. He worked out an agreement with Ch’en Tu-hsiu, which
gave him the power he sought, and which incidentally allowed the
Communists three months further grace before the purge began its
final phase in Wuhan.
In Shanghai the purge moved quickly to its consummation.
What is striking about it is that, contrary to later accounts
that have portrayed it as a sudden coup or completely unexpected
betrayal, its probability was spoken of openly for at least two
weeks before it occurred. The North China Herald printed almost
daily accounts of a rift forming between Chiang and his
Communist allies, and of the likelihood of his staging a 
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purge. On April 12 it came, and the Shanghai labour union
and Communist Party base in that city were decimated.
Once Chiang had destroyed all opposition in Shanghai, he
directed his attention towards forming a new government based
solely on the Kuomintang. On April 15 a conference of the
Central Executive Committee met in Nanking. It endorsed the
proscription of the Communists, and the establishment of a
130national government with its capital in that city. Hu acted 
as chairman of the session, and reemerged into political life 
as one of the leading proponents of the purge. On April 18 the 
new regime officially assumed office, and this effectively
131inaugurated what later became known as the Nanking Decade.
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In an article entitled "Even the Pinks Excluded," the North China
Herald made the following assessment of the new Nanking adminis- 
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tration:
The ’rightness1 of General Chiang Kai-shek’s Government 
cannot be questioned, as the leading spirit of the Nanking 
Conference is Mr. Hu Han-ming (sic). This leadership 
closes the door to even pink Communists. Mr. Hu spent 
some time in exile in Moscow; where he learned all the 
methods of the Third International. Since his return to 
China last May, he has been active in creating the split 
between the Kuomintang and the Communists which has now 
eventuated.
It is unlikely that H u ’s ’rightness’ and what the North China
Herald had in mind were identical. There was no doubt about H u ’s
anti-Communism, and the remarks made about H u ’s experience in
Russia are very perceptive. However, Hu’s own anti-imperialism,
of which his anti-Russian feelings were a natural part, and his
own genuine concern for social reform, albeit in a guided form,
definitely would have separated Hu by a wide degree from the
North China Herald’s editors and sponsors.
It was true that Hu played the role of at least one of the
guiding spirits in the new regime. He was named chairman of the
National Government Council. Within the party, he held the
position of chairman of the Political Council and head of the
Propaganda Department, as well as membership in the standing
committee of the Central Executive Committee and the Military
Affairs Committee. There were also several lesser committees,
such as those of finance and foreign affairs, to which he was 
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appointed. However, despite this impressive array of govern­
ment posts, H u ’s actual role in the development of a new civilian 
administration was limited by the dominant position held by the
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military under Chiang Kai-shek. During his four-month tenure of 
office, Hu probably devoted the greater part of his attention to 
the Propaganda Department. He made countless addresses to party 
workers, troops, mass gatherings and meetings of the Central 
Executive Committee. In these speeches, and in articles published 
in the party press, Hu presented his condemnation of the Soviets 
and the Chinese Community Party, along with a critique of the 
Marxist theory that had supported these intrusions into Chinese 
life. At the same time he attempted to build Sun Yat-sen’s ideas 
into an ideology that would provide not only an effective rebuttal 
to the Marxist challenge, but also would ensure the implementation 
by the Kuomintang of the political and social message that Sun’s 
doctrine contained.
H u ’s departure from the Nanking government after 
such a short time resulted from, the manoeuvres conducted in 
the summer of 1927 to reunite the Nanking and Wuhan factions 
of the KMT. On July 15 Wang Ching-wei turned on the 
Communists, thereby terminating the final stage of the First 
United Front. Neither the Wang nor Chiang groups could agree 
to work together in a reunified party. Both men decided to with­
draw from the political scene, though for Chiang this retirement 
was only a tactical retreat until political conditions changed 
for the better. Hu supported Chiang’s decision to step down.
On August 14, the Nanking administration resigned, and Hu
134accompanied his colleagues back to Shanghai. At this point 
Hu made a break from political life, and did not join Chiang in 
seeking a return to office. Hu’s intermittent bad health
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contributed to this decision. In January 1928, he set off on a
voyage which took him to the new republic of Turkey, and then to
western Europe, as a representaive of the Kuomintang. On his
return to China in the fall, he was brought back into the govern-
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ment as president of the Legislative Yuan. Hu continued to 
speak and write at every opportunity on the teachings of Sun 
Yat-sen. However, what he said during the last year of his life 
served mainly to emphasize and elaborate upon the positions that 
he had worked out during the critical year of 1927.
CHAPTER VI
A NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY FOR CHINA
Introduction: The Legacy of Sun Yat-sen
In late 1927 Hu Han-min published twelve of his most impor­
tant speeches and articles from that year in a collection called 
The Historic Mission of the Followers of the San-min-chu-i . The 
choice of title was not in the least fortuitous: in fact, it 
expressed most explicitly Hu's conception of his political role 
in the years following Sun's death. It would not be an exaggera­
tion to say that Hu saw himself as the guardian of the legacy Sun 
had bequeathed to the Kuomintang and to China. In 1927 Hu came to 
the fore to defend this legacy against both the Soviet Union, which 
threatened China's national sovereignty, and the Chinese Communist 
Party, which raised the spectre of social anarchy. In the years 
after 1927 Hu had to continue this struggle, but now within the 
Kuomintang itself, where the liberal and reformist spirit of Sun 
Yat-sen was threatened increasingly by the traditional evils of 
corruption and bureaucratism.
As with his earlier writing for Min-pao, those of the last 
period of Hu's life raise a problem of analysis because of their 
deliberate identification with the thought of Sun Yat-sen, In the 
earlier years this could be attributed to Hu's youth, and to his 
inexperience in the world of T'ung-meng Hui political and social
thought, In the two decades which separated the Min-pao period
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from 1927 Hu had gathered an immeasurable amount of political 
experience, and his intellectual searchings had led him to his 
studies of historical materialism during the May Fourth years.
In one way, then, it is curious that Hu should have returned to 
the role of expositor after such a rich and creative period of 
his life. But if one brings to mind Hu ’s unwavering dedication 
to the memory of Sun Yat-sen, as well as his deep commitment to 
Chinese nationalism and his belief in the principle of guided 
social reform, then the character of Hu’s political discourses 
after 1927 becomes much less problematic. It can also be argued 
that the insistence with which Hu repeated the fundamentals of 
Sun Yat-senism in the ensuing years was a result not so much of 
dwindling creative powers, but of a conviction that only a 
literal adherence to the ideas of the late leader would ensure 
the realization of the goals he had set out for the party.
While it is possible, then, to suggest a basis for the motiva­
tion which underlay Hu's writings of the post-1927 years, it 
still remains a difficult task disentangling Hu's own work from 
that of his mentor. It should be said at the outset that Hu's 
writings, on such interrelated topics as Marxism and the CCP, the 
KMT and Sun Yat-sen's social policies, do not form a cohesive or 
systematic body of materials. Rather, Hu's ideas are to be found 
scattered through many short speeches and articles. Perhaps 
because of the intensity of the battle against the CCP Hu was not 
concerned with long carefully considered articles similar to the 
ones he had composed earlier on historical materialism or tradi­
tional Chinese philosophy. However, once the repetitiveness of
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argument, and the predictable polemical style, are discounted, 
there remains a critique of Marxism and the Chinese Communist 
Party which expresses clearly the political viewpoint of a man 
who was both a committed nationalist and a social moderate.
Such an avowal of intrinsic merit cannot be offered so readily 
for the elaborations -made by Hu on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen. 
Because of the quality of the materials he was working with, 
and because he limited his role primarily to that of expositor, 
Hu could add little of theoretical novelty or interest to 
Sun's political philosophy. Yet even here the examination of 
Hu's work is of historical value, since Hu's failure to 
develop an effective ideology for the Kuomintang pointed out 
the fundamental inadequacy of Sun Yat-sen's thought.
Sun Yat-sen, Maurice William, and the Principle of Livelihood
Before an analysis of Hu Han-min's critique of Marxism can 
be made it is necessary to present Sun’s position on social 
reform in general, and Marxism in particular. As indicated in 
chapters XX and V Sun's social programme centred on the two 
policies of the equalization of land rights and the regulation 
of capital. These measures, which were worked out during the 
T'ung-meng Hui period, conceived social change in reformist 
and state-directed terms. After the 1911 revolution the 
following decade of political misfortunes prevented the Sun 
group from giving social policy the sustained theoretical con­
sideration of the Min-pao years. One reference from that period 
indicates not only the persistence of the reformist side of
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Sun’s programme, but an increased emphasis on the role of the
state in implementing reform. Such is the message to be found
in a speech given by Sun in 1912 on "The Principle of Livelihood
and State Socialism.” In this talk Sun spoke of the superiority
of state-managed reformism of the Bismarckian variety, a position
which had been adopted several years earlier by Feng Tzu-yu. In
his 1924 lectures on the Three Principles of the People Sun
returned to this theme. Bismarck had nationalized natural
monopolies, such as those in the communications field, and he
had prompted reforms in working conditions, as well as providing
state pensions and workers' insurance. As a result of his efforts
Bismarck had raised Germany to the position of strongest nation
in Europe on the eve of the First War: he had "transformed a
weak Germany into a powerful state.”
There was one other reason for Sun’s fascination with
Bismarck. Not only had the German leader shown the way to the
attainment of national strength, but also he had muted class
conflict and politically disarmed the German socialist party in
the process. In his fourth lecture on democracy, which was given
3
in April 1924, Sun emphasized this point:
The Socialist Party advocated social reforms and 
economic revolution. Bismarck knew that they could 
not be suppressed by political power, so he put into 
effect a kind of state socialism as an antidote 
against the Marxian socialists' programme.
Further on in the lecture Sun again complimented Bismarck’s social
reformism and political acumen: "by invisible means he caused the
4
very issues for which the people were struggling to dissolve." 
These quotations should not minimize Sun’s commitment to social
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change, nor imply a calculating exploitation of the people’s 
needs for his own political ends. What they do emphasize, as does 
everything in Sun’s political life, is the unyielding belief 
that orderly change would come about in China only under his 
leadership, and by extension, under that of the Kuomintang.
This is the most important premise of Sun’s social thought, and 
it is one that was shared entirely by Hu.
In the United Front period, however, it was not enough for 
Sun to argue the virtues of state socialism. With the growth of 
the Chinese Communist Party, and the spread of Marxist ideas , 
especially among the youth, it was necessary for Sun to meet
i
directly the challenge of Marxism. In doing this Sun drew 
substantially on the work of an American writer, Maurice William, 
for the content and vocabulary of much of his case. The relation­
ship between Sun, the leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party, 
and William, an obscure Brooklyn dentist who had dabbled in politi­
cal philosophy, is indeed a most curious one, and one which affords 
an illuminating, if unflattering, insight into Sun’s intellectual 
processes. William was the author of a book entitled The Social 
Interpretation of History, which was first published in 1921.^ in 
this rather lengthy and ill-organized work William attacked the 
radical wing of the European socialist movement, with his harshest 
words saved for the Russian Bolsheviks. William focused in particu­
lar on fundamental Marxist concepts such as the omnipresent nature
of class struggle, the pauperization of the working class under
6
capitalism, and the inevitability of violent revolution. In place 
of Marx's materialist conception of history William substituted his
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own "social interpretation of history," an unclearly formulated 
theory derived in large part from the biological evolutionism of 
Charles Darwin. According to this theory, the key to understand­
ing human history was the "struggle for existence." This was an 
elemental force which motivated both society and the individual. 
It was responsible for all progress and social change.^ In 
William's view, the class struggle described by the Marxists was 
only one of the many forms taken by this struggle for biological 
and social existence. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, 
William argued that class struggle ought properly to be seen as 
a diseased byproduct of social evolution, one which could be 
prevented through the enactment of proper social policies.
At some point, probably in late 1923, Sun read William's 
book, and absorbed those of William’s arguments which suited his 
own predispositions. Sun was much taken by William's "social 
interpretation of history," and the idea of "the struggle for 
existence" became the foundation of the political and social 
philosophy that Sun now attempted to develop in more systematic
g
and detailed fashion. However, it is most unlikely that the 
adoption of "social evolution" as the motive force in history 
required any change in Sun's own ideas. Although Sun had not 
elucidated any general theory of hisory, his various social and 
political notions were not at all out of place with a vague type 
of evolutionism: it might be said that it was precisely because
of their lack of rigour that they fitted so naturally into such 
an ill-defined, if not banal, scheme as the one proposed by 
William. Sun also noticed that William had spoken of specific
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social policies which had raised the standard of living of the 
west European working class, and thereby had defused the social 
democratic parties. These social policies appeared to Sun to be 
identical to those he advocated in his Principle of Livelihood.
As a consequence of his study of William’s book, Sun mentioned 
William by name in his first lecture on livelihood, which was 
delivered in August 1924, and he lauded William for being the 
creator of a "new theory," which "tallies exactly with the third
Q
principle of our party."
As mentioned above, it was in the provision of certain 
arguments against Marxism that the influence of Maurice William 
on Sun can be seen at its most obvious . In his first two lectures 
on livelihood Sun made generous, and for the most part unaccre­
dited, use of The Social Interpretation of History, a fact which 
later exercised William greatly, causing him to publish a book 
entitled Sun Yat-sen versus Communism, in which he took personal 
credit for Sun’s supposedly overnight conversion to an anti- 
Marxist stance.10 Sun’s history, as the leader of the nationalist 
movement, and his own idiosyncratic and eclectic social reformism, 
with its definitely paternalistic stamp, easily disprove William's 
fanciful claim. However, the comparison made by William in his 
second book of selected passages from The Social Interpretation of 
History and Sun’s lectures on livelihood reveals the derivative 
nature of several points stressed by Sun. Since these were later 
drawn on by Hu Han-min in his critique of Marxism, they should be 
mentioned briefly.
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To begin with, William gave considerable emphasis to the 
scientific nature of Marx's researches. As he put it, Marx 
"applied the scientific method," and "history alone furnished 
the basis of his conclusions." In William's view, Marx would 
have revised his theories constantly to incorporate new scien­
tific knowledge and historical experience. He would not have 
remained fixed on the Europe of 1848, which for some reason
William regarded as the locus classicus of the Marxist world- 
11
view. Marx, "were he living today," would have altered his
theories, presumably to a social evolutionary position, since
he "would have readily grasped the full significance of modern
social progress." This point about the scientific method
employed by Marx was enlarged upon by William in several places,
the most curious of these being William's contention that,
because of his scientific mind, Marx "had no schemes of his
,12
own to foist upon society.
The main object of William's attack on Marxism was the
theory of class struggle. According to William, class struggle
was a result of "insecurity in the means of existence." This
meant that it was "an effect," and "not a cause" of social unrest
This was why the materialist conception of history was inadequate
since it had "inverted everything" through explaining effects
rather than causes. The most memorable passage in William's
13
argument was phrased in the following manner:
Marx was a social pathologist. He studied social pathol­
ogy and mistook the phenomena he observed for the laws of 
social biology. The manifestations of the class struggle 
are symptoms of social pathology analogous to such symp­
toms as pain, heat, redness and swelling in human pathology
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This metaphor caught Sun's imagination, which is not surprising 
in view of Sun's medical background. Sun was particularly taken 
by William's description of Marx as a "social pathologist," and 
to this he added his own comment that Marx definitely could not 
be regarded as a "social physiologist." In his second lecture on 
livelihood Sun reproduced almost verbatim William's discussion of 
class struggle. Sun endorsed William's belief that the struggle 
for existence was the motive force in history, and that class 
struggle played only a peripheral role. As Sun concluded, "Marx, 
in his study of social problems, found only one of the diseases
IH-
of society; he did not discover the law of social progress."
From The Social Interpretation of History Sun also drew on 
William's discussion of the social reforms which had made class 
struggle irrelevant to the current age. These social reforms 
William saw as "the operations of social evolution." They were 
being carried out in "four well-defined forms: social and indus­
trial reforms, public ownership of the means of transportation and
communication, direct taxation, and government activity in the
15
redistribution of wealth. Direct taxation was seen by William
as being of great importance, since it was by this means that the
state removed from the capitalist class much of the surplus wealth
it had accumulated. In turn this wealth was utilized by the state
to underwrite its "social endeavours." Once the "distribution of
consumable wealth" had fully taken place, the "basic problem of
X6
security in the means of life" would be solved. In the capitalist 
countries this process of redistribution of wealth had been going 
on over the preceding half century. Sun took note of the four
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types of social reform outlined by William, and in his lectures
he spoke of them as "the four peaceful methods" which his third
principle would implement in China.^ What was probably of more
significance to Sun was William’s assertion that these reforms,
and the consequent lessening of the social problem, had been
effected in a non-violent way: "not by uprisings of the populace
against the Government, and surely not by civil war. . . but by the
majority of consumers using’their organized authority as the City,
18
State, or National Government." This idea was given further 
emphasis by William in a later passage, which is to be noted 
because of the striking manner in which it supported Sun’s con­
tention that the political movement he led stood for the interests
of all the people, regardless of class, against a few "antisocial 
19
minorities":
Instead of uprisings against the Government by the popu­
lace as in the case of former revolutions, we see the 
’populace', i.e., the majority of social beings themselves 
organized as the Government ’uprising’ against their ex­
ploiters. Both are social revolutions, aimed against 
antisocial minorities, the difference being that former 
revolutions were directed against the Government, which 
itself was the oppressor, while to-day the people con­
stitute the Government and use their organized power 
against the antisocial portion of the populace.
In both the area of specific social policy, and the more diffuse
regions of political philosophy, the ideas of Maurice William
indeed "tallied" with Sun’s principle of livelihood, and provided
Sun with further evidence of the rightness of his theories.
After giving William recognition for the influence he cast on 
certain aspects of Sun’s thought, it is necessary, last of all, to 
take note of the arguments Sun himself developed to counter the
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challenge of Marxism. The first of these was based on the recent
experience of the Soviet Union. In Sun's view, the Bolsheviks
had attained a degree of success in carrying out the political
revolution, but, because of Russia's backwardness, they had met
with failure in the economic revolution. As Sun put it, "the
economic life of her society has not reached the standard of
economic life in Great Britain or the United States, and is not
20
ripe for the application of Marx's methods." When the Bolsheviks 
realized that communism was not practicable, they adopted the 
New Economic Policy (NEP), a much more realistic programme of 
modern social reform. Sun was intrigued by the Russian experi­
ment from the time he first heard of it from Maring in late 1921.
On that occasion Sun said that he was both surprised and pleased 
to hear of the Russian change of heart in social policy. He also
stated that there appeared to him to be little difference between
21
the NEP and his own plans for national reconstruction. This 
indicated to Sun the superiority of his principle of livelihood, 
and in the 1924 lectures on the Three Principles he developed 
this theme. What the Bolsheviks had discovered only after great 
social hardship and prolonged experimentation Sun already had 
laid out for China in his principle of livelihood.
In the final years of his life Sun also began to advance 
the claim that the principle of livelihood not only was superior 
to Marxism and all other socialist creeds, but had absorbed their 
good points and had developed them in a politically much more 
practicable manner. It took Sun some time to work out the pre­
cise formulation of this idea. Comments of his can be cited
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to give the impression that he equated communism, a term he 
never precisely defined, with his own third principle of liveli­
hood. In December 1923, for example, he turned down Teng Tse-ju's 
attempted impeachment of the CCP with the remark that "essential­
ly, there is no difference between the Principle of Livelihood 
22
and Communism." Probably the most famous expression of this
theme is to be found in Sun's August 1924 lecture, when he
declared that, "The Principle of Livelihood is socialism, it is
03
communism, it is utopianism. However, these statements not­
withstanding, Sun's intent definitely was to subordinate all 
other social philosophies to his own. To resolve the ambiguities 
he had created around the principle of livelihood, Sun drafted 
a brief but noteworthy revision to the definition quoted above.
It was changed to read: "The principle of Min-sheng is used to
take the place of socialism. Also, it is used to encompass all
24
the problems of socialism." This clarification did not come ’to 
light until after Sun's death. However, it does provide textual 
evidence, if that is needed, for Sun's belief in the universal 
applicability of his theories. This was a claim that later pro­
vided one of the cornerstones of Hu Han-min's exposition of Sun's 
philosophy.
In the final analysis, the seeming contradictions which
characterized Sun's interpretation of communism disappear when
they are placed in the proper perspective. Sun indicated that
25
this was the correct approach to his philosophy:
I can put my distinction today between communism and the 
Min-sheng Principle in this way: communism is an ideal of 
livelihood, while the Min-sheng Principle is practical
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communism. There is no real difference between the two 
principles— communism and Min-sheng— the difference lies 
in the methods by which they are applied.
In the short term the methods to be used were those of moderate 
and gradual reform under the direction of the state. Sun assured 
all property-holders that they had nothing to fear from his poli­
cies, since the principle of livelihood was completely at vari­
ance with western notions of nationalization, which he said
26
amounted to confiscation. He repeated the social analysis that 
had been central to his programme for twenty years: "China now is 
suffering from poverty, not from unequal distribution of wealth." 
The methods of Marx, Sun admitted, could be applied to a society 
divided by great inequalities of wealth. But they were inappro­
priate to China. Since industry had not yet developed, "class
27
war and the dictatorship of the proletariat are unnecessary."
In the long term, Sun spoke of the coming of a communist 
society. However, even here his understanding of it placed a 
great gulf between Marx and himself. His conception of communism 
owed as much to his Chinese background as it did to western influ­
ence. It has been aptly described as "some type of utopian
communism as envisaged by ancient thinkers like Plato or Confu- 
„28
cius. The words with which Sun'closed his second lecture on
livelihood capture best his understanding of the term communism,
one which at the same time looks ahead to the utopian future, and
29
backwards to China’s national heritage:
If this is true [the Min-sheng Principle] , the people will 
not only have a communistic share in state production, but 
they will have a share in everything. When the people share 
everything in the state, then will we truly reach the goal 
of the Min-sheng Principle, which is Confucius' hope of a 
'great commonwealth.'
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Hu Han-min on Marx, Lenin and the CCP
In his discussion of Marxism, Hu stayed within the framework 
constructed by Sun Yat-sen, although the knowledge of Marxism 
which he had acquired during the May Fourth period, as well as 
the political conclusions he had drawn from the United Front, 
enabled him to construct more elaborate arguments about Marxism 
and the Soviet Union. There are many points in H u ’s work similar 
to those raised by Maurice William and Sun Yat-sen, but these 
undoubtedly resulted as much from a coincidence of views as they 
represented deliberate derivation by Hu. As an illustration, all 
three men paid respect to the creative genius of Marx, which they 
saw embodied in the use he made of the scientific method in the
Of)
construction of his theories. Whether Sun had reached this 
conclusion on his own, or whether he had adopted it from his 
reading of Maurice William, is difficult to say. In the case of 
Hu, it is apparent from his earlier work on historical materialism 
that he possessed a high regard for Marx. His writings during 
the 1927-1928 period show that he retained this interest in Marx, 
though his sentiments had become highly critical by then.
Hu opened his discussion of Marxism by observing that commu­
nism had been a utopian ideal throughout history. From the time 
of Plato until the nineteenth century, men had engaged in wish­
ful imaginings of this future society. The great importance of 
Marx lay in the break he made with this tradition when he 
attempted to build a theory derived from an analysis of history 
itself. He had done this by presenting the hypothesis that 
communist society was a necessary consequence of conditions
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existing within the capitalist system. However, in constructing
this argument, Marx had not completely divested himself of the
31older type of utopianism. As a result, his work contained
both a "scientific" analysis of nineteenth century capitalism,
and a "prophetic" depiction of the communist future. Hu admitted
that, in fact, it was the presence of these two aspects in
32Marxism that gave it such an "inflammatory" appeal. Neverthe­
less, they constituted a major contradiction in the theory. 
Furthermore, each of these components was open to attack. The 
conclusions Marx had drawn from his study of nineteenth century 
Europe were highly questionable in terms of methodology, while 
his prophecies of the future communist society had been proven 
wrong by the historical record.
In making his first point, Hu did not disagree with the 
analysis Marx had presented of western bourgeois society. What 
he objected to was the narrow range of materials used by Marx to 
construct a theory claiming universal application. Marx had
studied only two or three countries in western Europe. Even
33
America had been largely neglected. Because it was limited
in such a way, Marxism could be utilized as a philosophy of
revolution only by a small group of countries in the industri- 
34
alized West. When it came to examining Marx’s record as a 
prophet, the assessment, Hu believed, could only be negative.
Here Marx was wrong even in regard to the European nations he 
had studied so closely. The capitalist system had not collapsed. 
The most developed countries had not experienced a social revolu­
tion; instead, a revolution had taken place in Russia, where the
253
system of production was comparatively undeveloped. In the 
West, state socialist measures were alleviating the misery pre­
dicted by Marx. The concentration of capital in city and town, 
the acquisition by capital of all surplus value, the growing 
immiseration of the workers, the lengthening- of the workday, and 
the rise of commodity prices, all had failed to come about.
Thus, Marx had to be characterized as a failed prophet. Such a 
man, in H u ’s estimation, did not have the credentials to be a 
"world revolutionary leader.
The greatest miscalculation made by Marx was his underesti­
mation of the force of nationalism. The disintegration of the 
Second International at the outset of the First World War proved 
conclusively to Hu that race and nation were far more potent 
forces than the international brotherhood and solidarity of the 
proletariat. Hu described the impotence of the European social
O  £L
democratic leaders at the outbreak of the war:
All of them stood for class struggle. They would have 
nothing of racial or national boundaries. Their 
resolution was most determined. When they returned 
home, they advocated the transformation of the war 
between nations into civil war. But, as in the past, 
the war was one between nations. They advocated the 
transformation of the war into a class war, but also 
to no avail. The disciples of Marx in one nation 
attacked his disciples in the next nation; and the 
proletariat of one race attacked the proletariat op 
the next.
Hu went on to point out that this lesson was not lost on Lenin
who recognized the revolutionary potential of the East. This
was symbolized in the Comintern adoption of the Leninist slogan,
"Oppressed peoples of the world, arise!", to supplement the old
37
Marxist slogan, "Workers of the world, unite! However, Lenin
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regarded class revolution as the ultimate goal. The nationalist
movements of the colonial world acted only as accessories in
achieving this end. The effort made by the Comintern to manage
these revolutionary movements indicated that the Soviet Union
was as guilty of the charge of imperialism as the western powersT
In Hu’s words, the Soviet Union "everywhere had betrayed the
principle of self-determination of peoples." As with the Marxism
of the Second International, the Marxism of Lenin had met with
complete failure wherever it was exported because it could not
39overcome the "principle of nationalism.
As far as Lenin was concerned, Hu saw him as little more
than an unscrupulous demagogue who had inflicted untold hardship
on the Russian people through his fanatical adherence to the
40
doctrines of class struggle and proletarian dictatorship. Hu
did not accept Lenin as a successor to Marx; he made it quite
41
clear that Leninism was not to be confused with Marxism. What
was Leninism then? Externally, it represented nothing more than
Russian national aggrandizement. Internally, it represented the
monopolization of power by the Communist Party, the "new class,"
although Hu did not use that precise term. In a speech given in
July 1927, Hu referred to the famous words on the banner of the
bandit heroes of Liang-shan-po, "Carry out the way on heaven’s
behalf." He then asked: what heaven did the Russian Communists
represent and what way did they intend to carry out. In answer
42
to these two questions, Hu responded:
Russia’s worker-peasant dictatorship is in no way a 
genuine proletarian dictatorship. It is nothing more 
than a dictatorship of the Communist Party. It is said
i
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that the Communist Party must be allowed to exercise 
dictatorship today, so that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat may be realized in the future. But who 
would venture to guarantee that these words ever will 
come true?
Stalin had stated that Leninism was the theory and tactics of the
proletarian revolution. Hu summed up his conclusions in the
slogan, "Leninism is the theory and tactics of ’exploiting’
43
(li-yung) the proletarian revolution."
As with Sun Yat-sen, Hu was particularly interested in the 
Russian experiment of the NEP, which indicated to him that Lenin 
had realized the error of his earlier ideas of social disruption. 
It also indicated that the state could play a leading role in 
building a new social and economic order, especially in the 
countryside. Since Hu discussed this question in a much more 
dispassionate manner than usually reserved for Lenin's policies, 
it is worth outlining the points raised, especially as he had in 
mind the obvious similarities between the Russian and Chinese 
rural problem. To begin with, Hu noted the backward state of 
the Russian peasantry on the eve of the First War in comparison 
.to that of the rural population in the West. Capital had not 
begun to enter the villages and disturb the old social relation­
ships. The nobility still dominated that rural world. When 
the revolution occurred in Russia, Lenin was forced to improvise 
policies which took into account both the current political 
realities and the backward economic conditions of the country­
side. Hu noted three different stages in Bolshevik policy.
First, it was necessary for Lenin to gain the support of the 
peasantry: hence the programme of land distribution. Once the
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peasantry had gained land, what Hu descibed as "petty-bourgeois 
consciousness" set in among these small landholders. The second 
stage of Bolshevik policy was one of grudging acceptance of the 
peasantry which was no longer regarded as the ally of the prole­
tariat. The third stage marked a return to the earlier positive 
attitude towards the peasantry. The middle peasants were raised
to being allies of the proletariat. However, in the NEP there
44was a new actor on the stage: the state.
Hu gave considerable emphasis to the significance of the
Soviet exercise of "the power of the state" in rebuilding the
rural economy. The NEP showed that political power could
determine the course of economic change, and thus invalidate
Marx’s forecasts about the fate of the peasantry:^
The establishment of Soviet political power and the 
nationalization of the most important means of production 
have prevented a western European type of development. . . . 
Thus there has been opened up a new path.
Hu quoted from Stalin's recently published Questions of Leninism
to illustrate the state-sponsored reformist policies being applied
to rural Russia. Production and marketing cooperatives and the
provision of easy credit were two of the means by which the
peasantry was being saved from the impoverishment predicted for it.
Stalin also had pointed out that it was necessary to have a
socialized industrial base in order that cooperativization be
promoted. This further indicated the need for state direction
of the economy and planning of rural development. Hu commented
that the anti-rich peasant, pro-poor peasant line taken by
Trotsky and Zinoviev was more in keeping with the "spirit of
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Marxism." However, Stalin was the inheritor of the revisions
made by Lenin, who had come to realize the futility of the class
struggle. Hu expressed uncertainty about the future of .the
Russian peasantry, because the Communists continued to stress
the development of the industrial proletariat. Their policies
towards the peasantry were grounded, first of all, in "political
utility," and not in genuine concern for the peasantry. Hu felt
constrained to remark that they were "truly countless thousands
46
of li removed from Sun's agrarian policies." But apart from 
these comments, Hu's discussion of the NEP indicates that he saw 
it in very favourable terms. Through trial and error the Russians 
had worked out a policy which approximated Sun's principle of 
livelihood. Nothing could better testify to the superiority of 
Sun's theories than this revision of Marxism by the first Marxist 
state.
Despite their imposition of the NEP at home, the Russians
continued to export the doctrine of class struggle in order to
further their own national interests. According to Hu, in 1922
they had turned to China as their last hope when their plans
for European revolution failed. The Bolsheviks singled out the
Chinese peasantry, and through the medium of the newly founded
Chinese Communist Party, they hoped to promote "great disorder"
47
(ta tao-luan) in the Chinese countryside. Hu cited Borodin's
dismissal of KMT proposals for rural cooperatives and rent
limitation, and his advocacy in their place of the slogan "land
to the peasants" as evidence of the Bolshevik plan to create 
48
social chaos. In promoting this policy, Borodin found a most
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willing subordinate in the CCP. The CCP possessed no ideology
of its own; it had imported what Wu Chih-hui called a "foreign
49
eight-legged essay" (yang pa-ku). It advanced a fraudulent
type of class analysis to turn one group of the peasantry against
another. At the same time, it- cynically mobilized the "dregs"
of rural China to further its ends:"^
The poor peasants are to struggle against the tenant 
farmers; the tenant farmers against the independent 
farmers; the independent farmers against the petty 
landlords; the petty landlords against the middle 
landlords; and the middle landlords against the big 
landlords. Under these conditions, the dregs of rural 
society (ti-p fi liu-mang) will completely shake apart 
that world.
Hu drew back in aversion from the spectre of social upheaval
in the countryside and the riot of the elements declasses. At
the same time he reacted as intensely to the attempt made by the
CCP to push aside the KMT. The tactics of the CCP, Hu charged,
could be summed up in the phrase, "Occupy all organs of power,
and gain them for the left." To attain this objective, all
authority was open to attack: the CCP policy was one of "Down 
51
with everything!" The Communists attempted to create splits 
within the KMT by dividing the party into spurious factions.
Left, right, new left, new right were categories concocted by the
!
CCP solely to agitate the KMT membership and turn it against 
52
itself. This constituted a threat to the political movement 
Hu had been a part of for more than twenty years. The virulence 
with which Hu denounced the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 can 
be seen as part of a response to this mortal danger to the KMT.
As for the response itself, it cannot easily be divided into its
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component parts. Nationalism was a factor of equal importance 
in his concern for the party. The CCP not only served the Soviet 
cause, but also threatened the KMT, the embodiment of Chinese 
nationalism. At the same time the CCP had thrown aside the 
programmes Sun Yat-sen had devised for China's social betterment, 
and had replaced them with imported ideas of social revolution 
inapplicable to Chinese social conditions. All three elements—  
party, nation and the social order— were inextricably combined 
in determining Hu's intellectual rejection of Marxism, and his 
uncompromising attack on the CCP.
The Kuomintang and the Masses
With the destruction of the Communists and the completion,
at least in the official view, of national unification in 1928,
the Kuomintang faced the much more difficult task of national
reconstruction (chien-kuo) . The military phase of the revolution
was over; now there began the period of tutelage. Sun Yat-sen
envisaged tutelage lasting only a brief six years before full
53constitutional democracy was attained. The challenges facing 
the Kuomintang were immense if this programme were to be realized.
There is no question about Hu’s belief in the unique role 
to be played by the Kuomintang in the tutelary stage of the 
Chinese revolution. The theoretical justification lay in Sun 
Yat-sen's three-fold division of humanity, with those who under­
stood in advance being the leaders of those who understood later 
or never at all. The first group was equated with the party, 
whose members had mastered Sun's ideas and would apply them to
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the solution of China's problems. Of more concern are Hu's 
conception of the "masses" (min-chung), whom the party had the 
responsibility of guiding, and secondly, his understanding of the 
relationship which should exist between the two. An analysis of 
Hu's work soon makes it apparent, not unexpectedly, that the 
"masses" were for him an undifferentiated and neutral social 
group, in other words, simply the great mass of the people.
They were definitely not seen by him as composed of different 
classes. To have done so would run counter to Sun's depiction 
of Chinese society as one of shared, classless poverty.
It was the responsibility of the KMT to guide and educate 
this amorphous mass by organizing mass movements. Leadership 
of these movements, Hu noted, had to be provided by "members of 
the educated c l a s s e s . T h i s  identification of the intelligent­
sia with the KMT explained, incidentally, why the Communists had 
launched such wild attacks on the intelligentsia. Given such 
profoundly differing levels of capability, it was only logical 
that the party approached the masses in a highly paternalistic 
manner. Throughout Hu's work the masses appear as an unconscious 
being which can only be awakened from the outside. This must be
done with great care, however, as Hu indicated in his article
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"Revolutionary Theory and Revolutionary Work":
... step by step we will awaken the masses, and step 
by step we will take actions on their behalf. We 
must not cause the masses suddenly to have extravagant 
hopes, only to experience disillusionment later.
The problem of leadership of the masses was discussed at 
greater length by Hu in "The Kuomintang Theory of Mass Movements."
Much of this article was devoted to outlining Sun’s three-stage 
theory of political development, and to attacking the Communists 
for their unscrupulous exploitation of the labour and peasant 
movements. Hu stated that the importance of the mass movements 
had changed as China moved from the military to the tutelary 
stage. During the period of the military unification of China, 
the mass movements helped to realize the nationalist goals by 
attacking the warlords and their allies, Once that violent 
stage was past the work of reconstruction began. The mass move­
ments now were to be guided in attaining the political and social 
goals of Sun Yat-sen1s programmes. The party was to supervise 
all mass organizations, and party members were to permeate them 
in order to guide them from within. It was of utmost importance 
that the masses, whose volatility was always worrisome, should 
not be stirred up. The posters, slogans, and inflammatory 
speeches of the military stage must now be avoided.
Since the active leadership of the party contrasted so 
sharply with the passive role of the masses, it followed that 
the party would face a major problem in keeping itself responsive 
to the interests of the masses. Hu was well aware of this issue, 
and returned to it frequently. He suggested that the problem 
could be resolved if three steps were taken. First, the masses 
must be made to understand and trust the party. Second, the 
party must not allow itself to become a special privileged class. 
Third, the members of the party must constantly be prepared to 
sacrifice themselves for the good of the party, or for the masses. 
Of these it was the second which most concerned Hu. By the time
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of his return to government in October 1928, Hu had come to the
conclusion that bureaucratization and corruption within the
party were becoming serious problems. There were members to be
found who saw the party as nothing more than a means of dominating
the people. These individuals abused the principle of party
leadership in order to exploit the masses and safeguard their
own positions. They had become a "party gentry" (tang lao-yeh)
and affected "party airs” in their work (tang ch!i), Their only
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goal was the enjoyment of office at the expense of the masses.
The corruptions of office, however, were not limited to
certain individuals in the party. Hu feared that the Kuomintang
as a whole might become a privileged class set apart from the
people. The lesson of the Soviet party had not been lost on Hu.
A similar development on the part of the KMT would create a
59perilous situation in Chinese society:
In this revolution of all of the people we absolutely 
cannot tolerate the existence of classes. How then 
can we allow ourselves the right to become a separate 
class?
If the party were to become divorced from the masses in such a
way, it would in effect become a "counter-revolutionary." To
prevent this occurring the party constantly had to bring its
attitudes and work style into line with those of the common
people. This process Hu called p 1ing-min-hua, which may be
60
rendered approximately as party "popularization,"
In addition to the corruptions of office, both party and 
government faced a more subtle but equally serious problem in 
the persistence of old bureaucratic habits. The yamen style
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of work was by no means dead. Some officials followed rules 
much too closely; others refused to trouble themselves with 
routine business.matters. Moreover, there was a continual 
evasion of responsibility on the part of such people. Hu 
regarded the problem of bureaucratization as particularly danger­
ous to the KMT, since bureaucracy in China traditionally had 
implied corruption and negligence of duty. This was not the case 
in the West. Bureaucracy was necessary to the organization of 
modern life. A properly regulated and honest officialdom was
essential to China. But already too many people in the party and
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government were slipping into the old bureaucratic habits.
What solution did Hu provide to this question of bureaucrat­
ization and corruption which was increasingly afflicting the KMT? 
The problem exercised him greatly; yet he was unable to find an 
answer. He could offer nothing more than ceaseless exhortation 
to the party members to follow the teachings of Sun Yat-sen and 
to act in a selfless and dedicated manner. There was nothing 
of an ideological or institutional nature that Hu could suggest 
to rectify the serious problems surfacing in the party. Given 
the lack of participation by the masses, and the absence of a 
revolutionary social ideology to motivate the leadership, it 
was impossible to infuse the bulk of the party membership with 
a sense of anything wider than immediate personal interest, or 
to promote administration in anything but the traditional 
bureaucratic manner. Against this reality, Hu ’s repeated calls 
could have little more than a momentarily inspirational effect.
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The Exposition of Sun Yat-senism
In January 1928 Hu published his most important contribu­
tion to Kuomintang political theory, The Interlinked Nature of 
the Three Principles of the People. This extended essay, which
runs to over a hundred pages of text, was written basically as
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an exposition of the ideas of Sun Yat-sen. It cannot be called 
a major piece of creative work, although it is true that Hu 
attempted to present Sun's ideas in a more systematic manner, 
and with a stronger background of historical evidence to support 
them. It must be said that a careful examination of this essay 
reveals a very uneven quality. It is a rather disconcerting 
blend of a sound general knowledge of western political thought 
combined with arbitrary and narrow definitions of fundamental 
terms such as democracy, capitalism and militarism. The content 
of the essay consists in fact of several different arguments 
which have been forced into an overall theoretical structure.
Yet it must be recalled that this work was the creation of a 
man with an excellent intellect, and that it has probably done 
most to establish Hu's name as a theorist in the official Kuo­
mintang party roll.^
At the beginning of this work Hu stated that Sun's ideas 
were based on "the fixed laws of evolution," an assertion that 
revealed how far Hu had come from the doubts he had expressed 
about such laws in 1919. The evolutionary laws which Hu now 
had in mind were those of the struggle for existence as formu­
lated by Maurice William. This struggle, as Sun pointed out, 
could be reduced to the inescapable fundamental reality of "the
265
struggle of man against man." Hu illustrated other forms the 
struggles had taken in the course of history: priests against the 
monarch, the monarch against the nobility, the monarch against 
the people, workers against capitalists, the colonies against 
the imperialist nations. The forms of the struggles in human 
history were so numerous that they "could not be divided into 
clear and obvious stages." Neither was it possible to claim 
that there was one basic form of struggle in which all others 
were subsumed. Class struggle, for example, could explain only
some of the ways in which men had contended with each other.
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In no way was it the key to human history.
Having made this argument Hu then observed that Sun grouped 
all forms of struggle under three categories: the national revo­
lution, the political revolution, and the social revolution. 
According to Hu, the categories recognized by Sun not only 
embraced every form of the conflict amongst men, but also the 
whole of human history. In each of these three areas of the 
social struggle, Sun had constructed one of his revolutionary 
principles. As a result, the three principles of the people 
were all-embracing in nature. Because they supposedly took into 
cognizance every aspect of reality, they were also seen by Hu 
as supportive of each other. It was this "chained" or "inter­
linked" characteristic of the three principles that Hu cited as
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the guarantee of their indestructibility.
Opposed to the power of world revolution, which was to be 
found in Sun's three principles, was imperialism, the expression 
of world counter-revolution. According to Hu, imperialism was
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"the crystallization" of the three forces of militarism, capi­
talism and bureaucratism. These three forces possessed a kind 
of evil interdependence which gave imperialism its great strength.^ 
Defining imperialism as a western-generated phenomenon, Hu stated 
that for the past five hundred years mankind had been suffering 
from its scourge. At the time he was writing approximately two- 
thirds of the land and population of the world was exploited by 
European, American, or now Japanese, imperialism. As an indica­
tion of the power of the imperialist nations, Hu pointed to the
British empire, contending that each Englishman could be said to
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have on the average ten non-white people subject to him. ,
The components of imperialism, that is, militarism, capi­
talism, and bureaucratism, Hu traced back ultimately to individ­
ualism. On the level of the individual human being, there existed 
the desire for domination over others. It was true that individ­
ualism might result in artistic and scientific creativity, but 
it was more likely that individualism would express itself in 
the search for political or economic power. In present-day soci­
ety this drive for power had taken more advanced and original 
forms. A good example of this was to be found in militarism, 
which Hu defined as the state organized primarily for military 
purposes. Originally man had organized himself militarily for 
self-defence, but now the state set out on a deliberately aggres­
sive path. Militarism was insatiable in its appetite, and it 
subordinated to itself both its own citizens and the people of 
conquered lands. However, militarism was more than just a desire 
for the land and wealth of other nations. The pursuit of empty
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glory, the hatred of one race for another, the cultural arrogance 
possessed by a self-professed "superior culture” towards an "in­
ferior culture," all stimulated militaristic adventures. No one 
theory, economic, political, or otherwise, was fully sufficient 
to explain militarism,
When Hu examined capitalism he traced its origins to the 
struggle by the individual to gain power through property. In 
time, greater aggregations of property were built up, so that 
capitalism had come to be a force not only within the western 
nations, but also over the world at large. Capitalism as a 
major force in society was a product of the preceding four 
centuries. The capitalist era had resulted from the great devel­
opments in navigation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
and the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The economic and social system that had come into 
being as a result of these developments gave great scope for the 
expansion of individual power. Some men were able to dominate 
certain areas of production, and thus were able to dominate the 
productive power of other men, or of whole social classes. The 
owners of the means of production were therefore able to enjoy 
the wealth created by others with little expenditure of labour 
themselves. This type of social division was characteristic of 
the industrial nations. It is significant to note here that Hu 
did not see this division existing in his own society. In his 
view, the control of property in China by individuals or by
privileged social minorities was not in the least "excessive."
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Class conflict, therefore, was not imminent in China.
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After these mechanistic definitions of militarism and capi­
talism, Hu's explanation of bureaucratism has more immediacy to 
it. Hu stated that bureaucratism was a characteristic of all 
nations, although it was most virulent when put at the service of 
the other two counter-revolutionary forces. The bureaucracy was 
a privileged and parasitic group dependent on the state, and 
concerned solely with the survival of its own special status.
It included, in Hu's definition, not only government officials 
but professional politicians of the type to be found in the Pe­
king warlord regimes. Since the bureaucracy was not involved in 
production, it did not possess any economic independence. As a 
result, its members ingratiated themselves with whatever govern­
ment was in power. Since they lacked an ideology of their own, 
bureaucrats always assumed that of the ruling group. In the 
parliamentary democracies, whose system of government Hu termed 
"empty and hypocritical," the whole political class, whether 
elected or non-elected, served the interests of the ruling capi­
talists. In the imperialist countries, bureaucratism served its 
twin masters of militarism and capitalism. As a final example, 
Hu cited the colonial administrations, where bureaucratism was 
indispensable to the management and exploitation of the colonial
i 70peoples.
Hu then provided a brief sketch of the history of western 
imperialism. In doing so he demonstrated a sound knowledge of 
European history over the preceding four centuries. Hu regarded 
mercantilism as the first institutionalized form taken by impe­
rialism. With the great advances in technology made during the
Industrial Revolution, the western nations gained unparalleled
strength. It was in this stage of imperialist technological
71
superiority that China now found itself. Thus, a small state 
such as England was able to oppress much larger but weaker 
nations. Hu's comments indicate that he regarded England as 
still the chief oppressor of the Chinese. However, Hu also 
pointed out that competition among the industrialized powers for 
raw materials, markets and territory had drained the strength of 
English imperialism. By the end of the nineteenth century the 
United States and Germany had come to challenge England's supremacy.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century was also an 
age of rising nationalism. In the West, nationalism originally 
was identified with the demands of different peoples for self- 
determination and political independence. With the development 
of state power, economic nationalism replaced the earlier politi­
cal nationalism. This very quickly turned into imperialism, which 
invaded other people's territories, and oppressed them for its own 
ends. In the eastern countries, nationalism arose as a direct 
response to imperialist aggression, since each people "desired its 
own independence." At one point in his discussion Hu seemed to 
imply a racial definition of nationalism when he stated that
imperialism was the "subjugation of the colonial races by the white 
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race." This was uncharacteristic, since the focus of his 
discussion was the political oppression of China not only by the 
western powers, but also, most recently, by Japan. Although Hu 
spoke of the cultural arrogance and economic greed characteristic 
of these nations, his own response was generated by the affront 
the imperialist powers presented to China's national dignity.
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With this sketch of imperialism as a background, Hu then
demonstrated how the Three Principles of the People would triumph
over the forces of counter-revolution. The superiority of Sun’s
ideas lay in their specific application to China's revolution,
which was the youngest of world revolutions. According to Hu,
each historical epoch witnessed a development in the nature and
achievements of revolution. The American and French revolutions
had overthrown monarchical rule, but had failed to eradicate the
class system. The Russian revolution had destroyed czarism and
capitalism, but the dictatorship of the proletariat in reality
had resulted both in the personal despotism of Stalin, and the
emergence of a communist imperialism no different from the former
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capitalist imperialism. In comparison, the Chinese revolu­
tion would rise above these limitations to a higher stage.
This belief in the opportunities afforded China by the ear­
lier revolutionary experience of other nations was by no means 
unique to Hu. In 1918 Li Ta-chao had compared the French and 
Russian revolutions, and spoken of a progressive enlargement of 
revolutionary goals. The French Revolution had been primarily 
nationalistic, though it had "a social revolutionary flavour."
The Russian revolution was basically socialist, "with a world 
revolutionary colour." China’s revolution would fall heir to both 
of these.^ Hu certainly did not see China's revolution as an 
apocalyptic social transformation as did Li Ta-chao. Sun's Three 
Principles would act as the guide to realizing China's nationalist 
revolution. Yet both men shared a common faith in the great 
potential China possessed for revolution, and for world revolu­
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tionary leadership. Such a faith, it may be argued, was not so
much a product of any process of rational deduction as it was the
expression of a need to place China once more at the forefront of
world historical development.
The major part of Hu's essay was devoted to an explanation
of Sun's theories of nationalism, democracy and livelihood, which
were regarded by Hu as unarguable political and social truths.
Hu conceived his own work to consist of providing an exposition
of each of these, and took as his point of departure Sun's famous
7 6summary of the Three Principles:
Cosmopolitanism (shih-chieh-chu-i) is the ideal of nation­
alism, nationalism is the realization (shih-hsing) of 
cosmopolitanism; anarchism is the ideal of democracy, 
democracy is the realization of anarchism; communism is 
the ideal of the people’s livelihood, the people's liveli­
hood is the realization .of communism.
In his treatment of the principles of nationalism and democ­
racy Hu did not go beyond the oddly contrasting mixture of minutely 
detailed programmes and vague utopian ideals presented by Sun. 
Without stating the means of implementation Hu maintained that the
principle of nationalism would bring an end to class conflict, war
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and even national borders. With respect to the principle of democ­
racy, Hu argued that both anarchism and bourgeois democracy were 
inapplicable to China, the first because it lacked practicable 
means of realization, and the second because it was essentially a 
fraudulent device for perpetuating the rule of the bourgeoisie. 
China's political future lay in the adoption of Sun's ideas on 
the organization of the state. Sun's model, a curious amalgam 
of the American presidential system, traditional Chinese politi­
Ill
cal institutions, and radical measures advanced by the American 
Progressive movement, vested ultimate authority in the people 
through granting them the rights of suffrage, initiative, refer­
endum and recall. At the same time it provided for the exercise 
of government through the operation of the five-yuan system,
which represented the executive, legislative, judicial, examina-
78tion, and supervisory functions of the state.
Not surprisingly, the longest section of Hu's essay was 
devoted to his refutation of Marxism. However, there is nothing 
to be found in it that adds to the arguments brought forth by Hu 
in his articles and speeches of 1927 discussed earlier in this 
chapter. It might be observed that, in comparison with the rest 
of the essay, the discussion of Marxism stands out as much more 
forceful, pointed, and interesting. As a whole, The Interlinked 
Nature of the Three Principles of the People is unconvincing as 
a theoretical work, despite its genuine nationalist concerns, 
and its periodic historical insights. Even a preliminary study 
of this work reveals an unwillingness on Hu's part to give more 
than a forced or artificial definition of the terms he employed, 
which reduces at once the value of any discussion of such con­
cepts as militarism or imperialism. More perplexing is Hu's 
fascination with highly stylized arguments which are presented 
more in terms of symmetry than intrinsic logic: for example, 
the three forces of counter-revolution which were opposed to the 
three forces of revolution, and the three principles of Sun
Yat-sen which were to solve the three fundamental problems 
79of mankind.
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There is also present in the work a strange imbalance 
between what Hu chose to recognize, and what he chose to ignore. 
This can be illustrated with reference to his treatment of the 
principle of democracy. Sun believed that this principle could 
be realized largely through the practice of the mechanistic po­
litical measures advocated by the American Progressives in the 
early years of the century. Several of the American states had 
enacted these in order to facilitate the direct expression of the 
people's will. Yet it soon became apparent that the measures of 
initiative, recall and referendum were, at best, cumbersome po­
litical devices, or at worst, were susceptible to the traditional 
forms of corruption and manipulation. By the time of the First 
World War most of these laws had fallen into abeyance. By 1927 
it should have been apparent that this important part of Sun's 
doctrine was no longer tenable, or at least, could not guarantee 
the popular political democracy it promised. In his discussion 
of the principle of democracy, Hu showed no awareness of this 
problem, however.
This omission is all the more noticeable in light of his 
great interest in the New Economic Policy and the revisions Marx­
ism was undergoing in Russia. Admittedly, Marxism and the Soviet 
experience were of much greater political significance to Hu, 
and his former mission to the Soviet capital had given him par­
ticular insights into the Soviet world. This still does not com­
pletely account for the unreflective acceptance by Hu of Sun's 
ideas on democracy. There is a frustratingly static quality 
about Hu's exposition of Sun Yat-senism. Perhaps his literalness
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represented an unwillingness to come to grips with any questions 
which might undermine the foundations of Sun's ideological struc­
ture. Whatever the reason might be, it is apparent from The 
Interlinked Nature of the Three Principles of the People that 
Hu's complete dedication to the life and thought of Sun Yat-sen 
had forced him into an increasingly confined and inflexible 
intellectual position.
Last Reflections on Marxism and Sun Yat-senism
In 1933 Hu published in the San-min-chu-i yheh-k'an (The
Three Principles of the People Monthly) two important essays
which further attempted to point out inadequacies in the theory
of historical materialism. At the same time Hu sought to construct
a stronger philosophical base for Sun Yat-sen's ideas. The first
of these was entitled "The Conception of History in the Three
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Principles of the People." It had been originally written to
preface a translation by Yeh Ch'i-fang of the full five volumes
of Max Beer's General History of Socialism and Social Struggles,
the work Hu had translated in part in 1926. The second essay,
"The Concepts of Idealism and Materialism in the Three Principles
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of the People," was a shorter but more speculative composition.
Both articles provide some interesting last thoughts on historical 
materialism. What may be of more significance, however, is the 
evidence offered by these works of how difficult a task it was 
for Hu to develop Sun Yat-senism into a convincing political 
philosophy.
Hu opened his discussion of the three principles' theory of
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history by stating that there were certain areas in which the 
historical materialism of Marx was of value. These he enumerated 
as follows: the "relationships which existed within society;" 
the effect of the "institutional culture" (chih-tu ti wen-hua) 
on the "spiritual culture"; the prejudices of mankind; and the 
way in which individual self-interest was formed into class 
interest and class struggle. Hu then charged that historical 
materialism was seriously flawed because it lacked the compre­
hensiveness necessary to explain all historical phenomena. 
Abandoning the well-balanced understanding of the theory that he 
had displayed in his Chien-she writings, and forgetting as well 
the letters of Engels which he had quoted from so extensively,
Hu characterized historical materialism as being "a theory of
economic monism," one which explained all historical change in
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terms of "the economic structure." Hu admitted that this type 
of theoretical imbalance was not only to be found in Marxism. 
Every theory was limited by the state of knowledge that prevailed 
at the time of its inception. Lenin himself had observed that 
advances in science constantly affected man’s conception of the 
truth. When viewed from the outside, any philosophical system, 
regardless of its internal consistency, could be seen to possess
O  O
only a small measure of the truth.
It is surprising that after focusing on the limitations 
inherent in any theory, Hu should then claim an absolute value 
for Sun’s ideas. The "struggle for existence," which, as has 
been discussed earlier, Sun adopted from Maurice William, pro­
vided the motive force behind all historical change. Sun
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believed food and self-defense to be man's primary needs. The 
former caused man to organize himself in increasingly more 
sophisticated levels of production and distribution. At the 
beginning there was primitive man, the hunter; in the present 
day, there was the industrial capitalism of the West. Simi­
larly, self-defense, which Sun equated with government, evolved 
from the level of the individual through the more .advanced forms
of the monarchist and militarist state, until it reached the
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present imperialist stage. Hu then went on to charge that, in 
contrast to Sun’s comprehensive theory, Marx’s so-called produc­
tive forces and mode of production represented nothing more than 
two of the many means by which man took part in the struggle for 
existence. In a’statement unfortunately not elaborated on, Hu 
then pointed out that changes in the cultural and economic struc­
ture of a society followed upon changes in the struggle for 
existence. This observation would appear to take the argument 
back to the proposition that man’s first need was the production 
of his own subsistence, which.then determined man’s social organ­
ization and cultural values— the .starting point :of Marx’ s , 
analysis of society. Hu made no comment on this implied coinci­
dence, but simply reasserted his belief that existence (sheng)
R R
not matter (wu) was the motive force'of social evolution.
Hu devoted the remainder of this essay to a rather scholas­
tic survey of world thought which was designed to prove that non­
material forces were as important as material ones in determining 
the course of history. In presenting this argument, he ignored 
the fact that, when Marx spoke of the influence of the economic
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base on the superstructure, he was formulating this in terms of 
society at large, not in terms of each member of society. In 
1919 Hu was well aware of the scope for individual actions and 
eccentricities within the limitations imposed by the relations 
of production. In 1933 he no longer recognized this. From Max 
Beer’s general history, Hu quoted such disparate sources as Philo, 
Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, St. Augustine and Gregory VII to 
prove his argument that men were activated by more than a simple 
response to material interests. Philo, for example, had pointed 
out that the Essenes had shunned all but the bare essentials of 
life in their search for a more spiritual existence. Aristotle 
had written that excessive desire rather than genuine need had 
prompted man’s greatest crimes, while St. Augustine contended 
that "it was not the possessions but the desires of mankind" 
that required equalization.^
Hu concluded his essay with a more persuasive case than 
that offered by his curious list of philosophers and ascetics.
He drew attention to several significant passages in Bertrand 
Russell's Bolshevism: Practice and Theory. Russell stated that 
it was necessary to revise Marxism by taking into consideration 
vital non-economic factors in explaining history. In the modern 
world nationalism was the most important of these. This was an 
argument which Hu had put forward against Marxism since at least 
1927. Furthermore, Russell stated that the discoveries of m o d e m  
psychology made it impossible to consider man always to be moti­
vated in his actions either by rational self-interest or the 
interest of the economic class to which he belonged. According
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to Russell, Marx had inherited from the British orthodox econo­
mists a fundamentally optimistic view of man’s nature, but this 
belief in the rationality of the human psyche could no longer be 
maintained.^
In this essay on idealism and materialism Hu attempted to 
provide Sun Yat-senism with a more sophisticated intellectual 
apparatus. Hu took as his point of departure a statement by 
Plekhanov to the effect that all philosophical systems were 
monistic, since they held mind and matter to be mutually exclu­
sive. One proceeded from the other; both could not exist on 
equal terms. Plekhanov believed matter to be the ultimate 
reality, but, in H u ’s opinion, there was no reason why mind 
could not be regarded in the same way. Because of their fixation
on either mind or matter, western theorists had produced defi-
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cient political ideologies. Marx was a good example of this
failing. In The Poverty of Philosophy Marx believed he had
destroyed the idealist philosophy then dominant, and had replaced
it with the superior theory of historical materialism. In fact,
Marx had merely substituted the word "matter" for the word "mind,"
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and thus he had remained imprisoned by the old preconceptions.
Hu observed that over the past few thousand years the 
respective claims of mind and matter had been argued endlessly.
Now the supporters of each were drawing on modern science. The 
idealists believed that psychology would prove mind to be the 
ultimate reality, while the materialists believed that physics 
would do the same for matter. Their hopes never could be real­
ized, however, since the mind-matter dichotomy was an erroneous
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formulation of the problem. Hu proposed in its place a concept
which he termed "necessity" (hsii-yao). This was the ultimate
reality in man’s life; both mind and matter had to be subsumed 
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to it. Hu then went on to relate revolution to the above 
categories. Revolution was first of all an expression of the 
fundamental struggle for existence, or in other words, an ines­
capable response to necessity. In its more advanced stages 
revolution was charged with the responsibility of undertaking 
reconstruction in both the spiritual and material areas of man’s 
life. These areas Hu equated with the philosophical concepts 
of idealism and materialism, though he offered no explanation 
for this sudden change of definition. Hu then concluded this 
forced and unconvincing argument by stating that Sun Yat-sen’s 
ideas on "psychological transformation" constituted the proper 
recognition of the idealist side of the troublesome dichotomy, 
while his plans for economic reconstruction did the same for
the material side. Therefore, Sun had mended the age-old rift
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between idealism and materialism.
After this highly forced theoretical construction Hu’s 
concluding remarks on the current state of Sun’s ideas in China 
are of much more interest, both for what they reveal about the 
nature of official KMT ideology in the early 1930s, and for 
what they tell of H u ’s commitment to Sun’s political and social 
ideals. Hu began by noting that there had been a persistent 
effort over the past decade to distort the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, 
In the United Front period the Communists had attempted to equate 
the Three Principles with Marxism. Hu repeated the point that,
280
because of his concentration on "matter" (wu) or "profit" (li), 
Marx had failed to grasp the workings of history as a whole,
Marx had examined only modern bourgeois society, with its class- 
ridden system of productive relations, and as a consequence, he 
had reached the conclusion that class conflict was endemic in 
all societies. In words which Hu borrowed from Maurice William,
Marx could claim to be no more that a "social pathologist,"
92whose remedies were not applicable to China.
Hu then summarized the differences between Sun and Marx in 
tabular form. This provides a convenient statement of the main 
points in H u ’s nationalist ideology. Hu began with the observa­
tion that Sun’s revolutionary philosophy was "an existence 
conception of history" (sheng ti shih-kuan), as opposed to a 
materialist conception of history. The revolutionary masses 
were made of "all the people.," and not only the proletariat.
The enemies of the revolution were listed as, first, imperialism; 
second, the warlords and traditional politicians, both of whom 
represented the "feudal power" in China; and thirdly, the "local 
thugs and evil gentry" (t ’u-hao lieh-shen) . In comparison, Marx 
simply saw the bourgeoisie as the enemy. The nature of revolu­
tion, therefore, in Sun’s case, was national, while in Marx’s 
it was social. Last of all, Hu compared the "means of revolu­
tion" (ko-ming shou-tuan). Sun’s revolution would be attained 
through the national revolution and the promotion of the
programme of democracy, while Marx utilized only the class
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struggle and a worker-peasant dictatorship.
After presenting this schematized vindication of Sun’s
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theories, Hu turned to the more immediate and dangerous threat
to them posed by the Kuomintang itself. By the early 1930s the
KMT leadership had abandoned most of its pretensions to social
reform, and had moved to a position on the right which stressed
the nation and party, and the obligations of the populace to 
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obey. This shift found ideological expression in Confucian 
"restorationism," which was characterized by an assortment of 
quasi-mystical notions centring on such ill-defined ancient 
concepts as propriety (li) and righteousness (i). Supplementing 
this was the promotion of a cult of Tseng Kuo-fan, the hero of 
the imperial cause against the Taipings. The object of both of 
these experiments in political revivalism was the same: the 
attainment of social stability throughout the nation. Mary 
Wright described this aptly when she wrote that, "in the view 
of the Kuomintang ideologists, Confucianism was the most effective
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and cheapest means ever devised by man for the purpose.
Equally important to the restorationist movement was the
reassessment of Sun Yat-sen to emphasize his supposed link with
traditional Confucianism. At the same time the undeniable
"modern" component in his political and social ideology was
deemphasized. The leading spirit in the reinterpretation of
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Sun Yat-sen was Tai Chi-t’ao. He had seized’ upon references 
made by Sun to such Confucian concepts as "benevolence" and 
"love" (jen-ai). There is no dispute over the fact that Sun 
included these and other ideas from the Confucian tradition 
in his eclectic political philosophy. However, Tai Chi-t'ao's 
assertion that these elements constituted the essence of
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Sun Yat-senism in effect minimized the modern thrust of Sun’s
thought, and left it little more than a vague, mystical defence
of the status quo in China, According to Tai, Sun’s thought
was indisputably a part of "orthodox tradition" (cheng-t’ung).
Sun Yat-sen was heir to the moral conceptions of that tradition
developed from the time of Yao and Shun down to the time of
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Confucius and Mencius.
Hu reacted strongly to these attempts to "Confucianize"
Sun Yat-sen. Although he did not mention Tai Chi-t'ao by name,
he referred to the two statements mentioned above, and described
them as being arbitrary and without foundation. If they were
an accurate description of Sun, then he would have no claim to
his reputation as a great revolutionary thinker and leader.
The irrelevance and the danger to China of the whole Confucian
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restorationrst movement were put by Hu in the following words:
When I read the newspapers I wonder whether we are in 
the year 1933, when Japan has already seized Manchuria 
from us, and is infiltrating the north of China, or 
whether we have retreated three thousand■years into 
the past— or at the very least, five hundred.
Even more absurd to Hu was the attempt being made by some to
reconcile Sun’s ideas with Buddhism, a religion for which Hu
never possessed any sympathy. He abruptly dismissed it as
"idol-worshipping and unrevolutionary." However, he was forced
to admit that this need to present Sun Yat-sen in Confucian
or Buddhist terms reflected not just the force of superstition,
but also the unfortunately deep rooted Chinese habit of justi-
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fying any activity in the present by reference to the past.
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In conclusion, Hu returned to his earlier theme of the 
intrinsic excellence of Sun’s ideas. He called for open debate 
in China 'in place of the current intellectual repression, since 
the manifest superiority of the Three Principles to all other 
ideologies could be demonstrated most convincingly in a free 
environment. Sun had created a ’’practical and scientific theory," 
which was based on the laws of human social evolution, and not 
on metaphysics or materialism. Plekhanov's statement that all 
philosophical systems were monistic was true only of western 
creations, such as Marxism. It was not true of the Three 
Principles, which comprehended all human experience. The most 
important point to note about them, Hu emphasized, was their 
completely sufficient nature, which made any additions or 
revisions unnecessary. Anyone who tried to alter the substance 
of the Three Principles, whether in a Marxist, Confucianist, 
Buddhist, or any other direction, was an enemy of Sun Yat-sen.
The Limitations of KMT Ideology
At the heart of Hu Han-min’s ideological searchings was the 
need to find a revolutionary doctrine unique to China.. His 
rejection of Marxism, and his claims for the infallibility of 
Sun Yat-senism were both prompted by this need, probably more so 
than by his commitment to the preservation of the social order.
It was necessary for all revolutionary ideologies to take into
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consideration the characteristics of each nation of the world:
If a world revolution can be attained through a single 
ideology which can break down national boundaries.... then .
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that revolution must reflect the needs of the people 
of the world. If it does not, it is not a revolution.
How can it be said, then, that the so-called unique 
ideology is anything more than a rigid formula. . . ?
This statement begs the question of Hu's own claim for the 
universal efficacy of Sun Yat-senism, although it appears that 
Hu sought to escape this contradiction by maintaining that the 
Three Principles were of sufficient scope to encompass all 
national differences. As a possible resolution of the anomaly 
in his argument, this formulation is not persuasive. However, 
the exportability of Sun Yat-senism was not the main concern of 
Hu's ideology: in fact, it may represent a type of nationalistic
self-assertion as much as it does a reasoned.intellectual propo­
sition. The fundamental value of Sun's ideas lay in their 
suitability to the unique conditions of China, and it was this 
which justified the exclusion of all alien revolutionary 
ideologies from China.
It was the pretensions of Marxism to universal validity, 
irrespective of national differences, which Hu found completely 
unacceptable. Whether or not Hu felt Marxism could be revised 
to acquire a national form cannot be ascertained, since Hu's 
utterances on this topic are inconsistent. As noted earlier,
Hu often stated that Leninism was nothing more than a cynical
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form of power manipulation, completely divorced from Marxism.
Yet, on another occasion, he replied the contrary, when he 
stated that the failure of the Russian revolutionary 
experiment was not only a result of particular Russian condi­
tions, but also an inevitable consequence of the Russian attempt
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to implement the defective theory of Marxism. The possibility
that Marxism could be revised is also implicit in the attention
given by Hu to the qualifications which Marx made in 1872 to his
earlier belief that violent revolution was the only path to
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victory for the proletariat. Marx had stated that the workers
might hope "to secure their ends by peaceful means" in some
countries, such as the United States, England and Holland. Hu
did not choose to complete this excerpt, since Marx went on to
indicate that force probably would have to be used in the other
European countries. This may constitute a distortion of Marx’s
words; on the other hand, Marx’s exemption of several nations
from his earlier universal formulation of revolution may have
indicated to Hu that the path to revolution was unique for each
nation. Since Marx had not spoken of the Asian nations, there
was even more reason for Hu to see Marxism, revised or unrevised,
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as inappropriate to China. Because it was based on the 
experience of the industrialized West, Marxism, as Hu put it, 
could have no relevance to the backward (lo-hou) nations of the 
world, as it did not offer them the means (pan-fa) by which they 
might achieve revolution."^^
For convenience, it may be possible to simplify H u ’s posi­
tion on Marxism in the following manner: the Marxism of Marx 
himself was inapplicable to the non-European nations; and 
secondly, if it were possible to revise Marxism it had not been 
successfully achieved, certainly not in the Soviet Union, the 
only state which claimed, rightly or wrongly, to follow the 
Marxist doctrine. As far as China was concerned, the philosophy
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of Sun Yat-sen and the leadership of the Kuomintang were the two 
lodestones of the Chinese revolution. Sun had recognized the 
essential characteristics of Chinese society when he descried its 
universal poverty, and he had organized the Kuomintang as the 
political movement of the oppressed of China against their war­
lord and imperialist oppressors. Hu stated flatly that it was 
completely fallacious to maintain that "a party of workers and 
peasants was the most revolutionary" to be found. The followers 
of the Three Principles constituted the world’s most revolu­
tionary party, which "definitely was not a peasant-worker party,"
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but one representative, of all the people. Its unity could not 
be threatened by the development of factions of the left or the 
right. Any attempt to do this would imperil "the all-inclusive 
revolutionary party," and would be tantamount to "counter­
revolution.”1^
Hu ’s determination to promote a nationalist ideology for 
China, and to implement it through an independent political party, 
was a logical consequence of his own fundamental Chinese nation­
alism. Whatever the theoretical weaknesses of Sun Yat-senism may 
have been, it did provide its adherents with a supposedly unique 
Chinese political philosophy. However, Sun Yat-senism in reality 
was more a set of programmes than it ever was a philosophical 
system, even if its obvious inadequacies as the latter are dis­
counted. A brief examination of these programmes, in so far as 
they sought to solve the great social problem of China, that of 
the peasantry, reveals how limited Sun’s grasp of the countryside 
was. The approach taken towards the peasantry was, first of all,
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a highly patronizing one. In Hu's explanation of KMT rural policy,
the peasantry appears as a great, undifferentiated mass. Peasants
were to be helped by "the power of the state"; on no account were
they to be "thrown into disorder." Hu sketched out the programme
of rural reform, which was to begin with the land-survey initiating
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the equalization of land rights policy. The state also would set 
up agricultural banks to make low-interest loans available to the 
peasants, thereby enabling them to "escape the usurious interest 
charges of the t ’u-hao lieh-shen.11 The state would establish 
cooperatives to facilitate the sale of produce, and so help the 
peasants avoid the manipulation of the market by exploitative 
merchants. Irrigation and conservation projects would mitigate 
the ravages of natural disasters, while new scientific knowledge, 
as applied in such important areas as the improvement of farm 
implements and the development of fertilizers, would bring about 
an increase in production. In these ways, the welfare of the 
peasantry would be secured. Then, as Hu concluded, "What need
110will there be for the disruptive methods of the Communist Party?"
Viewed from one perspective, there was nothing intrinsically 
wrong with the above prescription as a long-term solution to some 
of the problems of China’s countryside. Increased production was 
essential to the nation’s economic, social and political betterment. 
However, what Sun, Hu and the rest of the progressive KMT leader­
ship refused to consider when they laid out their carefully detailed 
plans was that the Chinese countryside was not a homogeneous whole, 
which could be rescued from poverty through the general application 
to it of technology, easy credit and other such measures. Apart
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from the awkward, and persistently ignored, question of how these 
programmes were to be financed, the KMT plan for rural reconstruc­
tion was fatally flawed because it discounted the infinite grada­
tions of poverty which existed among the peasantry, and it made 
light of the virtually unchallengeable domination of the country­
side by the traditional elite. Hu referred to the exploitative 
elements of rural society, the unscrupulous merchants and the 
tTu-hao lleh-shen (whom he had narrowly, and curiously, defined 
as money-lenders), but he implied that the political power of the 
state could easily undercut their power through raising the stan­
dard of living of the peasantry as a whole. In view of the 
Nanking government’s inability to construct an effective rural
administration in face of the strength of the local despots, this
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hope was extraordinarily optimistic. In sum, it may be said
that half of the rural problem, that of endemic poverty, was
recognized from the beginning by the KMT leadership, but the
other half, that of the oppressive traditional social structure,
was continually minimized, if not ignored.
With such a solution to offer for the regeneration of rural
China, the KMT had no alternative but to stress social order and
discipline while the slow measured pace of reform altered the lot
of the peasantry. This approach was applied to China at large.
Hu said that the party must emphasize the "centre," as opposed to
the "left" or the "right," although he took pains to explain that
this did not imply any form of compromise with the enemies of 
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society. At the same time, Hu underlined the obligation of the 
party to lead the masses through the period of political tutelage
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and economic reconstruction, and to hold firm to the ideology of 
Sun Yat-sen in carrying out its tasks. Yet it is apparent that 
this ideology was too compromising to act as a vehicle of social 
change in China, and it was too weak as an intellectual structure 
to compel the allegiance of most of the party membership to its 
genuinely progressive aspects. While there were a few in the 
party such as Hu who preserved their faith in Sun Yat-senism, 
it was manifestly clear that once the party.had settled into 
power '.in 1928 most of the party membership gave the official 
ideology no more than a ritual acknowledgement.
Hu was fully aware of this lessening of revolutionary 
spirit in the party, and he attempted to counter it. In doing 
so, he was reduced to a most ironical position for a man who saw 
himself as a modern revolutionary, for he could do nothing but 
ceaselessly call on party members to become better men through 
constant rededication to the party’s mission and Sun Yat-sen’s 
teachings. As a young man, Hu had broken with all of the obvious 
traits of Confucianism. But when he was confronted with the 
problem of reinvigorating the political movement founded by Sun, 
he could offer nothing more than an essentially Confucian 
solution: the provision of good leaders, imbued with a high 
sense of political virtue, who would govern honestly and 
genuinely implement the .party's programmes of reform. In this 
respect, Sun Yat-senism revealed its fundamental political weak­
ness, since even its most thoughtful and dedicated followers, such 
as Hu Han-min, ultimately had to fall back on the chimerical hope 
that its goals were attainable if only enough good men could be found.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION: THE CAREER AND THOUGHT OF HU HAN-MIN
Political Power and Political Exile: 1928-1936
The last years of Hu Han-min!s life were ones of deep frus­
tration. Although he was invited back to Nanking in the fall of 
1928 to join the newly proclaimed National Government, he soon 
found his political role severely circumscribed. Hu was appointed 
president of the Legislative Yuan in the five-power administra­
tive system officially promulgated on October 4. According to 
the model which had been drawn up earlier by Sun Yat-sen in his 
Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, the Legislative Yuan 
was declared "the highest legislative organ" of the government, 
with "the power to decide upon the following: legislation, 
budgets, amnesties, declarations of war, conclusion of treaties," 
as well as other matters involving international relations. 
However, the exercise of these powers was very much restricted 
by the allocation to the Executive Yuan and the State Council 
of virtually the same responsibilities. The Executive Yuan was 
"to decide on" all bills which were to be submitted to the 
Legislative Yuan, while the State Council, the highest organ of 
the state, was granted the right to declare war, conclude trea­
ties, and to "exercise all the government powers of the Republic
of China."1 In this confusion of jurisdictions what, in effect,
290
291
determined questions of policy was the possession of real poli­
tical power, whether financial, military or factional, and not 
the letter of Sun Yat-sen's complex constitutional structure.
This meant that the Legislative Yuan was reduced to a delibera­
tive function, while effective authority resided in whatever 
part of the state structure Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage 
happened to occupy.
Hu Han-min himself had been brought back into the Kuomintang 
ruling elite largely because of questions of factional balance.
In the February 1928 plenary session of the KMT Central Execu­
tive Committee, Wang Ching-wei and his purported left-wing allies 
had been forced into political retirement. Chiang Kai-shek, 
while obviously the preeminent political figure, required the 
support of one of the major factional groupings in the party if 
his position were to be consolidated. This was provided by the 
reentry into the Nanking government of Hu, not so much because 
he was the active leader of a clique, as because he was regarded 
by the veteran members of the.party, particularly the large
Cantonese contingent, as their leader due to his long service 
2
to the party. This role was one which Hu fully accepted. Since 
he had been associated with Sun Yat-sen from the founding of the 
T'ung-meng Hui, Hu saw his position in the new government as 
that of propagator and defender of Sun's teachings about the 
party and the nation.
In the two and a half years in which he served as president 
of the Legislative Yuan Hu had the opportunity to exercise those 
legalistic interests which had been revealed two decades earlier
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in Min-pao in his lengthy study of foreign exclusionism and 
international law. From the testimony of contemporary observers, 
Hu applied himself to his work with great personal integrity and 
dedication, qualities which stood in sharp contrast to the tradi­
tional bureaucratic habits of indolence and peculation which were
3
reasserting themselves all too quickly in the Nanking regime.
It is unfortunately the case, however, that many of the laws
drafted by the Legislative Yuan never had any application to the
lives of the citizens of the Republic. An exception to this
statement might be cited with respect to the promulgation of
modern codes of criminal and civil law, and the provision of
4
properly trained judicial officers. The goal of these endeavours 
was one of utmost importance to the Nationalist government: the 
abolition of the foreign privilege of extraterritoriality, 
which was the centrepiece of the system of the unequal treaties.
In two other important areas of legislation, women’s rights 
and rural reform, the Kuomintang legislation remained confined 
largely to paper. In 1930 a new civil code concerning the 
rights of women declared legal equality to exist between the 
sexes. Both enjoyed the right to vote and stand for office. 
Women, married as well as unmarried, had the right to inherit 
property. Grounds for divorce were identical for both sexes. 
There were other provisions which made the code one of the 
most modern of its time, so that Hu Shih termed it "a gigantic 
and bloodless social revolution."^ The reality, however, was 
otherwise. This legal code could have little application to 
any women apart from those who were members of the small west-
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ternized bourgeoisie in the large cities. The land legislation
passed in the same year limited peasant rents to a maximum of
37.5 percent of the crop, and allowed for the compulsory purchase
of holdings of absentee landlords. With rural China still in
the grips of the traditional social structure, and with Nanking
unwilling under any circumstances to challenge the rural landed
class, there was no way in which such a law could be applied.
This in fact was recognized when Nanking deferred even its offi-
£
cial promulgation to 1936, For Hu Han-min, though, it may be 
said that the enactment of legislation in itself constituted the 
essential first step in the orderly realization of Sun Yat-sen’s 
programme of social reform.
In early 1931 Hu broke with Chiang Kai-shek and resigned 
from office. There were two immediate points of difference, 
although Hu's frustrations at presiding over the impotent Legis­
lative Yuan, along with his deepening resentment of Chiang's 
dictatorial political style, had prepared him for the break well 
before it came. The ostensible cause for Hu ’s withdrawal from 
political life lay in his opposition to the proposed provisional 
constitution (yiieh-f a), which was to guide China for the dura­
tion of the period of tutelage. In Hu’.s interpretation, which 
was certainly open to challenge, Sun’s teachings forbade the 
adoption of a constitution prior to the transition to the final 
stage of full constitutional rule. It is likely, however, that 
Hu was as much concerned about Chiang using the yiieh-fa to 
strengthen legally his own considerable powers, since the 
constitution made provision for a President of the Republic.
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This could be blocked by a literal reading of Sun’s texts, 
which Hu felt particularly competent to make.^
That the break between Hu and Chiang resolved itself into 
a struggle for power between two strong figures, each represent­
ing a separate interest in the Nanking government, may be seen 
in the other matter of contention, the proposed silver loan.
Hu took the initiative as president of the Legislative Yuan in 
negotiating a loan of one thousand million ounces of silver 
from the United States. This was to be used by the Legislative 
Yuan to underwrite many of the policies of national reconstruc­
tion outlined by Sun Yat-sen. The successful negotiation of 
such a loan would have strengthened appreciably the position of 
the Legislative Yuan, since budgetary control hitherto had 
remained in the Executive Yuan, which was dominated by Chiang 
and the military. The upshot of the increasing tension between 
the two men was H u ’s resignation on February 28, 1931, Chiang 
immediately placed Hu under house arrest, which he explained 
was in H u ’s best interest, since counter-revolutionary elements
in the treaty ports might entice him there and exploit his 
8
good name,
Hu’s arrest once more placed a strain on the fragile strun 
ture of the KMT. In Nanking Hu had a large following among the 
rank and file members of the government and the party, who saw 
him representing their interests against the clique of milita­
rists, financiers and relatives which surrounded Chiang. More 
important in terms of power relationships was the support Hu 
enjoyed on the part of party elders, many of whom originated as
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he did from the province of Kwangtung. This mixture of political
principle and regional self-interest was demonstrated most
tellingly by the coup staged in Canton by Ch’en Ch'i-t'ang at the
9
end of April, 1931. ChTen declared Kwangtung independent of the
dictatorial Chiang regime; at the same time ChTen demanded the
release of Hu. When Canton and Nanking failed to resolve their
differences, ChTen called for a punitive expedition against
Chiang. Preparations for this were under way when the Japanese
suddenly invaded Manchuria on September 18. This brought about
a truce between Canton and Nanking, and temporarily restored a
superficial state of unity to Nationalist China. Ch’en Chi-t’ang
was recognized as head of the KMT Branch Council in the south,
and Hu Han-min was released from detention.
After his release Hu proceeded south to Canton, but he
soon found that the support of the military clique there did
not go as far as allowing him an active role in Canton politics.
Hu went on to Hong Kong, where Ch'en provided for the upkeep of
10
a large establishment. Once, more Hu turned his attention to 
literary work. With Liu Lu-yin he edited the San-min-chu-i 
yiieh-k’an, which published its first issue in Canton on 
January 15, 1933. Hu was the moving spirit behind the journal, 
and over its first two years he contributed articles to it on 
a regular basis. Por the most part, these consisted of comment 
on current Chinese affairs, and repeated explication of the 
familiar doctrines of Sun Yat-sen. There are certain points of 
interest which stand out. Hu attacked the Chiang regime unre­
mittingly for its "subservient" attitude towards Japanese aggres-
296
11sion in north China. He attacked it almost as' insistently
because of its political dictatorship, and its support of fascist
organizations such as the Blue Shirts, both of which insulted
12
Sun's principle of democracy. Hu continually stressed the need 
for implementing Sun's principle of livelihood. This led him 
to laud the Soviet Union's first five-year plan, which he saw as 
proof that a nation could industrialize quickly through state 
direction and mass involvement. In his view the Soviet Union's 
plan fell short of what China could realize in the Three Prin­
ciples, but, as he noted, the Soviet Union had realized impres­
sive gains in national power, while China had yet to confront
13
the tasks of national reconstruction.
After 1934 Hu's contributions to the journal decreased 
quickly in number. This was attributable largely to his recur­
ring ill health, the reason for a voyage of relaxation which he 
made to Europe in 1935. While he was absent from China, the 
KMT held its Fifth Congress in November of that year. The party 
members met under the shadow of increasing Japanese aggression 
and growing party factionalism. Unity, both in the nation and 
in the party, became a theme of the Congress. As a result, over­
tures were made to Hu to rejoin the government, and his impor­
tance to the party was recognized in his election to the chair-
1 /
manship of the Central Executive Committee. When he arrived in 
Hong Kong in April 1936 on his return from Europe, envoys of 
Nanking were sent to meet him. He set out for the capital, but 
he had only reached Canton when a cerebral haemorrhage struck 
him down on May 12, at the early age of fifty-six.
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Hu was given a state funeral, memorial meetings attended
by thousands of mourners were held throughout the country,
editorials were written lamenting his death, and a testimonial
volume by his colleagues was published.^ Shortly after his
death H u ’s will was made public. This prescribed the national
tasks, resistance to Japan, opposition to dictatorial rule,
and suppression of the communists, if the Three Principles were
to be realized. Some doubt was cast on the authenticity of the
will because it appeared to serve the interests of the dissident
16
Canton government. Whether this faction benefited or not, 
there is nothing about H u ’s enjoinments which was out of 
character with the course of his entire life. According to 
contemporary accounts, the sentiments expressed on the occasion 
of Hu's death were genuinely motivated. In a time of growing 
national and international crisis for China, H u ’s political 
dedication to the ideals of Sun Yat-sen, and his uncompromising 
nationalism in the face of Japanese aggression, were held up as 
examples to the nation of what was best in the nationalist cause.
An Assessment of the Political Thought of Hu Han-min
There are certain basic statements to be made, or repeated, 
concerning the nature of Hu ’s intellectual career. His life of 
intense political activity imposed severe, and usually unpredic­
table, limitations on the opportunities that he had for sustained 
study. The most striking example of this is his abrupt termina­
tion of writing for Chien-she, the high-point in terms of his 
creativity. Hu ’s work, at least when regarded superficially,
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displays a rather compartmentalized quality, with great outbursts 
of theoretical work set off by long periods in which he composed 
nothing apart from routine party directives. However, while this 
generalization is true in so far as the schedule of his writing 
career is concerned, it may disguise the basically unified nature 
of what he wrote over the thirty years of his political life.
A second point to raise at the outset is that of the nature 
of the intellectual relationship between Hu and Sun Yat-sen.
From his early days in the T'ung-meng Hui, Hu saw himself as the 
young disciple of the old master. This concept was deeply 
embedded in the Chinese intellectual tradition. However, it did 
not preclude Hu’s independence of mind, nor did it prevent him 
from ranging into his own areas of interest, as indicated in his 
studies of Marxism during the May Fourth period. At the beginning 
of the relationship, Hu wrote in Min-pao almost as a literal 
expositor of Sun’s social reform policies. Curiously enough, at 
the end of his career, Hu again assumed the role of expositor, 
but this time it was to remind the Kuomintang of the faith it 
was losing, not to make converts to the revolutionary cause. 
Regardless of the specific focus of Hu's interests throughout 
his life, he saw himself as the defender of Sun Yat-sen’s 
political and social mission.
A last preliminary statement concerns Hu ’s fundamental 
political activism. Through many long years filled with setbacks 
he fought on behalf of Sun’s cause. Activism was not only a 
part of his emotional makeup; it was central to his intellectual 
comprehension of the world. From his early article on Yen Fu
299
through his more sophisticated interpretations of historical 
materialism, Hu emphasized the great scope for activity open to 
the individual. Although the ultimate causes for this belief 
cannot be determined, the consequence of it was a voluntarist 
interpretation of man’s role in politics and history.
The aspects of Hu's character and thought mentioned above 
are easily identifiable. Where the problem becomes difficult is 
in ascertaining the relative degree of traditionalism or modern­
ism in his thought. This is a significant question, since Hu 
belonged to a generation which fell into both the world of 
Confucian China and that of the modern West. In Hu’s case this 
is particularly evident. As a youth, he was trained to take 
the imperial examination, and at the age of twenty-one he 
attained the provincial degree. Hu possessed a grasp of the 
traditional culture shared by few of his contemporaries. Yet 
in his thought, there is little direct evidence of the influence 
of that culture. Hu seemed able to set it aside, without any 
noticeable intellectual stress. His attitude towards the 
Confucian tradition was highly dispassionate, indicating, perhaps, 
a high degree of self-assurance about the ideas he had adopted 
in its place, as well as a lasting pride in his nation's past.
If Hu's attitude towards the traditional culture is clear, 
and it was a surprisingly non-partisan one for the time, the 
presence of what might be termed residual Confucian influences 
in his thought remains a much more open question. There are 
certain ambiguities to be found in Hu's major social and political 
positions, and they may represent a tension between the tradi­
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tional culture and that of the modern West. This is not to 
imply that Confucianism and modernity represent polar extremi­
ties, nor that Hu Ts ideas may be fitted into such tidy and 
convenient categories. The question of politics, the first 
point to be considered, illustrates the difficulty involved here. 
Was the traditional Chinese emphasis on the importance of 
politics necessarily a Confucian preserve? Taoism was also 
concerned with the role of government. On balance, though, it 
may be argued that Confucianism, with its emphasis on practical 
and theoretical matters of government, represented the dominant 
strain in a widely shared Chinese tradition of politics.
In Hu ’s case, the fascination with politics is obvious.
The theme which emerges in his analysis of the Chinese philosoph­
ical tradition is the dominance of politics over thought. When 
it came to analyzing society in the present, Hu saw political 
classes,, not economic classes. To what extent, though, did he 
view political activity from a traditional perspective? Hu was 
attracted to Sun’s conception of a party composed of "those who 
understood in advance," in other words, a benevolent intellectual 
elite whose duty it was to guide the masses. This paternalism, 
highly reminiscent of'the Confucian attitude towards the common 
people, became more pronounced after 1927, when the Kuomintang 
had power to exercise on a wide scale. The party, according to 
Hu, was to educate and lead the masses, but it was to take great 
care lest the masses be stirred up, and social -o^der be the 
result. Does this reflect a commitment on the part of Hu to 
such a fundamental Confucian notion as harmony? It cannot be
301
that simple, in view of the fact that Hu was a hard-headed 
political realist who had not shrunk back from political revolu­
tion. His aversion to social revolution may stem partly from 
this, but it also was a product of his conviction that ration­
ally conceived and executed social policies were the most effec­
tive solution to the problems facing the Chinese masses.
If certain of H u ’s political attitudes might be regarded 
as exhibiting Confucian characteristics, the mechanism through 
which he chose to express his political interests was completely 
of the twentieth century. This was the political party, an 
entirely new departure on the Chinese scene. Hu devoted his life 
not only to Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary goals, but just as much 
to the succession of parties which Sun organized to realize his 
aims. H u ’s modernity in this regard is even more apparent from 
the eagerness with which he embraced democratic centralism when 
it was brought to the Kuomintang by the Russian advisers in the 
First United Front. For the sake of argument, it might be 
objected that democratic centralism and the political culture of 
the traditional government elite shared certain characteristics, 
such as complete accountability to higher authority, and the 
irresistible pressure of the group. There may be parallels 
here; all the same, there was a fundamental difference between 
the two in that the traditional political structure eschewed open 
rules and compulsion, and preferred to operate instead through 
a system of only slowly mastered intimations and allusions. 
Democratic centralism, and the Leninist type of political party, 
were set apart by a vast divide from anything the traditional
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political culture had produced, regardless of the obvious 
authoritarianism, and even capriciousness, of both.
The modernity of H u ’s political thought also may be seen in 
his conviction that the rule of law was essential to a regenerated 
China. In Confucian China there had not been a lack of individ­
ual laws, but law as an abstraction in the western sense was non­
existent. Through the course of his life, from the time of his 
enrolment in the Tokyo Law College, Hu attempted to give practical 
expression to his legal interests. The most lengthy work to his 
credit was the survey he wrote in Min-pao of the principles of 
international law. In 1928 as president of the Legislative Yuan,
Hu actively sponsored legal equality for women, and promoted the 
development of modern codes of criminal and civil law. It might 
be said that this intense dedication to law became a liability 
to Hu as a political thinker. He saw the solution to social 
problems lying in carefully framed legislative proposals. Such 
an approach, however, was of genuine application only to societies 
less rent by division than China. To put Hu’s interest in law 
into perspective, it is necessary to recall that to a member of 
the young generation in China at the turn of the century, law 
did not signify maintenance of the established order. Instead it 
represented the modernization of China, the advancement of equality 
among the people, and the liberation of the individual from state 
authority. If Hu ’s legalistic propensities are to be associated 
with his commitment to gradual, social reform, then it would be 
unfair to deny him credit for promoting the advancement of China 
in an area where the nation had been notably deficient.
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A survey of H u ’s political career and intellectual interests 
reveals a content that was modern, although it was sometimes 
infused with a more traditionalist spirit. In the case of the 
focal point of H u ’s life, the Kuomintang, the record of the late 
1920s and early 1930s was one of an irresistible slide back into 
tradition. Hu dismissed its Confucian restorationsim as a slander 
on the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, However, was the pure, undefiled 
ideology of the Kuomintang relevant to China at that time? Hu 
did not seem willing to confront the question. Instead he 
repeatedly emphasized the undoubtedly good aims that Sun had in 
mind: national dignity, democracy, and the general welfare of
the Chinese people. The realization of these goals, Hu admitted, 
would require much time and hard work. But they were attainable 
if Sun’s policies were followed. To this end, Hu consistently 
exhorted the members of the party to return to the true faith, 
and thereby,it would appear, regain the art of governing properly.
Did this signify a reversion on Hu’s part to the traditional 
Confucian belief that good government was the inevitable conse­
quence of the actions of good men? Hu's insistence on the need 
for China to implement fully the many structural changes in 
government which Sun had proposed gives evidence once more of the 
modern component so prominent in Hu’s thought. Yet, paradoxically, 
this sustained exhortation for a party membership morally pure 
to carry out Sun's ideals was, in fact, Confucian in effect, 
though not in intent. But the reality of the Kuomintang was the 
preemption of most of its positions of authority by people who 
were of the traditional political elite. Hu realized this, and
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attacked those whom he described as the party gentry. What he 
did not, or would not, recognize was that the Kuomintang hostility 
to social revolution was the force that drew these people into 
the party, and kept out those who would breathe new life into it.
Because of the social realities of China, particularly the 
rural areas, there was no prospect that Sun Yat-sen’s political 
and social doctrines could be implemented, even if sufficient 
good men could be found to carry out the party's tasks. Sun had 
developed his ideas- at a time when the political revolution 
excluded more than passing concern for other issues. By the 
1920s, however, the social revolution no longer could be ignored. 
In this regard, Hu belonged to the early generation of Chinese 
revolutionaries, whose attention was devoted primarily to the 
political sphere. When the political movement to which he had 
devoted his energies finally achieved a measure of success in 
the 1920s, the problem to be solved by the party had changed to 
one it was not equipped to handle. In Hu's case, this problem 
was compounded by his own dedication to the letter of Sun's 
teachings, and by his own fundamental belief in the exercise of 
human activity within a framework of orderly change. However,
Hu was not alone in containing in himself the ambiguities 
mentioned above. They were inescapable for all of the members 
of his generation. In fact, it may be said that the struggles 
China has endured over the past century for cultural and social 
transformation have made such ambiguities a characteristic of 
every generation.
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FOOTNOTES
Chap ter I_
1. The time of writing of the autobiography (tzu-chuan) is un­
certain. It came to light in 1949, and was published four 
years later in Lo Chia-lun, gen.ed., Ko-ming wen-hsien (Rev­
olutionary Documents), Volume III, (Taipei, 1953), 373-442. 
There is a brief introduction to the autobiography tracing 
the circumstances of its discovery. The edition used in 
this study was published under the title, Hu Han-min tzu- 
chuan, hereafter cited as TC, by the Chuan-chi wen-hsueh
ch'u-pan-she, (Taipei, 1969). Its text is identical to the 
1953 edition, but the pagination is different.
Internal evidence points to a possible dating of 1915-1917, 
though it appears that several passages were either composed 
or rewritten some time after 1920. The account breaks off 
very suddenly in May 1912. As it is written almost wholly 
in wen-yen it is difficult to believe that it could postdate 
1919, by which time Hu had readily adapted his style to pai- 
hua. The elaborate detail given the T'ung-meng Hui uprisings 
of the 1907-1911 period suggests a fairly close- proximity to 
the events. The years 1915-1917 also seem possible as this 
was a low point in the political fortunes of Sun's group.
Much of this time Hu spent in Shanghai.
There is in the autobiography a reference to Marx and the 
theory of historical materialism on 35, and one to the
Soviet revolution on 69. These are both to be found in
passages of pai-hua interpolated in the wen-yen text. The
account of the Boxer uprising to be found on pages 6 to 8 is
likewise largely composed in the new style. It is possible 
that these were rewritten during Hu's stay in Moscow over 
the winter of 1925-1926. According to the recollection of 
an old friend and political colleague, Huang Chi-lu, Hu 
"worked on his autobiography while he was in Russia." (Inter­
view with Huang Chi-lu, Taipei, July 9, 1975).
2. Schwartz, Benjamin, In Search of Wealth and Power, (New York;
Harper Torchbook, 1969), 22.
3. TC, 1-2. Much of the material in the autobiography is repro­
duced in Chiang Yung-ching, "Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-p 'u-
("A Chronological Biography of Mr. Hu Han-min"), hereafter 
cited as NPK. This source is published in Wu Hsiang-hsiang, 
gen. ed., Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an (Collected
kao"
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Materials on the History of M o d e m  China), (Taipei, 1961), 
Volume III, 79—320. The NPK is an impressive collation of many 
sources on Hu's life. However, it carefully avoids any edi­
torial comment, and it omits materials concerning certain 
contentious episodes in Hu ’s later political career.
There is also a brief summary of Hu's life to be found in 
Boorman, Howard and Howard, Richard C., editors, Biographical 
Dictionary of Republican China, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1968), Volume II, 159-166. Its usefulness is affected 
by the presence of several errors, as well as the omission of 
some important facts about Hu's career.
4. This collection has been published under the title Pu-k'uei 
shih shih-ch'ao (Poems from the Studio of Ever-filial Piety), 
(Taipei, 1958). The reference is taken from ode 202: "My 
lord will have pious sons,/ Pious sons in good store." See 
Waley, Arthur, The Book of Songs, (New York, 1937; reprinted 
Grove Press, 1960), 214. My appreciation to Professor Jan 
Yun-hua of the Department of Religion, McMaster University, 
Hamilton, Canada for identifying the source of this quotation,
5. TC, 2.
6 . Loc. cit.
7. Loc. cit.
8 . NPK, 87. Chiang quotes from a speech given by Hu in December
1930.
9. TC, 2. For brief selections from Wang Fu-chih see de Bary,
William T., ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964), Volume I, 597-606.
10. TC, 2.
11. Ibid., 2-3.
12. Ibid., 5-6. See also Wright, Mary, ed., China in Revolution:
The First Phase 1900- 1913, (New Haven, Conn4 . Yale University
Press, 1968), 1-4. In her introductory essay Mary Wright draws
attention to the importance of the year 1900 as a turning 
point in China's m o d e m  history.
13. TC, 6 . This section may have been written in 1925-1926.
14. Ibid., 6-7.
15. For excerpts from Ch'en Tu-hsiu's two articles see Carrere
d'Encausse, Helene and Schram, Stuart R., editors, Marxism
and Asia: An Introduction with Readings, (London, Allen Lane: 
The Penguin Press, 1969). The first of these is "Two Mis­
taken Ideas We Have About the Boxers," 223-224; the second,
"The Monument to von Ketteler," 210-211. Professor Stuart
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Schram drew my attention to the dialectical nature of Hu’s 
interpretation of the Boxers, and its contrast to that of 
Chen Tu-hsiu.
16. TC, 5. The reference to Sun Yat-sen is in TC, 2.
17. Ibid., 8 . See also NPK, 88, n. 1. Chiang points out that
the date Hu passed the chii-jen examinations must be 1900, 
rather than 1902, the year given in Hu’s account. The latter 
date is completely at variance with the rest of Hu ’s chro­
nology.
18. TC, 9.
19. TC, 11. There is a testimonial to Hu by one of his former 
students at Wuchow in Liu Lu-yin, ed., Hu Han-min hsien-sheng 
chi-nien chuan-k’an (Mr. Hu Han-min: A Memorial Edition), 
(Canton, 1936), 67-74.
20. TC, 15.
21. Ibid., 16. Hu lists his duties and daily itinerary at the 
party headquarters.
22. Min-pao has been reprinted in four volumes by the Committee
for the Compilation of Party Historical Materials of the
Kuomintang Central Committee, (Taipei, 1969).
23. For excerpts from "The Six Great Principles of the Min-Pao,”
see de Bary, op. cit., Volume II, 101-105.
24. NPK, 101.
25. Japanese was the only foreign language that Hu mastered.
According to his daughter, Hu later learned to read English,
but only with considerable difficulty. (Interview with Hu 
Mu-lan, Taipei, July 12, 1975).
26. Jansen, Marius, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1970 ; first' published 1954), 122-
123.
27. TC, 20. See also Yu, George T., Party Politics in Republican 
China, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1966), 54-55.
28. Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, (Stan­
ford: Stanford University Press, 1961). Chapters 3 and 6 
provide a good summary of the revolutionary attempts made by 
the T ’ung-meng Hui.
29. Friedman, Edward, Backward Toward Revolution: The Chinese
Revolutionary Party, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
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of California Press, 1974), 112-113.
30. TC, 25-26; Hsueh, op. cit., 65-67.
31. TC, 28.
32. Ibid., 32, See also Gasster, Michael, Chinese Intellectuals 
and the Revolution of 1911, (Seattle: University of Washing­
ton Press, 1969), 94.
33. Gasster, op. cit., 95-96.
34. Hu Han-min, "Wu-hu! Man-chou so-wei hsien-fa ta-kang.M This 
was published in Chung-hsing jih-pao, September 24-0ctober 9, 
1908. See Gasster, op. cit., 99.
35. TC, 36-38; HsUeh, op. cit., 75-77.
36. Hslieh, op. cit., 79; Rhoads, Edward J.M., China’s Republican 
Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895-1913, (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975), 197-199.
37. TC, 44; HsUeh, op. cit., 93; Rhoads, op. cit. , 199-202.
38. TC, 49-52; Rhoads, op. cit., 225-229.
39. TC, 60-62; Yu, op, cit., 68-69,
40. Yu, op. cit., 69-72.
41. TC, 71-74, Yu, op. cit., 78-80; Friedman, op. cit., chap-
ter 2 , passim (29-47).
42. There are countless later references to this problem in Hu's 
writings. A very good illustration of this, which will be 
discussed in chapter V, is his 1924 article, "A Criticism of 
Criticisms of the Kuomintang." In it Hu categorized the 1912 
creation of an open party as a disastrous mistake.
43. The autobiography terminates in May 1912, just after Hu's
resumption of the governorship of Kwangtung. The main source 
for the following years is Nien-p'u-kao, although it is very
spotty in places. Rhoads, op. cit., is quite useful on
1912-1913, the year of Hu's governorship.
44. NPK, 135-137; Rhoads, op. cit., 248.
45. Rhoads, op. cit., 257.
46. Ibid., 240-241.
47. Ibid., 239-240.
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48. Ibid., 253-255.
49. This judgement appears in several accounts. For example, 
Eastman, Lloyd, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nation­
alist Rule, 1927-1937, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1974), 320, n. 50. Eastman’s informant also mentioned 
Wang Ching-wei as another uncorrupt member of the Nationalist 
government. The only adverse comment to my knowledge is to 
be found in Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese 
Revolution, (London: G. Routledge, 1930), 327. Because he 
was a close follower of Wang Ching-wei, Tang had few kind 
words for Hu. However, the furthest he went was to charge 
-that Hu was guilty of nepotism,
50. Rhoads, op. cit., 259-262; Yu, op, cit., 109-115.
51. Friedman’s study of the Chinese Revolutionary Party is the 
definitive work.
52. NPK, 150-152.
53. NPK, 154-160; Friedman, op. cit., 105-112.
54. NPK, 160.
55. The following tortuously involved episode of China’s modern 
history is summarized in Li Chien-nung, The Political History 
of Modern China, 1840-1928, translated and edited by Teng 
Ssu-ytf and Ingalls, Jeremy, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1969), 363-378.
56. NPK, 170.
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Chapter II
1. MP, Number 1, (November 1905), prefatory materials, 0012. 
Since consecutive pagination was not used in Min-pao until 
the fourth issue, the master numbers of the Taiwan reprint 
are given in each reference.
2. Liao Chung-k'ai, translator, "She-hui-chu-i shih ta-kangM 
(nA Basic History of Socialism1')? MP, Number 7, (September 
1906), 101-111 (1037-1047), especially 110-111. For the 
original, see Bliss, W.D.P., A Handbook of Socialism, (New 
York: C. Scribner and Sons, 1895), 39-49.
3. Scalapino, Robert, and Schiffrin, Harold 2., "Early Socialist 
Currents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement: Sun Yat-sen 
versus Liang Ch'i-ch'ao," JAS, Volume XVII, Number 3, (May 
1959), 326-327. See also, Li Yu-ning, The Introduction of 
Socialism into China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1971), 53-56.
4. Li, ibid., 27-28.
5. Chu Chih-hsin, "Te-i-chih she-hui ko-ming-chia hsiao chuan" 
("Short Biographies of German Social Revolutionaries"),
MP, Number 2, (January 1906), 0223-0239. Chu followed this 
in the next issue with a sketch of Ferdinand Lassalle.
6 . Ibid., 0232.
7. Ibid., 0229-0232. Chu gave the second point a page and a 
half of explanation, and the third point half a page. For 
the listing of the ten points, see Feuer, Lewis, ed., Marx 
and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, 
(London: Fontana Books, 1969), 69-70.
8 . Chu, ibid., 0228-0229; Feuer, ibid., 82. See also Bernal, 
Martin, Chinese Socialism to 1907, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 1976), 117. This is the most comprehensive 
study of the subject to date.
9. Chu, ibid., 0227-0228; see also Bernal, op. cit., 117.
10. Schiffrin, Harold Z., "Sun Yat-sen's Early Land Policy,"
JAS, Volume XVI, Number 4, (August 1957), 549-564; Bernal, 
ibid., 58-73.
11. Hu's continued dedication to the land rights policy in the 
late 1920s is discussed in chapter VI.
12. Bernal, op. cit., 52-53.
13. Hu cited the well-field as an early attempt to solve the land
question in "Six Great Principles," 0344.
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14. Schiffrin, "Early Land Policy," 550.
15. Bernal, op. cit., 58.
16. Sun’s letter is quoted in Bernal, ibid., 59.
17. TC, 18.
18. Sun Wen, "Fa-k'an-tz’u" ("Preface"), MP, Number 1, 0010.
See also Bernal, op. cit., 68.
19. For the Proclamation, see Teng Ssu-yii and Fairbank, John K., 
China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839- 
1923, (New York: Atheneum, 1975), 227-229. The excerpt 
translated here is adapted from Bernal, op. cit., 69.
20. Hu Han-min, "Min-pao- chih liu ta chu-i" ("The Six Great 
Principles of the Min-pao") .MP, Number 3, (April 1906), 
0341-0346. A translation of this section is available in 
de Bary, op. cit., Volume II, 101-105.
21. Bernal, op. cit., 70.
22. Hu, "Six Great Principles," 0343-0344.
23. Ibid., 0345-0346.
24. Ibid., 0342.
25. Sun Wen, "Chi shih-erh ytieh erh-jih pen pao chi-yiian chieh" 
("The First Anniversary of The People’s Report"), MP,
Number 10, (December 1906), 90 (1506).
26. Hu Han-min, "Kao fei-nan min-sheng-chu-i-che" ("To the 
Denouncers of the Min-sheng-chu-i"), hereafter cited as 
"To the Denouncers," MP, Number 12, (March 1907), 100 
(1824).
27. Ly, J. Usang, "Dr. Sun and China," International Socialist 
Review, Volume 14, (1913-1914), (New York: Greenwood Reprint 
Corporation, 1968), 173. This contemporary article 
summarizes the political and social programmes of the newly 
organized Kuomintang.
28. Bernal, op. cit., 150.
29. TC, 15.
30. Yu, Party Politics, 42-43.
31. Hu Han-min, "Shu hou-kuan Yen shih tsui-chin cheng-chien" 
("The Most Recent Political Opinions of Mr. Yen Fu"), 
hereafter cited as "Yen Fu," MP, Number 2, (January 1906), 
0241-0257.
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32. Hu Han-min, "Yiieh chung nu-tzu chih pu-chia-che" ("Unmarried 
Women in Kwangtung"), Hsin shih-chi (New Century), Number 60, 
(April 15, 1908), 9-11.
In this note, Hu described a practice to be found in certain 
parts of Kwangtung, whereby women who rejected arranged 
marriages banded together in self-supporting groups. Hu 
commended them for their assertiveness, but he observed that 
their success stood as proof that equality for women was 
unattainable unless they possessed economic independence.
33. TC, 18. See Cochrane, Donna M . , Hu Han-min*s Articles in
Min-Pao, (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1960), 54-83
for a precis of this discussion.
34. Ibid., 31-32.
35. Hu, "Yen Fu," 0243-0214.
36. Onozuka is identified in Cochrane, op. cit., 36, n. 1.
37. Hu, "Yen Fu," 0248-0250; see also Cochrane, ibid., 40-43,
for a synopsis.
38. Hu, "Yen Fu," 0251.
39. There is an excellent summary of the Hu-Liang controversy in
Bernal, op. cit., 141-160; and a briefer account of it in 
Li, op. cit., 34-43. Hu wrote his article under the pseudo­
nym, "Min-i" ("The People’s Interest").
40. Hu, "To the Denouncers," 49 (1773).
41. Ibid., 102 (1826). These terms are emphasized in the original
text.
42. Hu,tkci; 58-59 (1782-1783).
43. Ibid., 64 (1788).
44. Loc, cit.
Ibid., 90 (1814).
Ibid., .126 (1850); Li, op. cit., 24.
For the triumph of anarchist ideas among Chinese student 
radicals in Japan, see Bernal, op. cit., 198-220.
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Chapter III
1. Schwartz, Benjamin, ed., Reflections on the May Fourth 
Movement: A Symposium, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1973). See the introduction by Schwartz, 1-13, 
especially 2-3.
2. Ibid., 6-7; Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intel­
lectual Revolution in Modern China, (Cambridge, Mass: Har­
vard University Press, 1960). This is tihe classic account 
of the May Fourth Movement. See in particular 300-313.
3. Chow, op. cit., 42-48; Bianco, Lucien, Origins of the 
Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1971), 33-35.
4. Chow, op. cit., 278-283; Bianco, op. cit., 32-33; Hu Han-min, 
letter published in the correspondence (t ’ung-hsin) section 
of CS, Volume I, Number 1, (August 1919), 195.
5. Meisner, Maurice, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marx­
ism, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 63-69.
6 . Chow, op. cit., chapter 4, 84-116, for the account of the 
demonstrations. For Hu Han-min’s observations, see Hu Han-min, 
"Lu-pang ti ch'un-chung hsin-li” ("Le Bon’s Crowd Psychology”), 
hereafter cited as ”Le Bon," CS, Volume I, Number 1, (August 
1919), 77-78.
7. Chang Ching-lu, Chung-kuo ch'u-pan shih-liao pu-pien 
(Supplement to Materials on Chinese Publications), (Peking, 
1957), .442.
8 . Loc.cit.
9. Wu-ssu shih-ch’i ch’i-k'an chieh-shao (Introduction to the 
Periodicals of the May Fourth Period), hereafter Introduction 
to Periodicals, (Peking, 1958). This two-volume collection 
was published under the auspices of the Marx-Engels-Lenin- 
Stalin Editorial and Research Office of the Chinese Commu­
nist Party. See Volume I, 114-117 for this reference.
10. Ibid., 115-116.
11. Bernstein, Gail Lee, Japanese Marxist; A"Portrait of Kawakami 
Hajime, 1879-1946, (Cambridge,.Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1976). A brief sketch of Kawakami’s Marxism at the time that 
Hu encountered it is to be found in chapter 7, "The Meaning
of Marxism,” 103-116, and chapter 8 , "Historical Materialism 
and Revolutionary Will,” 117-128.
12. Seligman, Edwin R.A., The Economic Interpretation of History, 
(New York: Columbia University Press; first edition 1902,
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paperback reprint 1961). The articles making up this book 
first appeared in the Political Science Quarterly, Volumes 
XVI and XVII (1901-1902). Edwin Seligman (1861-1939) was 
the first editor of The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 
His book on historical materialism had quite an impressive 
publishing history, being translated into the major west 
European languages, as well as into Japanese and even Armen­
ian.
13. Bernstein, op. cit., 39.
14. Ibid., 95.
15. Ibid., 109.
16. Ibid., 119-123.
17. Kawakami Hajime, "Ma-k’o-ssu ti wei-wu-shih-kuan,M O ’Marx’s 
Historical Materialism”) . The Ch’en-pao article was re­
printed in HCN, Volume 6 , Number 5, (May 1919), 509-516.
For this reference see 514, upper part. '
18. Ibid., 516, upper.
19. Ibid., 514, lower.
20. Ibid., 513, lower. For Marx’s Preface, see Feuer, Marx and
Engels, 83-87.
21. HCN, Volume 6 , Number 5, (May 1919), 1-2, for table of con­
tents .
22. Chow, op. cit., 244, note k.
23. Ku Meng-yu, "Ma-k’o-ssu hstteh-shuo” (’’Marxist Theory”),
HCN, Volume 6 , Number 5, (May 1919), 450-465. In particular 
note 452-458. The article is signed Ku Chao-hsiung.
24. Ibid., 455-456. The evaluation of historical materialism
is on 456, upper part
25. Li Ta-chao, "Wo-ti ma-k1o-ssu-chu-i kuan” ("My Marxist 
Views”), HCN, Volume 6 , Number 5, (May 1919), 521-537. See
also Meisner, op. cit., 91-95.
26. Li, op. cit., 527-530.
27. Rignano, Eugenio, Essays in Scientific Synthesis, (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1918). Rignano (1870-1930) first 
published this book in French in 1912. Chapter 7 is enti­
tled "Historic Materialism” (188-215).
28. Li, op. cit., 533, upper part, makes one mention of Rignano
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by name. About one-third of Li’s article is an exact trans­
lation of selected portions of Rignano*s chapter on histori­
cal materialism. This material carries the burden of Li’s 
argument. It should be noted that a different attitude to­
wards the identification of sources then prevailed in China, 
and Li may have felt that his solitary reference to Rignano 
was adequate.
29. Ibid., 532-533; Rignano, op. cit., 195-196 and 204. The 
most important of Engels’ letters are those to Joseph Bloch 
(September 22, 1890), Franz Mehring (July 14, 1893), and 
Heinz Starkenburg (January 25, 1894). See Feuer, op. cit., 
436-439 and 446-451.
30. Meisner, op. cit., 94-95.
31. Introduction to Periodicals, Volume I, 550-558, for the 
index to Hsing-ch’i p ’ing-lun. This periodical is not 
available outside the People’s Republic of China. Hu is 
listed as a contributor to a discussion about "the libera­
tion of women" (issue Number 8 , July 27, 1919).
32. Introduction, Volume II, 752-754 for the index to Chien-she.
There was a Volume III, Number 1 published in late 1920 but 
this did not involve the group to which Hu belonged. All 
the members of the Chien-she Society had followed Sun to
Canton. For a discussion of CS, see Introduction, Volume I,
221-234.
33. Ibid., 221; Chow, op. cit., 299, note c, for Li Ta-chao’s 
connection with CS. Sun Yat-sen had no editorial functions 
on the Kuomintang journals, but he contributed lengthy plans 
for the development of China’s harbours, railways and other 
means of communication.
34. Hu Han-min, "Meng-tzu ytl she-hui-chu-i" ("Mencius and Social­
ism"), CS, Volume I, Number 1, (August 1919), 157-168. This 
was later reprinted in a collection of six of Hu’s essays 
from Chien-she. See Huang Ch’ang-ku, ed., Wei-wu-shih-kuan 
yti lun-li chih yen-chiu (Studies on Historical Materialism 
and Ethics), (Shanghai, 1925), 155-178. The Huang edition 
of H u ’s 1919-1920 writings is used when available.
35. Hu Han-min, "Le Bon," 78. The editors of the Introduction 
to Periodicals completely distort Hu’s statements on the 
May Fourth movement. By tendentious selection, and by the 
implication that Le Bon's views were shared by Hu, they 
charge that Hu opposed the mass movement, and wanted to see 
it severely restricted in its scope (226-228). Whatever 
H u ’s later attitude towards the mass movements of the 1926- 
1927 period might have been, he certainly supported the 
struggles of the May Fourth period.
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36. Hu Han-min, "Chung-kuo che-^sileh shih chih wei-wu ti yen- 
chiu" ("A Materialistic Investigation of the History of 
Chinese Philosophy"), hereafter cited as "Philosophy," CS, 
Volume I, Number 3, (October 1919), 513-543; and CS, Volume I, 
Number 4, (November 1919), 655-691. Reprinted in Huang,
op. cit., 63-153.
37. Hu Han-min, "Ts’ung ching-chi ti chi-ch'u kuan-ch’a chia- 
tsu chih-tu" ("An Enquiry from an Economic Standpoint into 
the Family System), hereafter cited as "Family System," CS, 
Volume II, Number 4, (May 1920), 731-777; Huang, op. cit., 
243-306.
38. Hu Han-min, "Wei-wu-shih-kuan p ’i-p’ing chih p ’i-p’ing"
("A Criticism of Criticisms'of Historical Materialism"), 
hereafter cited as "A Criticism," CS, Volume I, Number 5, 
(December 1919), 945-989; Huang, op. cit,, 1-61. The Huang 
pagination is used here. Chow, op. cit., 298-299 makes the 
puzzling statement that this was "almost a direct rebuttal, 
point by point, of Li’s article." This is not the case, 
though Li’s earlier article may have inspired Hu to write
a more comprehensive and balanced study of historical mate­
rialism.
39. Hu Han-min, "Chieh-chi yU tao-te hslleh-shuo" ("Class and 
Theories of Morality"), hereafter cited as "Class and Moral­
ity," CS, Volume I, Number 6 , (January 1920), 1175-1190;
Huang, op. cit., 221-241.
40. Hu Han-min, "K’ao-tz’u-chi ti lun-li-kuan yii lo-li-ya ti 
lun-li-kuan" ("The Ethical Views of Kautsky and Loria"), 
hereafter cited as "Kautsky and Loria," CS, Volume II,
Number 6 , (August 1920), 1109-1139; Huang, op. cit,, 179-219.
41. Lichtheim, George, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961; paperback 1964).
See part five, "Marxian Socialism, 1871-1918" (203-301) for 
discussion of the development and character of the European 
social democratic movement.
42. Ibid., 244-258 on dialectical materialism. Note in particu­
lar 245-248. In his review of Lichtheim’s book Lewis Feuer 
stated that Lichtheim had understated the degree to which 
Marx himself was moving in the direction of equating his 
method with that of biological evolution. Whether or not 
this is defensible, it still remains true that Engels worked 
out the theory in detail. The Feuer review, "Marxism as 
History," is to be found in Survey, Number 41, (April 1962), 
176-185. See 178 for the above comment on dialectical mate­
rialism.
43. Engels, Frederick, Introduction to ’The Class Struggles in 
France, 1848 to 1850,’ hereafter cited as Class Struggles,
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in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works in Two 
Volumes, (Moscow, 1958), Volume II, 118-138.
44. Stekloff, G.M., History of the First International, (New 
York: Russell and Russell, 1968; first English edition 
published in 1928). See 240—241 for MarxTs speech to the 
Amsterdam branch of the International following the congress 
at The Hague.
45. Engels, Class Struggles, 129,
46. The potential of this aspect of Marxism was developed by Hu 
in 1927 when he stressed that violent revolution was not 
the sole path to change. By that time Hu had become aware 
of the Amsterdam speech, and its suggestion of a peaceful 
route to political power. See chapter VI.
47. Lichtheim, op. cit., 259-277 has a very good discussion of 
Kautsky.
48. Kautsky, Karl, The Social Revolution, (Chicago: Charles 
Kerr and Co,, 1912). See "The Concepts of Social Revolu­
tion," 5-20 and "Forms and Weapons of Social Revolution," 
84-102. In the latter section Kautsky mentions the misfor­
tune of the premature uprising of the Paris Commune. He 
also states that his own work is that of "investigating, 
not prophesying" (96-99).
49. Ibid., 9. See also the introduction by Robert Tucker to 
Kautsky1s The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program) , (New York: 
Norton Library, 1971; reprint of Kautskyfs 1892 text), 1-5.
50. Engels, Class Struggles, 128.
51. Lichtheim, op. cit., 290-300.
52. Kautsky, Karl, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of
History, hereafter cited as Ethics, (London: The Twentieth 
Century Press, Kautsky’s preface dated January 1906; English 
translation by J.B. Askew).
53. Hu, "A Criticism," 55.
54. Kautsky, Ethics, 53-63, for "The Social Instinct."
55. Ibid., 120-126, for "The Moral Ideal."
56. Hu, "A Criticism," 56.
57. Ibid., 55. In his article on Le Bon (88-89), Hu mentioned
that hitherto mankind had been ruled by superstition, but 
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